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Nation building is the process in question. This process is, as a rule, complicated 
in diverse countries, such as Kazakhstan. As a post-Soviet nation, it is still not 
sure how to define itself in the country and in the outside world. The crisis of 
the Kazakh identity is compromised by the manifold ethnic groups and cultures, 
juxtaposed by the clashes of Kazakh and Russian languages and different 
identities. In this regard, the role of cinema in the need for cultural certainty 
and the systematisation of national identity cannot be underestimated. Film is 
one way of offering knowledge of the nation to itself. Through cinema it is 
possible to imagine the history of the nation and construct modernity and to 
rebuild the nation.  
The current study investigates Kazakh cinema in transition. This thesis, for the 
first-time, provides an assessment of Kazakh cinema production after the 
adoption of the new Cinema Law (2019) and the Eurasia International Film 
Festival (EurIFF) within a nation-building context. Also, little work using a 
theoretical framework has been done on the relationship between Kazakh film 
and nation building within the wider discussion of nationalism. This thesis adds 
to this small body of work by addressing Kazakh cinema’s role in nation building. 
 
Through the analysis of Kazakh films framed through Anthony Smith’s ethno-
symbolism concept, this thesis will look at how Kazakhstan is trying to define 
itself through cinema, how Kazakh films aid the country to reconstruct itself. In 
order to critically analyse the current Kazakh cinema landscape, this thesis has 
adopted a qualitative approach, utilising semi-structured interviews with 30 
participants residing in the Kazakhstani cities of Almaty and Nur-Sultan.  
After carrying out my research in relation to the literature on nationalism and 
film studies, the analysis of the data establishes four primary themes. Firstly, I 
investigate Kazakh film policy, focusing on the way the Cinema Law may reshape 
the film industry in the country. Secondly, I consider the significance of the 
Eurasia International Film Festival (EurIFF) as well as the unusual challenges that 
this state-run festival had to face in order to organise itself effectively. The 
third theme explores the curation and programming of the festival, examining 
the festival’s approach to its audience and palette of films. Finally, in the fourth 
theme I demonstrate the influence of the film industry on both Kazakh cinema 
and the EurIFF with respect to image building.  
 
Today, not many countries have successful cases of nation building through 
films. Kazakhstan is no exception. I conclude that Kazakh cinema and film policy 
is situated in between the discords of the old system (Kazakhfilm) and the new 
(the State Centre for Support of National Cinema). This thesis shows that the 
impact of Kazakh cinema on nation building is limited. Ultimately, I argue that if 
Kazakhstan had a stronger business-oriented approach to film policy, both 
domestic and international markets would be more reachable. As a result, 




Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ......................................................................................... 2 
List of Tables ................................................................................... 6 
List of Figures .................................................................................. 7 
Dedication ...................................................................................... 9 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................... 10 
Author’s Declaration ........................................................................ 11 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................ 12 
1 Introduction ............................................................................ 14 
1.1 Why does cinematic nation building matter? ................................ 15 
1.2 Political institutionalisation and cultural policy in Kazakhstan ........... 18 
1.3 New film policy in Kazakhstan .................................................. 26 
1.4 Research aims and objectives .................................................. 26 
1.5 Limitations ......................................................................... 28 
1.6 Structure of the thesis ........................................................... 28 
2 Reimagining Kazakh nationalism .................................................... 31 
Introduction .................................................................................. 31 
2.1 Nation, cinema, and nation building .......................................... 31 
2.2 Kazakhstan’s nation-building history .......................................... 38 
2.2.1 Kazakhstan under colonialism ............................................. 39 
2.2.2 The collapse of the USSR ................................................... 43 
2.2.3 Independence ................................................................. 44 
2.3 Kazakh identity .................................................................... 45 
2.3.1 Kazakhstan, Kazakstan or Qazaqstan? .................................... 48 
2.4 Language ........................................................................... 49 
2.5 Tribalism............................................................................ 50 
2.6 Cinema .............................................................................. 52 
2.6.1 Different approaches to the development of Kazakh cinema........ 54 
2.6.2 Thematic approach .......................................................... 60 
2.6.3 Borat’s help ................................................................... 67 
Conclusion .................................................................................... 70 
3 Methodology ............................................................................ 72 
Introduction .................................................................................. 72 
3.1 Qualitative methodology ........................................................ 72 
3.2 Project history and the timeline ............................................... 73 
3.3 A case study approach ........................................................... 76 
3.4 The data collection ............................................................... 78 
3.4.1 Challenges ..................................................................... 79 
4 
 
3.4.2 Interviews ..................................................................... 81 
3.4.3 Observation and the research diary ...................................... 85 
3.5 Transcribing and translating data .............................................. 87 
3.6 Data analysis ....................................................................... 88 
3.7 Ethics ................................................................................ 89 
Conclusion .................................................................................... 90 
4 Kazakh cinema in transition ......................................................... 91 
4.1 Debates around the Cinema Law 2019 ........................................ 91 
4.2 The State Centre for Support of National Cinema: Kazakh Cinema ...... 94 
4.2.1 Statistical data and the new electronic ticket system ................ 97 
4.2.2 A new funding model compared to the old one ........................ 99 
4.2.3 The Expert Council: how crucial is the selection stage? ............. 105 
4.3 Issues in the distribution system .............................................. 114 
Conclusion ................................................................................... 120 
5 An examination of the EurIFF ...................................................... 123 
Introduction ................................................................................. 123 
5.1 The history of the festival movement in Kazakhstan ...................... 123 
5.1.1 The 15th Eurasia International Film Festival ........................... 125 
5.2 The festival’s reputation and how it is perceived ......................... 127 
5.3 Challenges ......................................................................... 132 
5.3.1 Announcing the dates ...................................................... 132 
5.3.2 Funding ....................................................................... 135 
5.3.3 Festival staff ................................................................. 140 
5.3.4 From Almaty to Astana. From Astana to Nur-Sultan? ................. 141 
Conclusion ................................................................................... 148 
6 The EurIFF’s programme and audience ........................................... 150 
Introduction ................................................................................. 150 
6.1 Programme ........................................................................ 150 
6.1.1 Curation ...................................................................... 151 
6.1.2 International jury ........................................................... 157 
6.2 Audience ........................................................................... 163 
6.2.1 Audience engagement in theatre-screened films ..................... 163 
6.2.2 The professional audience ................................................ 169 
6.2.3 Volunteers .................................................................... 170 
6.2.4 Participants .................................................................. 172 
Conclusion ................................................................................... 177 
7 National or international? The industry and Kazakh cinema .................. 179 
7.1 The industry element of EurIFF ............................................... 179 
7.1.1 The pitching of international projects .................................. 181 
5 
 
7.1.2 International producers .................................................... 188 
7.2 Rebates and tax incentives ..................................................... 192 
7.3 Co-production .................................................................... 197 
Conclusion ................................................................................... 206 
8 Conclusions ............................................................................ 209 
8.1 Findings ............................................................................ 210 
8.2 Implications for film policy..................................................... 216 
8.3 Limitations and further research .............................................. 218 
8.4 Concluding remarks .............................................................. 219 
Appendices .................................................................................. 221 





List of Tables 





List of Figures 
Figure 1 The map of Kazakhstan 16 
Figure 2 The monument of Zhanibek and Kerey khans in Nur-Sultan 38 
Figure 3 Alzhir museum depiction of the seizure of children 41 
Figure 4 The uprising in Almaty, 16-17 December, 1986 42 
Figure 5 Ethnic composition of Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2020 44 
Figure 6 The Monument of Independence in Almaty. The Scythian Golden Man 47 
Figure 7 Kazakh clan division. Three Zhuz 51 
Figure 8 Director Rashid Nugmanov and Viktor Tsoi on the set of the film The 
Needle (1989) 55 
Figure 9 Still from Allazhar: Akan Satayev in the role of Azat 57 
Figure 10 Still from Schizo (2004) by Gulshat Omarova 58 
Figure 11 The poster of The Road to Mother (2016) by World Wide Motion 
Pictures Corporation 59 
Figure 12 A DVD cover of Myn Bala: Warriors of the Steppe on Amazon 63 
Figure 13 Still from Tomiris (2019). The actress Almira Tursyn in a costume of 
the Saks (Scythian) tribe 64 
Figure 14 The poster of Kazakh Khanate: The Golden Throne (2019) by Rustem 
Abdirashev 66 
Figure 15 Still from Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit 
Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (2006) 68 
Figure 16 The poster of Nomad: the Warrior (2006) by Wild Bunch distribution 
company 69 
Figure 17 Project financing scheme by the SCSNC from 2019  102 
Figure 18 Members of the new EC and the SCSNC head staff voting for projects 
for a pitching session 112 
Figure 19 Parliament Deputy Bekbolat Tileukhan acting in the historical film The 
Kazakh Khanate: The Diamond Sword 113 
Figure 20 The number of national films at cinema theatres in Kazakhstan 118 
Figure 21 French actor Gérard Depardieu at the 10th EurIFF in 2010 126 
Figure 22 Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF. Nur-Sultan 131 
Figure 23 Chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, Andrey Khazbulatov, President of 
the EurIFF, Yermek Tursunov, Programme Director Eleonora Granata and 
Director of the Department of Culture and Art of the MCS, Abil Zholamanov 133 
Figure 24 Fans of the Turkish actor Burak Özçivit fight for selfies 138 
Figure 25 Khan Shatyr entertainment centre, designed by the British architect 
Norman Foster, Rixos President Astana hotel, Nur-Sultan 147 
Figure 26 A programme director of the 15th EurIFF Eleonora Granata at the 
press-conference, 28 June, 2019, in Nur-Sultan 152 
Figure 27 Main international jury members:  Hervé Schneid (France), Liu Zhe 
(China), Tamas Toth, the chairman (Hungary), with programme director Eleonora 
Granata and the president of the 15th EurIFF, Yermek Tursunov 159 
Figure 28 Still from The Secret of a Leader 162 
Figure 29 Chaplin Cinema in the Khan Shatyr 165 
Figure 30 Film screenings at the Chaplin Cinema 167 
Figure 31 Volunteers in red T-shirts at the festival 171 
Figure 32 British actor Martin Swabey, French actress Emilie Piponnier, 
Belorussian director Mitriy Semenov-Aleinikov and Uzbek director Shokir Kholikov
 173 
Figure 33 The participant Maira Karsakbayeva defending a project at the pitching 
session at the 15th EurIFF, Nur-Sultan 183 
8 
 
Figure 34 Six international jurors at a pitching session 184 
Figure 35 Georgina Surtees (Discovery, England), Rick Smotkin (The Third Circle, 
the USA), Julian Grimmond (Global Film Solutions, New Zealand), and Simona 
Roman Bhrlikova (Polite Rottweiler, the USA) 189 
Figure 36 A potential film location in the Mangystau region, Kazakhstan. 196 
Figure 37 The poster of the biopic The Composer (2019) by Kazakhstan and China
 202 
Figure 38 Signing the memorandum of cooperation by the SCSNC with GFM 
Production Studio (Georgia), "Uzbekfilm" (Uzbekistan), Kyrgyzfilm National Film 






In loving memory of my mother, Mariyam Hakimova, whose care and love I will 











First, I praise the Lord Almighty for His love and blessings in my most difficult 
times. I am thankful that He gave me a chance to study at Glasgow University. 
Without His support I would never be who I am today.  
 
My foremost gratitude goes to both my supervisors, Professor Philip Schlesinger 
and Dr Lynn Whitaker, whose supervision I was honoured to have. I am indebted 
for your valued supervisory assistance and keen critiques throughout my PhD 
journey. You also motivated me when I was lost in the maze of my PhD. I can say 
without hesitation that I reached this stage thanks to your patience and your 
strong belief in my capabilities. I am much obliged to you. From the bottom of my 
heart, I thank you!  
 
I am also indebted to my father, Professor Kaken Kamzin. You sacrificed so much 
for us and worked so hard. You encouraged me to continue when I felt exhausted. 
You supported me when I thought that there was no way to solve an issue. You 
showed me the way and I learned from your lessons in life. Father, I hope that I 
can make you proud of me. Also, I am thankful to you for free childcare when I 
was working on field trips. 
 
I am grateful to the JSC Center for International Programs and the Bolashaq 
Scholarship from the Kazakhstani government whose funding enabled me to do 
my Masters degree in 2011 and finish this thesis in 2021. I thank all citizens of 
Kazakhstan, whose taxes go to the Republic’s budget for supporting Kazakh 
students like me to study abroad. 
 
Thanks also to all my field work participants, who took part in the research and 
gave me transparent and thoughtful responses. It was an honour for me to 
interview each of you. Also, my sincere acknowledgments go to the scholars 
Robert Saunders and Rico Isaacs, who gave me useful insights for this thesis.  
 
Finally, I am similarly grateful to my dearest daughter, Fatima. You made my 
days in Scotland brighter and happier. You were my companion in this difficult 











This thesis represents the original work of Assel Kamza unless otherwise stated in 
the text. The research on which it was based was carried out at the University of 
Glasgow under the academic supervision of Professor Philip Schlesinger and Dr 










ABC American Broadcasting Company 
AFCI Association of Film Commissioners International 
APK Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan 
BAFTA British Academy of Film and Television Arts 
BFI British Film Institute 
CIFF Copenhagen International Film Festival 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
DW Deutsche Welle  
EC Expert Council 
EurIFF Eurasia International Film Festival 
FAMU Film and TV School of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague 
FCR Festa del Cinema di Roma 
FIAPF International Federation of Film Producers’ Associations 
FIPRESCI International Federation of Film Critics 
FTC Film Tax Credit 
GFF Gdynia Film Festival 
JSC Joint stock company 
MAI Monthly accounting index 
MCH Ministry for Culture and Heritage of New Zealand 
13 
 
MCS Ministry of Culture and Sport 
MFA Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
MFAT Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand 
MIFF Moscow International Film Festival 
MRC Movie Research Company 
NETPAC Network for the Promotion of Asian Cinema 
NZFC New Zealand Film Commission 
RK The Republic of Kazakhstan 
SCSNC State Centre for Support of National Cinema 
Sovnarkom Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR 
TAT Tourism Board of Thailand 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UK United Kingdom 
UKFC UK Film Council 
USA United States of America 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VGIK Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography 





This thesis will examine nation building and the role of cinema within 
Kazakhstan by focusing on post-Soviet films and reforms in film policy in 
transition. Its purpose is to explore the complicated relationship between 
government bodies and filmmakers and the overall impact of these tensions on 
nation building. The aim is to apply this theme to the study of film policy as a 
dimension of cultural policy.  
In order to understand film policy in Kazakhstan, this thesis explores the role of 
key actors and relevant legislative acts. As is detailed in subsequent chapters, 
the new model of Kazakh cinema production after the reform of the cinema 
industry is studied in relation to the old model. This thesis looks at Kazakh 
cinema as “a useful analytical lens to reveal the political and contentious nature 
of nation-building” (Isaacs, 2018, p.253). The old Soviet system coexists with a 
reformed system of film policy in Kazakhstan. In other words, archaic traditions 
reflecting an old-style Kazakh mentality of tribalism, corruption, and 
bureaucracy do not accept the new, post-Soviet, film policy with its cardinal 
reforms. Secondly, this thesis brings to light the fact that different forces such 
as government bodies and film producers are fighting each other over who 
controls the system. This thesis will argue that cinema has been, and is, a 
nation-building instrument for both Soviet and post-Soviet Kazakhstan in uniting 
the Kazakh nation and in helping the nation to self-define. However, I argue that 
this power struggle between the old and new systems does not allow the film 
industry to progress rapidly.  
This thesis will find that there is an attempt to modernise and to reach the 
market outside Kazakhstan by a small expansion of the distribution system. If 
Kazakhstan could have gotten rid of the film industry’s old institutions, the 
domestic and international markets would have been more easily accessible. As 





1.1 Why does cinematic nation building matter? 
The notion of nation building in Kazakhstan became very distinct and relevant 
following independence in 1991. The country was one of the most vulnerable 
countries in social, economic and cultural terms. Initially, the country struggled 
with poverty, the establishment of its own currency and an economic crisis. The 
dissolution of the USSR left Kazakhstan a country known for little apart from a 
Soviet stigma. Since the end of the 1990s, it has attempted to gain leverage as a 
Eurasian country positioned on the two continents, working through its Turkic, 
Muslim, Nomad, and post-Soviet identities. It can be said that this Central Asian 
country had no alternative but to define itself within ethnically derived 
nationalism in the 21st century, given its specific ethnic composition (Saunders, 
2007, p.227). As it has over 130 ethnic groups and over 60 per cent of them are 
Kazakh (www.stat.gov.kz), multiethnicity became a crucial factor in the 
decision-making process of political, social, and cultural policy (see Figure 5). 
That is why the “construction of national-self” (Isaacs, 2018, p.1), the so-called 
national self-identification in the post-Soviet period, was problematic, given 
Kazakhstan’s diverse cultures. Moreover, as a post-colonial nation, Kazakhstan 
also has its own distinctive traits, having inherited a complex political system 
and language. Tensions between the Kazakh and Russian languages go hand in 
hand with the transition into the state’s new regime in 2019-2020, which 
resulted in a new political and social situation.  
 
So, Kazakhstan faced a two-way challenge: creating its image internally (within 
the country) and promoting it externally (globally) as “film has indeed become a 
subtle yet powerful tool for dissemination of a nation’s self-image domestically 
and internationally” (Yunis, 2014, p.50). Here one can clearly see the 
connection between the interrelated processes in the projection of the nation, 
so to speak, in nation branding and nation building (Waśkiel, 2019). Therefore, 
film is a tool for the projection of nationhood to local and foreign audiences at 
the same time. On the one hand, the reputation of a country plays a vital role in 
its “progress and prosperity” (Anholt, 2010, p.2), in social, political, economic, 
and cultural terms. On the other hand, as Mikos (2014, p.410) argues, “people 
use films to shape their own identities as well as their social relations”. Here 
one can see that nation building through films underpins people to self-define, 
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Figure 1 The map of Kazakhstan. www.voanews.com. 
 
 
Despite its rich historical background, few countries know about Kazakhstan’s 
geographical location, which is one of the fundamental problems (Waśkiel, 2019) 
(see Figure 1). That is why for a country that has a bad reputation, or does not 
have any, it is hardly ever possible for it to compete on the world stage to 
attract international attention (van Ham, 2001). Whenever Kazakhstan was 
presented in Western media through clichés such as yurts, the vast steppe, the 
Aral Sea disaster and the Baikonur Cosmodrome (Fauve, 2015), marketing “the 
self” was essential. As one of five new “Stans” in Central Asia (see Figure 1),1 
Kazakhstan’s case has become even more complicated by “brand confusion” in 
the global arena (Saunders, 2008, p.67). The whole spectrum of Kazakhstan’s 
population feels uncomfortable when the country is classified alongside 
Afghanistan to the south due to its very different history and socio-economic 
development (Ibid). In an attempt to escape being associated with instability 
and terrorism, in 2014, the former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, during a 
visit to the Atyrau region to meet with the local community, suggested changing 
                                         
1 Not to mention Afghanistan, Pakistan, as well as other sub-national units in the world, such as 
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Karakalpakstan. 
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the name Kazakhstan to Kazak Eli (State of the Kazakhs) (Azattyq, 2014). 
Although discussed in social media by social activists, his proposal was not 
widely accepted or developed further publicly (Waśkiel, 2019). This leaves the 
potential renaming of the country up in the air, with the likelihood of possible 
change in the future, and further “brand” confusion along with it. 
 
However, as Kotler and Gertner (2002, p.250) point out, states which do not 
deliberately brand their country can still produce and generate perceptions in 
people’s minds, even if they are negative. For example, for many, just 
mentioning Turkmenistan, North Korea, or Sudan immediately suggests 
dictatorships. On the other hand, positive perceptions or images can push people 
to buy, invest or travel. In this respect, the media and the entertainment 
industry, and cinema in particular, play a vital role in shaping public perceptions 
of a country (Kotler and Gertner, 2002, p.251; Waśkiel 2019, p.52). In this 
respect, Kazakhstan became vulnerable after the release of the Borat 
mockumentary.   
Sasha Baron Cohen’s 2006 film, Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make 
Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan undermined Kazakhstan’s efforts to 
establish an international reputation, although previously the country had 
treated its international image carelessly (see section 2.6.3). The information 
war between the country’s officials and Cohen continued for a couple of years. 
Since then, no amount of money could enable the Kazakhstan authorities to rid 
the country of associations with the film’s eponymous fictional journalist 
character, Borat. The image of the country was hit, and Kazakhstan was 
categorised as a “laughable nation” in academic literature (Saunders, 2017, 
p.159). On the other hand, the fictitious Borat may also have turned Kazakhstan 
into an international brand (Marat, 2009). Or, to put it another way, the film 
helped the country’s cinema to develop and became free advertising for 
tourism. 
In order to understand the Kazakhstani nation-building context, it is crucial to 
explain the political and institutional system and how state bodies undertake 





1.2 Political institutionalisation and cultural policy in 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is an oil- and gas-rich authoritarian state. The presidential system 
and hierarchical and vertical institutionalisation of authority duplicates the 
power distribution under the Communist Party. Those who were the leaders of 
the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union became 
the first presidents of the independent republics of Central Asia: Saparmurat 
Niyazov (Turkmenistan), Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan) and Nursultan Nazarbayev 
(Kazakhstan) (Isaacs, 2011). After the collapse of the USSR, Nazarbayev ruled 
the state for almost three decades, which can be called the Nazarbayev era. The 
cult of personality, similar to neighbouring Turkmenistan, appears in naming 
streets, the capital city, the international university and the airport after him as 
well as erections of monuments across Kazakhstan. According to Isaacs (2010), 
Nazarbayev was regarded as Papa, Elbasy [Head of the nation], Father of the 
Kazakhstani nation, who was capable of facing the challenges of building an 
independent state. Also, he was seen as a symbol of the nation, a warrant of 
stability, prosperity and peace.  
 
Nazarbayev’s resigning in March 2019 can be seen as a “half-departure” (Isaacs, 
2020, p.5), because he still has political control as Chairman of the Security 
Council and remains the central figure in the country. His long-term presidency 
allowed Nazarbayev to adjust the political system in the country to his interests 
and those of his closest allies (Zhiltsov and Zonn, 2019). The opposition 
movements and mass media which criticise his power are subject to repression. 
 
The legislative power of the state is exercised by two chambers of parliament: 
Mazhilis – a lower chamber, and the Senate – an upper chamber. The Mazhilis 
consists of 107 deputies, 98 of whom are elected from party lists. Nine deputies 
are chosen by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK) within the APK 
itself (see below). The Senate deputies are elected by the deputies of regional, 
district and city Maslikhats (local representative bodies) on the basis of indirect 
election, not by ordinary voters (two representatives from each region, capital, 
and two major cities) (Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazahstan, 1995). Fifteen 
members are appointed by the president. The term of office of Mazhilis deputies 
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is five years, whereas Senate deputies are in office for six years 
(www.parlam.kz).  
 
The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan – a unique institution in the post-
Soviet world – is fully funded by the state. Established by Nazarbayev in 1995, it 
represents the interests of more than 800 ethnic and cultural associations in the 
country (Melich and Adibayeva, 2013). The APK’s activity is regulated by the Law 
on the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (2008 with the amendments in 2018 
and 2020), which states as its aim that it “ensures effective interaction of state 
bodies, organisations and civil society in the field of interethnic relations, 
creating favourable conditions for further strengthening social harmony and 
national unity” (Zakon Respubliki Kazahstan ob Assamblee Naroda Kazahstana, 
2020). Permitting the APK nine seats in Parliament, which was possible after a 
number of amendments to the constitution in 2007, can be considered as an 
attempt to regulate interethnic relations by the Nazarbayev regime (Melich and 
Adibayeva, 2013). On one hand, this significantly increased the social and 
political role of the APK, which is, nonetheless, totally subordinate to the 
current political regime. On the other hand, it can be assumed that sharing 
constitutional power with the APK was done not only to keep interethnic 
harmony, but to secure the electoral votes of more than 130 ethnic minorities 
for the ruling regime in Kazakhstan (see section 2.2.3 and Figure 5). 
Furthermore, the guaranteed representation of the APK members in parliament 
without the requirement of meeting a seven per cent threshold in election goes 
against real political competition. The general electorate does not vote for APK 
candidates, instead APK members select their candidates on a separate day. This 
creates an imbalance of power, competitiveness, and decision-making.  
The electoral system does not allow for individuals or self-nominated candidates 
to participate in elections. However, the establishment of a party is 
complicated. Parties are allowed to register if they have at least 600 members in 
each of 14 regions (Isaacs, 2011). Since 1999, the party system has been 
dominated by the ruling Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland), the party of power. Nur 
is the first syllable of Nazarbayev’s name – Nursultan. After previously being 
called Otan, the party became Nur Otan in 2006 and it was soon fashionable to 
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rename companies, firms, and schools in the same way to show commitment and 
loyalty to the ruling regime.  
Other parties in Kazakhstan, independent from the president, are based 
on factional groups of elites. They represent and protect business and/or 
political interests of factional elite groups, or alternatively provide a 
platform for a personal ambition of a famous public figure. (Isaacs, 2011, 
p.40) 
 
These “puppet” parties were set up only to give the impression that Kazakhstan 
has a multiparty system. They do not have a stable and continuous nature as in 
the USA, the United Kingdom or Germany. For instance, by 2008, parties on the 
political landscape were divided into: “pro-presidential” – Rukhaniyat (Rebirth), 
the Party of Patriots; “soft” – Adilet (Justice), Ak Zhol (Bright Path), Auyl 
(Village), the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; and “hard” opposition – the All-
National Social Democratic Party and Alga (Forward) (Bowyer, 2008). Most of 
them were set up and disintegrated or combined with others in a short period of 
time and did not last long.   
 
Since the last parliamentary elections in 2016, the Nur Otan party won almost as 
many seats as in previous votes, with 84 members out of 107 in the parliament. 
The two other parties, Ak Zhol and the Communist People’s Party, won seven 
seats each. When it comes to making decisions, the latter two never contradict 
Nur Otan on the majority of issues. The other three registered parties – the 
National Social Democratic Party, Auyl and Birlik (Unity) could not cross the 7 
per cent threshold for seats (BTI country report, 2020). The case when no 
deputies voted against the law could be seen during the discussion of the Cinema 
Law in September 2018 (see section 4.1).  
 
One may argue that the Mazhilis and the entire political system of Kazakhstan is 
closely connected with clan identity. Deputies work for the various interests of 
groups on behalf of clans and rich oligarchs (see section 2.5). Real oppositional 
parties do not exist and the country can be described as “hyper-presidential” 
(Ambrosio and Lange, 2015, p.539). As Isaacs (2011, pp.36-37) notes, “the law is 
construed by officials at the Ministry of Justice in such a way as to impede the 
registration process of political parties that the ruling regime is wary of seeing 
active in the political process. The law is applied in an active sense to deter the 
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formation of political parties which oppose the current regime of Nursultan 
Nazarbayev.” Therefore, the parliament lacks independence.  
 
Nonetheless, Kazakhstan is trying to take tiny steps towards democratic nation- 
building. The second president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, made several 
amendments to the legislation in 2019 providing the introduction of 
parliamentary opposition and a 30 per cent quota in party lists for youth and 
women (Vlast.kz, 2020). Six parties were registered in Kazakhstan for the 
Mazhilis elections in 10-11 January, 2021: Nur Otan, Auyl, Adal (Honest, 
formerly Birlik), Ak Zhol (White Path), the National Social Democratic Party and 
the People’s Party (formerly the Communist People’s Party) (Kumenov, 2020).  
 
In 2017, radical constitutional reform was implemented in Kazakhstan, which 
was supposed to shift some responsibilities from the president to the executive 
power – government and parliament. For example, ministers can be removed 
from office by parliament. Also, the president must appoint the ministers at the 
prime minister’s recommendation. However, these amendments have not been 
realised in practice (BTI country report, 2020). 
 
The objectives of cultural policy are determined by the “two presidents” – the 
“Tokayev-Nazarbayev tandem” (Isaacs, 2020, p.2) – and announced in live, 
annual addresses to the Kazakhstani people as well as through comprehensive 
and extensive articles in the media. These addresses are transformed into 
planned goals, which are implemented by the ministries and local Akimats (city 
councils). Government, on the basis of these presidential speeches and articles, 
introduced several concepts and projects, such as Kazakhstan: 2030, Mangilik El 
(Eternal Nation) and the Top 50 Developed States, which provided directions for 
the course of development in different spheres (Sharipova, 2019). Another one 
of the most important programmes implemented by the state was Cultural 
Heritage (2004). Its goal was to research, restore and preserve the historical and 
cultural heritage of the country, reviving the historical and cultural traditions as 




Kazakhstan started moving to adopt the Latin alphabet (see section 2.4) after 
Nazarbayev’s article, Course Towards the Future: Modernisation of Kazakhstan’s 
Identity in 2017. In this article Nazarbayev (2017, n.p.) states:  
 
Hollywood played a major role in ensuring the success for the U.S. during 
the “cold war”. If we want to be a nation with a unique place in the 
global map of the 21st century, we should implement one more project – 
Modern Kazakh Culture in the Global World. […] Our national traditions 
and customs, language, music, and literature, in one word, our national 
spirit should remain with us forever. […] When one talks about the impact 
of foreign ideological influences, we should keep in mind these cover 
certain values, cultural symbols of other nations. Only our own national 
symbols can oppose them.  
 
Here, Smith’s concept of ethno-symbolism, described in section 2.1, is 
pertinent. Cultural policy is based on the difference of national values. Kazakh 
nation building is evolving through national symbols. All these symbols can be 
found in cinema, which has been used to decolonise the Kazakh memory that 
was heavily influenced by Soviet and Russian culture.  
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned article, the government developed the 
programme Rukhani Zhangyru (Spiritual Modernisation) (Burkhanov, 2020). One 
of the tasks that was set up was the creation of the National Digital Film 
Collection Film Fund. The film fund keeps 7,010 units of films produced by the 
Kazakhfilm studio. It has 15,122 units altogether, including the archives on CIS 
countries and other foreign films (anonymous interviewee, personal 
correspondence, February 2019). This task has been implemented by the Kazakh 
Research Institute of Culture over three years and was a part of the Digital 
Kazakhstan (2017) national programme as well. Also, Kazakh Cinema days were 
held in the USA and Italy with the screening of seven domestic films within the 
Spiritual Modernisation programme (Inform.kz, 2018).   
 
The role of biographical films as a part of nationalistic discourse in constructing 
the nation is enormous (Kumar, 2014). ‘Biopic’, an anglo-american term, can be 
described as one of the earliest genres in the history of cinema (Landy, 2010). 
According to Bingham’s (2010, p.10) analysis, it is a “genuine, dynamic genre 
and an important one” that has come to define the Hollywood era. In the 1930s, 
the biopic, as a source of historical facts, acquired a new appeal more 
associated with genres such as epics, gangster films, war films and westerns 
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(Landy, 2010), as cinema became more commercialised (Vidal, 2010). As Kumar 
(2014, p.39) puts it, by using different narrative strategies such as ‘otherness’, 
visualisation of national boundaries, ‘glorification of hyper-masculinity’ and 
thematic concerns, contemporary biopics deliver the ‘myth of nationhood’ and a 
feeling of national pride. 
 
The personality cult described earlier still persists in Kazakh cinema through 
biographical pictures dedicated to Nazarbayev. Sheehan (2010, pp.35-36) lucidly 
discusses how living personalities filled the entire genre of biopics after 2005: 
 
A recent surge of biographical pictures have cast living figures into a genre 
heretofore reserved for dead ones, displacing the present from itself 
through a historicizing representation that remembers the still-living. […] 
The coincidence of the present as both past and enduring within these 
films, elaborates the collapsed distance between the actual and 
information that attains its own reality: a collapse that ultimately accounts 
for the fatalism in each narrative.2 
 
These narratives of ‘instant’ biopics (Ibid) of still-living figures are present in the 
films about Nazarbayev. By the order of the presidential administration, the 
Ministry of Culture and Sport, along with Kazakhfilm, produced six extremely 
expensive feature films: The Sky of My Childhood (2011) biopic portrays his 
childhood. The follow-up to this feature was a series of four epics. The Leader’s 
Way: Fiery River (2013) tells the story of the student years of Nazarbayev and the 
formation of his personality. The Leader’s Way: Iron Mountain (2013) tells the 
story of Nazarbayev’s career path from simple metallurgist to secretary of the 
party committee of the metallurgical plant in Karagandy. Breaking the Vicious 
Circle (2014) describes how he went into politics and made efforts to solve the 
burning issues of the industry at the formation stage. The last in the series, The 
Stars Have Aligned (2016), depicts the rise of Kazakhstan from 1984 to 1991, 
accentuating the president’s role in gaining independence and his initiatives. The 
final feature, The Leader’s Way, Astana (2018) is a story of the construction of 
the new capital, Astana. In the film, Nazarbayev’s proposal to move the capital 
faces opposition and indignation in Almaty. Despite this, the government works 
                                         
2 Films in this category are The Queen (2006) about Queen Elizabeth II, and W. (2008), portrayal 




hard to relocate the capital to the provincial town, Akmola (see sections 2.1 and 
2.2.3). Currently, Kazakhfilm is working on a sequel The Leader’s Way: At the 
Epicenter of the World, started in 2018. The film will describe the history of 
development of the young capital, Astana, from 1994 to present day. It is a rare 
example in world cinema of six biopics in a row being dedicated to the same 
person. The scripts of both films were written by Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, graduate 
of VGIK, the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography in Moscow, who worked as 
head of the presidential administration between 2016 and 2018. Thus, cinema as 
a nation-building tool draws the elite’s attention in Kazakhstan. A second 
interesting fact is that the actor who played Nazarbayev’s role in the films The 
Leader’s Way: Fiery River (2013), The Leader’s Way: Iron Mountain (2013) and 
Breaking the Vicious Circle (2014), Nurlan Alimzhanov, became a Mazhilis deputy 
after being awarded the title of Honoured Worker, continuing his career on the 
Committee for Social and Cultural Development. Therefore, from these examples, 
one can see the interaction between Kazakh cinema and nation building. If “the 
biopic is a form that itself is about self-identification and self-invention […] it is 
also about identification with others” (Bingham, p.378), by portraying 
Nazarbayev’s life, the ruling power aims to reinvent and reimagine the history of 
the whole nation as ‘life-writing cannot be separated from nation-writing’ (Vidal, 
p.23).   
 
For the films about the new capital, the producers invited the British make-up 
artist Mark Coulier, Oscar and BAFTA winner for The Grand Budapest Hotel 
(2014) and The Iron Lady (2011) to replicate the exact make-up, hair styles and 
costumes of particular political figures of 1990s Kazakhstan. These facts support 
Vidal’s (2010, p.11) argument that “the biopic trades on a sense of 
authenticity”. Consequently, the budget of the above films is extremely high. 
For example, the government allocated ₸3 2.3 billion (which is over $6.8 million, 
or £4,113,900)4 just for the last film, The Leader’s Way: at the Epicentre of the 
World (Azarov, 2017). This is more than one third of the annual budget, ₸7.5 
billion, ($17,615,640, or £13,467,000) requested by the Ministry of Culture and 
Sport for film production during the defence of the Cinema Law in parliament in 
                                         
3 The symbol of Kazakhstan’s currency – tenge. 
4 I have calculated all amounts in USD ($) and GBP (£) at the prevailing rate.  
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September 2018 (see section 4.2.2). The deputies of Mazhilis described the 
annual budget for the production of new films as “too much”, whereas just one 
film about the authoritarian leader was funded without any obstacles or 
discussion by the government.  
 
Reproducing myths about the nation’s founding fathers is one way of narrating 
the story of the nation (Kumar, 2014). In the Soviet Union, movies served as the 
main tool of propaganda and the ‘monstrous “cult of personality”’ developed in 
pictures such as Lenin in October (1937), Lenin in 1918 (1939) and The Fall of 
Berlin (1949). Moreover, since the 1940s, every Soviet film had to include the 
visual image of Stalin (Christie, 2002, pp.294-295). A parallel example is South 
Korean heroic biopics that demonstrate the success and performance of leaders 
who save the nation from foreign invasion or starvation (Hwang, 2010). Similarly, 
the biopics of Kazakhstan’s cinema created and promoted Nazarbayev’s image as 
saviour of the Kazakhs. The Kazakhstani government intended to make people 
reimagine Kazakh history in the way the ruling powers wanted them to. One 
example can be found in the scene on the uprising against Russian ruler 
Gennadiy Kolbin in 1986 (see section 2.2.1) in the film The Stars Have Aligned 
(2016), where Nazarbayev is shown as compassionate to rebels, which is 
disputable. In fact, Nazarbayev went out into a crowd and asked them to 
disperse, saying that he supported Kolbin’s appointment. After these words, he 
was pelted with snowballs (Akiner, 1995, p.55). The true story of the protest is 
only shown in Allazhar released in 1993 (see section 2.6.1), which was banned in 
Kazakhstan. This is an example of what Kumar (2014, p.41) would describe as 
‘historical (re) writing’ through the subjective lens of the figure’s individual 
accomplishments. Although one may argue that, “at the heart of the biopic is 
the urge to dramatize actuality and find in it the filmmaker’s own version of 
truth” (Bingham, 2010, p.10), this genre can be problematic in Kazakhstan 
because, as Vidal (2010, pp.1-2) concludes, as it is “often cavalier in its handling 
of historical fact and mired in its own sense of self-importance, the biopic 
commands as much critical derision as industrial visibility”. Hence, how close 
the above-mentioned biopics are to historical fact is controversial.  
 However, the main message that the authorities wanted to disseminate through 
this cult-of-personality film was the following: in the film a British journalist 
asks Nazarbayev how long he intends to remain as the head of Kazakhstan. 
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Nazarbayev answers: “As long as the people wish”. This message sounds like an 




1.3 New film policy in Kazakhstan 
Given the government’s role is so central to nation building on so many levels, 
this is this study’s main focus. Isaacs (2018, p.15) argues that, “the government 
is using film as an ideological tool to present its interpretation of history and its 
vision of Kazakhstan’s nationhood to domestic and international audiences”. But 
how successful is such an ideological policy? It was difficult to answer this 
question until Kazakhstan adopted its Cinema Law and launched a new State 
Centre for Support of National Cinema (SCSNC) to operate the film policy in 
Kazakhstan in 2019. After that, the issue of using cinema in nation building 
became more relevant because film has really started to occupy a central place 
in Kazakhstan’s cultural policy as one of the vehicles to create a national 
representation of a way of life.  
 
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
Kazakh cinema is not a new object of study. Up until now, in the literature – 
because of the earlier need to assert Kazakhstan’s independence – few 
researchers considered Kazakh cinema from a nation-building perspective 
(Isaacs, 2015; 2016; 2018; Abikeyeva, 2006; 2013). Thus, little attention has 
been paid to the projection of Kazakhstan through cinema (except Waśkiel, 
2019; Yessenova, 2011; Yessenova, 2015) within a wider nation-building 
discourse or how Kazakhstan can be marketed through cinema. Put differently, 
cinema’s influence on the country’s image as a part of nation building at both a 
domestic and an international level is unique but woefully neglected.   
The scope of this thesis is the critical analysis of Kazakh cinema’s transition from 
when the country gained independence in 1991 up to 2020 and the launch and 
operation of a new body to regulate film policy in Kazakhstan. The aim of this 
thesis has been to investigate the modern Kazakh film landscape by gathering 
evidence from the film industry itself to see how the Kazakh nation is 
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constructed and imagined through film. The research has been carried out by 
using a case study approach. Kazakh cinema itself will act as a broad case study, 
the umbrella, if you like, beneath which I will focus on my two specific case 
studies of Kazakh cinema production and the Eurasian International Film Festival 
(EurIFF). The studies will be considering various aspects of film such as features, 
distribution, management, and festival organisation. 
 
A second aim is to explore the post-Soviet transition period of Kazakh film policy 
and the film industry itself, connecting past, present and future by applying 
theories of nationalism to the Kazakhstani situation. This part of the research 
has underpinned the understanding of the primary material as well as theoretical 
concepts used in this thesis (see Chapter 2). 
 
Thirdly, it should be acknowledged that Kazakh cinema is often researched 
together with other Central Asian film industries (for instance, Abikeyeva 2001; 
2003) given they share the same geographical region. Additionally, these studies 
tend to be descriptive, focusing on images of woman, man, child, and family in 
Kazakh films as well as on problems of film distribution. This has resulted in a 
restricted and limited view of Kazakh cinema. It is worth noting that the case of 
EurIFF, which is full of confusion and pitfalls, is also explored here from a 
nation-building perspective for the first time. There are no academic works on 
the Kazakh festival and its difference from other film events globally. This is an 
academic, theoretical gap which this thesis aims to fill. Furthermore, the 
combination of the above factors influenced the choice of the EurIFF as a second 
and illuminating case study. 
 
This study seeks to shed light on the following three core research questions: 
 
1. Who takes the decisions in the Kazakh cinema industry and who controls 
it?  
2. To what extent does EurIFF contribute to nation building and the 
projection of the nation?  
3. What is the role of Kazakh cinema in nation building?   
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To that end, a qualitative research method has been used. A case study 
approach as an empirical method was possible thanks to desk research, semi-
structured interviews, observation, and field research (see Chapter 3).   
1.5 Limitations 
It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to explore all film genres in depth. It 
will only focus on a brief exploration of the main ones. Nor will it cover the 
representation of Kazakhstan in international movies (Frigerio, 2017). The only 
exception to this will be Borat because it affected the overall image of the 
country and influenced the course of its tourism policy (see section 2.6.3). 
The focus of the research will be the period of the new millennium age. 
However, the Soviet and post-Soviet historical background will facilitate a more 
profound understanding of these two Kazakh case studies. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Following on from this introduction, Chapter 2 frames the research by reviewing 
theories of nationalism and attempts to define concepts of national cinema. In 
particular, it explores in detail the connection between nation and nation 
building, and between cinema and nation building. Also, the chapter will focus 
on the concepts of Hollywood’s hegemony and the Kazakh state’s policy of 
protecting the national market. Furthermore, I critique the relevant historical 
moments. I limit history to the most significant contemporary events. 
Contentious issues such as the Kazakh language, national identity and religion 
will constitute part of a brief outline of the cultural context after Kazakhstan 
became an independent country in 1991. In addition, this chapter examines 
Kazakh cinema history to establish a historical, nation-building context to this 
Kazakh case study.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the project’s history and timeline before moving on to 
explain the qualitative methodology applied in this thesis. The chapter will 
justify the case-study approach and will explain the rationale behind using a 
combination of semi-structured interviews, participant observation and a 
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research diary. After that, it lays out the obstacles and challenges, ethics, and 
approach to transcribing data in conducting the research.  
 
Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the analysis stage of this study. It takes a close 
look at Kazakh cinema in transition, i.e., before and after January 2019, when 
the new Cinema Law took full effect and divided cinema’s life in Kazakhstan into 
two parts: before and after. This chapter will uncover a number of themes: a 
comparison of the old and new systems of state funding and distribution; Kazakh 
cinema’s lack of independence and, finally, the contradictory relations between 
cinema theatres and distributors. The chapter will also investigate the activity 
of the State Centre for Support of National Cinema (SCSNC), critically analysing 
the role of the Expert Council (EC) in the selection of potential projects for 
funding. 
 
Chapter 5 looks at the specific case of EurIFF to consider factors that may have 
influenced festival development and ultimately nation building in Kazakhstan. 
The empirical evaluation of the festival looks closely at the event’s various 
challenges, such as the late funding and announcement of its dates as well as 
moving the festival from traditional Almaty to the new capital, Astana, in 2017. 
It looks at the political, economic, and cultural reasons for this. As this thesis 
unfolds, this study opens up a discussion on how changing the venue of the event 
and renaming the capital Astana as Nur-Sultan in 2019 affected the image of the 
festival and, consequently, the projection of Kazakhstan itself. 
 
The thesis then turns to the festival programme and audiences, with Chapter 6 
considering how EurIFF functions in relation to its audience as well as the role of 
curators in selecting content. The chapter shifts its focus to how programming 
and audience perception has shaped Kazakhstan’s image. 
 
In Chapter 7, the final findings discuss the industry component of the festival 
and Kazakh cinema as a whole. It explains the role of the stakeholder, the 
SCSNC, in facilitating the film industry with tax-rebate schemes and launching 
new film commissions across the country. This chapter also includes an analysis 




Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by highlighting its essential empirical findings 
and pulling together the main themes in the conceptual chapters in relation to 
the research questions. Then, it discusses the implications of the results. Finally, 





2 Reimagining Kazakh nationalism 
Introduction 
Theories of nationalism are relevant to the analysis of Kazakh cinema in 
transition. Taking the concept of ethno-symbolism as my starting point, I will 
review the relationship between nation building and theories of nationalism. I 
will argue that national identity, as a “visual representation” (Smith, 2002, p.45) 
of the nation, stands out in films with ethnic symbolism. 
After, this the chapter will lay out the framework for the role of cinema in 
nation building in relation to the representation and image of the country. It is 
essential, at the same time, to place Kazakhstan in its historical context because 
history is “a crucial player in the construction of a nation” (Hayward, 2000, 
p.90). Therefore, this chapter will make an attempt to outline Kazakh nation-
building history by examining the main historical events relevant to the creation 
of the Kazakh Khanate, as well as the history of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-
Soviet Kazakhstan because these events influenced the construction of the 
nation and changed the consciousness of the Kazakh people.  
Furthermore, this chapter will delineate Kazakh identity after 1991, paying 
attention to barriers that had to be overcome in the course of creating that 
national identity. The role of symbolism and language issues are also covered, 
given the influence they have on the cultural development of a country. 
This chapter will next provide a detailed outline of the various stages of Kazakh 
cinema, concluding with the significant impact of the Borat mockumentary on 
Kazakhstan’s image.  
2.1 Nation, cinema, and nation building 
The term nation building was coined by American researchers (Karl Deutsch, 
Charles Tilly, Reinhard Bendix) in the 1950 and 1960s. Since then, it has often 
been used with concepts of nationalism, national consciousness, and national 
self-identification. Currently, there are several theories of nationalism that 
analyse the nation-building process (Abikeyeva, 2006). The key debate in nation 
building is between modernism, where the nation is seen as a political, 
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constructed concept (Ernest Gellner, Rogers Brubaker), and primordialism, 
where the nation is recognised as the primordial identity and the basis of social 
structures is ethnicity (Walker Connor, Anthony Smith). Connor (1994), per 
contra to modernists, defined nationalism based on ethno-primordial claims.  He 
argued that post-colonial states had very strong ethnic identities. Indeed, I 
argue that the Kazakhs as a nation pre-date the USSR and the post-Soviet state. 
Accordingly, they have a strong ethnic identity that needs to be revived and 
rebuilt.  
The most pertinent analysis of nationalism for this study is Anthony Smith’s 
theory of ethno-symbolism. Smith’s (1998, p.224) paradigm focuses on the social 
premises of nations. Opposed to Benedict Anderson (2006), the author of the 
concept “imagined communities”, Smith sees nations as “reconstructed” rather 
than “constructed”, by rediscovering of “ethno-symbolic repertoire for national 
ends”, which include myths and memories and the collective destiny.  This 
assumption can be seen more closely in Smith’s (1991) earlier studies of the use 
of flags, currency, national clothes and anthems, the creation of monuments and 
ceremonies – all of these are reminders of people’s cultural heritage. The strong 
ties between “ethnie” (Smith, 1995) and these symbols are encapsulated in the 
concept of ethno-symbolism. It is ethnic groups that circulate symbolism and in 
functional ways the symbols bring them together as a community. In other 
words, Smith (1991, 1995, 1998) accentuates cultural, mythological, and 
symbolic aspects of the nation-building process. Consequently, one can define 
nation building as “the process of constructing a shared sense of identity and 
common destiny, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal 
differences and to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty” (Fritz and 
Menocal, 2007, p.47). 
To borrow from Smith (1998), the power of connection and the recognition of 
heroes and sagas with an assumed ethnic past, along with myths and folklore and 
emblems, are significant for the nationalist enterprise to be successful. The 
result of all this, he believes, is that the nation stays in a past which contours 
the future along with every aspect of a nation’s sense of self. Similarly, for 
Renan (1990, p.19): “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which 
in truth are but one, constitute this spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one 
in the present”. This suggests the nation is connected both to the past and 
33 
 
present. As such, a nation’s image and national identity is deeply rooted in 
history and culture. Hence, the ethnic history of the nation and its link with 
national destiny is the most powerful tool to support and project nationhood.  
On the other hand, according to Smith (1998, p.191), symbols are “powerful 
differentiators and reminders of the unique culture and fate of the ethnic 
community”. This view stands in opposition to the other scholars in nationalism, 
who argue that the main identifiers of a nation can be language (Brubaker, 
1996), literacy and written language (Gellner, 1983; 1994; Anderson, 2006), 
national identity (Cameron, 1999; Billig, 1995; Williams, 1999), and cultural 
identity (Schlesinger, 1991). The national sense of “self” and “other” and 
distinguishing “us” from “them” are crucial indicators in this national 
identification process (Miller, 1995; Guibernau, 2007; Hall, 1989; McCrone, 1998; 
Clampin, 1999). Bhabha (1990, p.4), whose understanding of nation rests upon 
cultural difference, adopts this distinct criterion of identification. He notes how 
the “cultural temporality of the nation”, means that the “‘other’ is never 
outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully within cultural discourse when we 
think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’”. 
Similarly, Schlesinger’s (1991) analysis of inclusion and exclusion describes a 
very distinct form of nation building which enables the country to clearly mark 
out its defining cultural values. Therefore, it can be argued that to identify 
oneself as a person involves differentiating the self from others. The same can 
be applied to nations finding their place on a world map. 
In this sense the role of cinema in nation building is essential. Cinema fits into 
the theories of nationalism as a form of expression and representation of the 
nation. Rather than just being pertinent to a given nation, cinema would be 
central to the process of defining nations in general (Williams, 2002). Cinema 
may assist imaginings that support nation-states (Cummings, 2009; Isaacs, 2018). 
Moreover, it is what Smith (2002, p.45) describes as a “visual representation of 
national identity”. Therefore, cinema is a medium for expressing, shaping, and 
highlighting national identity, culture and heritage. In this regard, a national 
cinema reflects the prevailing culture and nation’s sense of belonging. Such a 
cinema is one of the bridges between the “self” and “other”, and “us” and 
“them”. It is a medium for the construction of national identity on screen. This 
forms part of Elsaesser’s (2005a, p.75) argument about how the nation is 
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“constructed” through “media memory”. Thus, cinema may form not only 
identity but the memory of the nation. In this case, national cinema is pertinent 
in forming both identity and memory. Moreover, cinema, especially national 
cinema, as a “constructed social phenomenon” (Isaacs, 2018, p.30) can be a 
medium of ideological impact, propaganda, and a dimension of cultural 
development. Here one can see the intersection between cinema as a visual 
representation of identity and Smith’s ethno-symbolism.  
Secondly, the connection between nation and cinema can be found in film 
studies. Schlesinger (2000, p.29) highlights the sociological connection between 
nationhood and cinema acting as an “expression of the cultural geography of the 
nation-state”. This sums up the basic principle on which film studies have been 
based when it comes to sociological arguments about national identity and 
nationalism. 
It is worth noting that European cinema developed in the context of the global 
dominance of Hollywood in the 20th century. Indeed, the context of the cinema 
industry often centres on Hollywood versus domestic markets. For example, 
Higson (1989, p.36) suggests that cinema is an industrial construction, where 
people can notice the difference between “national cinema” and a “domestic 
film industry”. It is also a way of representing narratives and images of the 
nation, which circulates and gives us a sense of difference. This underlines 
differentiation from Hollywood in the theory of national cinema. Schlesinger 
(2000, p.24), for instance, sees American production as a challenge: 
 
It is precisely the extra-territorial cultural pressure of Hollywood’s 
production, imported into the national space, that sets up the 
contemporary issue of national cinema. This outside challenge to ideas of 
the national is at once interpreted as cultural, economic, and political as 
well as ideological. 
 
Therefore, national cinema is an industry’s response to Hollywood. However, 
this tension exists not just between Hollywood and Europe but also much more 
globally, including such vulnerable countries as Kazakhstan. 
Aside from the different interpretations of Hollywood hegemony, the stance by 
Schlesinger perpetuates the view that the outside challenge needs to be 
discussed in the national context to see the whole picture of local production. 
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Further to this, Higson argues that Hollywood’s “over-domination” (1989, p.38) 
of local markets not only means the impoverishment of domestic filmmaking, 
but also flags up a need to examine national cinema in relation to local 
distribution, screening, consumption and audiences as well as the film 
production process itself. As cinema is described as both a medium and an 
industry (Willemen, 2006, p.41) and as a constructor of national identity (Morley 
and Robins,1993), the approach of differentiating any given national cinema 
from Hollywood partly answers questions on the who, what and where of how 
films are made, which also answers questions of distribution and the screening 
of films. 
In this regard, the case of Kazakhstan is interesting. One could argue that nation 
building for Kazakhstan was problematic. As a post-Soviet state, which has 
inherited ethnic diversity, it does not have a clear national identity. Both 
Russian and Kazakh, and other minor languages, coexist in a vast territory. The 
problem has been aggravated by the repatriated Oralmans, who do not speak 
the widespread Russian language, creating a split within one nation: Kazakhs, 
Shala Kazakhs (Russified Kazakhs), and returnees themselves (see section 2.2.3). 
Evaluating this issue from Wimmer’s (2015) position, the nation-building process 
is weak. According to him, the less the linguistic diversity, the more it enhances 
nation building. This is not the case for Kazakhstan. 
 
Given the plight of the Kazakh nation during the Soviet era, it is appropriate to 
engage with the concept of ‘small nations’. Firstly, it is necessary to define what 
qualifies as a small nation. There are debates between scholars regarding the 
different measures of smallness which include: population (Bray & Packer, 1993; 
Vital, 1967), geographical scale (Olafsson, 1998; Gellner, 1996) and gross 
national product (Kuznets, 1960). This concept is not widely regarded by film 
scholars as a clearly articulated analytical point (Hjort & Petrie, 2007). For 
instance, Thompson & Bordwell (2019, p.67) examine the survival of film in 
“smaller producing nations”. Yet another example is Danish cinema being viewed 
as ‘minor cinema’ by Hjort & Bondebjerg (2001, p.20) for the following reasons: 
the size of the population is low for a market-oriented domestic film industry; 
the Danish language is spoken only by Danes, which makes the export of these 
films problematic; and the challenge of American films. All of these factors are 
present in the contemporary Kazakh cinema landscape but with even more 
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uncertainty due to the issue of bilingualism and the dominance of the Russian 
language (see sections 1.1 and 2.1), coupled with the insufficient size of the 
Kazakhstani population to support a local film industry and the state’s inability 
to recoup losses (see section 4.2.2) amid the ongoing threat of American films 
(see section 4.3).  
 
Focusing on a comparative history of small nations and their nation-forming 
processes, Miroslav Hroch (1985) outlines a structural model for the 
periodisation of national movements as part of a complex nation-building 
process. He discusses the history of colonial rule in connection with this, writing: 
  
We only designate as small nations those which were in subjection to a 
ruling nation for such a long period that the relation of subjection took on 
a structural character for both parties. (Hroch, 1985, p.9) 
 
This echoes Olaffson’s (1998) view that small nations have proliferated as a 
result of decolonisation. Inasmuch as Kazakhstan had been under the colonial 
regime of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for 260 years (1731-1991), 
Hroch’s measure of rule by non-co-nationals, in this case Russians, is one of the 
key arguments for defining a small nation insofar as it helps to capture the 
imperatives of nation building through film. This argument may usefully be 
applied to define Kazakhstan as a small filmmaking nation. 
 
Also, the issue of nation versus city is central to the nation-building concept, 
and also relates to Kazakhstan’s case. Hobsbawm (1992), in his studies on 
nationalism, underlines the decline of the nation-state and the growing interest 
in regions and cities. A city identity is not inferior to a country identity. A city 
represents the nation, as well as being a social constructor for nationhood 
(Therborn, 2006). Moreover, the identity of the city and nation building are 
linked on national level (Vale, 2011). One can argue that this is not the case for 
the countries which transfer their capital. Since the 1950s, 13 states in the 
world have relocated their capital. In 1997 Kazakhstan was the only post-Soviet 
state to move its capital from Almaty to Astana, a very rare occurrence in post-
communist countries (Schatz, 2004b). If moving a capital city is an act of 
“symbolic import” that is “designed to highlight the state’s place in the 
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international system” (Ibid, p.121), there was an attempt by Kazakhstan to 
embody Astana as a symbolic centre and to establish the country’s image.   
Along with this, one of the options for Kazakhstan to reimagine and reconstruct 
its past was to turn to cinema. Norris (2012, p.384) describes Kazakhstan’s 
purpose in foregrounding its nomadic nationhood:  
To help to build a new sense of nationhood and to articulate new 
historical narratives to the broadest possible audience, the Kazakh state 
also turned to cinema. Nazarbayev invested a great deal in the cinema 
industry, overseeing the reconstruction and re-emergence of Kazakhfilm, 
the largest film studio in Central Asia. Films have therefore become one 
of the primary sites where the past gets interpreted and ultimately an 
important place to examine for the emergence of nomadic nationhood.  
 
Films, therefore, are instruments for the creation of a nomadic history and 
nationhood, and in Renan’s (1990) formulation, for reuniting the past with the 
present. Furthermore, historical films “provide ‘a historical map’ of the national 
past in order to bind the spectator more firmly to the present national identity” 
(Smith, 2000, p.52). Furthermore, Kazakh cinema is connected to the birth of 
the modern nation “as an analytical lens to explore the construction of 
representations of the nation over time and to account for how they evolve, 
adopt and are contested” (Isaacs, 2018, p.6). Analysing cinematic nation 
building in Kazakhstan, it is argued:  
The concept of national cinema will allow for the analysis of such symbols 
[the symbols of traditions, history, and identity] within the wider 
discursive practice related to the production, distribution, market 
(domestic and global), technological development and reception of 
Kazakhstani films. The wider context includes the domestic film industry 
as well as its broader relationship to the international film business, but 
also, more importantly, the political background and role of the state in 
film production. (Ibid, p.20) 
The above broader approach will be applied in the following chapters, paying 
attention to reforms in Kazakh film policy, including those launched in 2019 by 
the State Centre for Support of National Cinema (SCSNC). The centre aims to 
market Kazakhstan through cinema and film festivals in a way that the 
government controls. Also, there is an attempt at modernisation as well as an 
attempt to reach markets outside Kazakhstan. It becomes evident from the 
above discussion that national cinema as a projection of national identity, or as 
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a practical marketing tool to position the country, is one of the ways of 
portraying the country, shaping an image rooted in the country’s history. 
 
2.2 Kazakhstan’s nation-building history 
It is believed that the term Qazaq as a form of nomadic self-identification 
emerged during the formation of the Kazakh Khanate in the 15th century. Isaacs 
(2016, p.141) argues: 
The ethno-genesis of the Kazakh people dates back to the 15th century 
when two tribal leaders, Zhanibek and Kerey Khan [see figure 2], united a 
number of disparate Uzbek-Turkic tribes and established the Kazakh 
Khanate.  
 
The group consisted of Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes based on a common 
language, culture, way of life and social structure (Olcott, 1986). Kazakh was 




Figure 2 The monument of Zhanibek and Kerey khans in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. www.el.kz. 
 
Dave (2007), Hirsch (2005) and Sarsembayev (1999), in contrast to Olcott (1986), 
claim that nation building, taken in the modern sense of a sovereign 
independent state, did not truly begin until the early 20th century in 
Kazakhstan. This was during the short-lived Kazakh national government, formed 
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in the chaos of the civil war5 – the Alash Orda, founded by Kazakh intellectuals. 
It was a provisional and self-proclaimed Kazakh government led by Akhmet 
Baitursynov, Mirzhakyp Dulatov, Alikhan Bokeikhanov, and others educated in 
Russia (Kesici, 2017). From Kesici’s (2017) point of view, the Alash Orda enabled 
Kazakh ethnicity to transform into a Kazakh state, as these Kazakh intellectuals 
were aiming to declare this newly formed government the ultimate power. It 
was an attempt to define the Kazakh land as an independent country.  
 
The party that took on the name of Alash held an historical belief that this 
mythical figure had been the father of all three Kazakh Zhuz (see section 2.5 on 
tribalism). This idea is supported by Smith’s (1995, p.155) argument: “the 
myths, memories, symbols and ceremonies of nationalism provide the sole basis 
for such social cohesion and political action as modern societies”. Their attempt 
to unite all Kazakhs into this single Alash party transformed how Kazakhs defined 
themselves as a nation up to that point. Kazakh intellectuals “conceptualized 
Kazakh national identity around the unifying cultural and social symbols of the 
Kazak’s nomadic pastoral past” (Sabol, 2003, p.151).6 Many national identity 
theorists believe that essential things such as self-definition and self-
consciousness had developed late in respect to Kazakhstan. Yet it was 
undermined by the earlier Russian invasion in the 18th century that instilled in 
the Kazakh people a colonial consciousness that lasted for almost three 
centuries. 
 
2.2.1 Kazakhstan under colonialism 
Kazakhs led a nomadic way of life, and they had to migrate in order to keep 
cattle. They moved between Kystau – the wintering place in winter, and Jailau – 
the summer settlement to gain the benefits of differing climates in such a vast 
territory. Isaacs (2016) notes two negative effects of the forced settlement and 
sedentarisation of the Kazakh nomads into collective farms in the 1930s by 
Russia. Firstly, it led to an unspeakable tragedy, and millions died from famine 
                                         
5 Civil war took place between different ethnic and social groups and state entities and followed the 
establishment of Bolshevik power as a result of the October Revolution in 1917. 
6 Sabol (2003), Holm-Hansen (1999), Crowe (1998), and Kolstø (1999) used ‘Kazak’ and 
‘Kazakstan’ transliteration rather than the Sovietised ‘Kazakh’ and ‘Kazakhstan’. 
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and disease. Secondly, it also disconnected Kazakhs from their traditional ways 
of life and patterns of migration. In Holm-Hansen’s (1999) view, Kazakhs were 
among the ethnic groups that suffered most in terms of demography during the 
Soviet period. The total number of Kazakhs decreased from 5.2 million in 1916 
to 1.9 million in 1945. The facts about the famine were hidden and hushed up. 
During the Soviet era even the distribution of such facts was punishable by harsh 
criminal sentences, and the risk of execution. It took 43 years for Kazakhs to 
return to their 1926 population size (Norris, 2012). 
 
As a result of Russia’s aggressive policy, nomadic Kazakhs settled, and the land 
also then became available to other European homesteaders (Olcott, 1997). 
Svanberg (1996, pp.324-325) describes this process: 
 
The Volga Germans, Balkars, Lezghins, Chechens, Ingushs, Finns, 
Karachais, Ossetians, Crimean Tatars, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Meskhetian 
Turks, Greeks, Kurds, and Koreans belong to the peoples deported to 
Kazakhstan before or in connection with the Second World War.  
 
In total, 1.2 million people (Norris, 2012) found their home in Kazakhstan. As 
Olcott (1997) argues, Russia aimed to make the Kazakh nation a minority in its 
own territory. By contrast, Svanberg (1996) asserts that the deportations were 
probably to compensate for the decrease in the indigenous population in the 
early 1930s. The Soviets institutionalised multinationalism, which led to “a legal 
incongruence and a spatial mismatch between its two components – national 
territories and personal nationalities” (Brubaker, 1996, p.34). According to the 
1989 census, more than 73 million Soviet citizens lived outside their national 
territory (Ibid). No matter what the real reasons for the deportation, this 
process had implications for the nation building of Kazakhstan, not to mention 
how it marginalised the Kazakh language and influenced the country’s internal 
policy. 
 
Norris (2012, p.382) takes another approach to the reasons for the deportations:  
The empty space could be populated by other Soviet peoples, whether 
they were party enthusiasts or deported “special settlers”. No wonder, 
then, that Kazakhstan also became the site of major Gulag camps. No 
wonder it became the centre of Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands scheme. And 
no wonder it served as the space for Soviet nuclear tests and for sending 
Soviet rockets into space. The Kazakh lands proved to be the laboratory 
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for Soviet projects in population management, agricultural reform, and 
technological developments. 
 
The colonial administration used Kazakhstan to achieve selfish goals. The country 
became a land for forced labour. The Gulag,7 Alzhir8 and Karlag9 camps were used 




Figure 3 Alzhir museum depiction of the seizure of children. www.museum-alzhir.kz. 
 
According to Kaukenov (2017), the whole country was turned into a kind of 
enormous prison in that period. According to other sources, the total number of 
convicts far exceeded 5.2 million. From the period 1921 to 1954, 100,000 people 
were convicted and 25,000 were sentenced to the death penalty – by execution. 
In 1928 mass arrests of former leaders of the Alash Orda government began. At 
the peak of the repression in 1937 in Kazakhstan, the number of prisoners 
reached 105,000, of which about 22,000 were sentenced to be shot (Kaukenov, 
2017). It caused irreparable harm to the country’s demographic and intellectual 
                                         
7 The abbreviation derives from Russian ГУЛАГ, Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei (the headquarters of 
the camps).  
8 The Akmola camp for the wives and children of ‘traitors to the Motherland’ was located 40km from 
the capital Nur-Sultan. It was the only camp in the USSR where up to 20,000 women were kept 
- the mothers, wives, and daughters of oppressed people (www.museum-alzhir.kz).  




potential. The famine mentioned above, along with repressions and executions, 
led to “social amnesia".10 What Smith (1996, p.383) describes, cynically perhaps, 
as necessary – “the importance of national amnesia and getting one’s own 
history wrong (is essential) for the maintenance of national solidarity” – clearly 
worked in Kazakhstan’s case.  
 
The Soviet regime had a strict rule on nationalism: “nations were to be seen but 
not heard; culture […] was to be national in form but socialist in content” 
(Brubaker, 1996, p.36). Being in a minority in their own land without a chance to 
fully self-express culturally led to animosity towards Soviet power. Ultimately, 
the wide gap between the government’s territorial framework and ethnic culture 
led to a massive mutiny. 
 
Figure 4 The uprising in Almaty, 16-17 December, 1986. www.vlast.kz. 
 
 
In December 1986 revolts erupted against the appointment of a Russian ruler, 
Gennadiy Kolbin, who had no connection with Kazakhstan, in the capital Almaty 
(see Figure 4). This, in Olcott’s (1997) view, led to the failure of Gorbachev’s 
government. Kazakh students and people, mainly aged between 16 and 40, went 
                                         
10 R. Jacoby (1975) defined social amnesia as ‘memory driven out of mind’, as collective forgetting 
of the past.  
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to Central Square demanding a Kazakh leader be chosen to govern. Crowe (1998) 
argues that the rioting, which lasted for two days, became violent after 10,000 
police with sharpened shovels attacked demonstrators. There are contradictory 
accounts of this event, with numbers of casualties uncertain: “anywhere from 
three to 58 Kazaks either died in the rioting or were executed afterwards” 
(Crowe, 1998, pp.407-408). The information about the exact number of arrests 
and deaths is opaque. It is argued (Ibid) that “Few of Kazakstan's current leaders 
can escape charges of some involvement in the government side of things”, 
hinting at official Kazakh involvement. That is why the data about this riot is 
still not available to the public. It can be argued that the riots awoke the 
national consciousness.   
 
2.2.2 The collapse of the USSR 
The systemic disintegration of the national economy, social structure and 
political sphere of the Soviet Union led, ultimately, to the dissolution of the 
USSR as a state in 1991. With its collapse, 15 former union republics gained 
independent statehood (Olcott, 2010). Brubaker (1996, p.23) describes this 
process: 
 
The Soviet Union has collapsed, but the contradictory legacy of its unique 
accommodation to ethnonational heterogeneity lives on. […] The Soviet 
state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized the 
existence of multiple nations and nationalities as fundamental 
constituents of the state and its citizenry. It established nationhood and 
nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the 
overarching categories of statehood and citizenship. In so doing, it 
prepared the way for its own demise.  
 
There is no doubt that the Soviet norms of life and Soviet past influenced 
Kazakhstan. As a successor state, Kazakhstan’s leaders were proud of the 
demographic variables and multinationalism of that Soviet inheritance; it was an 
ideology close to them and they had every intention of continuing along the 
same path. That said, a country, which had lived in the Russian shadow (Akiner, 
1995), witnessed a dramatic effect on its self-esteem after 1991. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, as Nazpary (2002) notes, the post-Soviet period in 
Kazakhstan was one of bardak (chaos) and an unstable state. The reason for that 
was the rapid accumulation of wealth in a few hands through immoral methods 
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such as privatisation, insecure loans, bribery and the emergence of a lawless 
society and violence. 
   
2.2.3 Independence 
After inheriting a dual legacy (territorial/political and ethnocultural/personal) 
(Brubaker, 1996), Kazakhstan became “a hybrid nation-state that has attempted 
to create a new sense of nationhood” (Norris, 2012, p.380) (see Figure 5). 
Having declared independence in December 1991, Kazakhstan had to map itself 
in the world and to choose a clear strategy for its nation-building process. Blum 
(2007) supports the idea that Kazakh identity has been constructed from a 
combination of Soviet and pre-Soviet sources such as Turkism, Tengriism (a pre-
Islamic religion) and a historical background that has always reinforced the 
connection between East and West along the Silk Road. The result of all this, he 
argues strongly, is that the official Kazakhstani nation-building doctrine accepts 
the frontiers drawn up by the Soviet authorities as indissoluble. 
 
Figure 5 Ethnic composition of the population of Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2020. 
www.stat.gov.kz. 
 
One state decision in relation to their nation-building strategy was to invite 






Kazakhs 12,764,800 Russians 3,512,900 Uzbeks 605,100




Thus, since 1991, the government has sponsored a number of foreign Kazakhs, 
mainly from Mongolia, China, and Turkey, to return to Kazakhstan in order to fill 
this gap. In the past, Kazakhs who did not obey Soviet rules and did not give up 
their cattle to Russians crossed the border to China. From there, on foot and on 
horseback, they escaped from the Chinese communist regime and repression to 
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, then to Europe and the 
USA. More than half of them died during their long and difficult journey. Some of 
them stayed in those countries for several generations and live there still. About 
5 million people identified as Kazakhs live abroad. Since 1992, about 900,000 
Oralman, ethnic Kazakhs, have been repatriated (Laruelle, 2015). This policy 
was to increase the Kazakh population and distribute repatriates throughout the 
whole territory of Kazakhstan – in other words, to ‘Kazakhify’ the land. 
However, local people often consider the Oralman as ‘other’ (Oka, 2013) and 
treat them as Chinese and Mongols because they adopted the culture and 
language of the receiving countries in which they had settled. Moreover, local 
people tend to think that ethnic repatriates enjoy too many privileges, such as 
special allowances and benefits, while other ethnic minorities argue that 
Kazakhstan should not give privileges to Oralman at the expense of the local 
population (Ibid). Having come from different cultural and social environments, 
repatriates who do not speak Russian face difficulties in adapting to the new 
local culture. In cities, where the Russian language is still dominant, Oralman 
have little chance of being accepted as Kazakhs. Thus, this divergence between 
repatriates and local Kazakhs may further inhibit the formation of a common 
national identity within the already multinational society of Kazakhstan, which 
has enough problems already in unifying the diverse groups already there.  
 
2.3  Kazakh identity  
Historically, Kazakh cultural identity had long been actively suppressed to 
imitate a common Soviet identity (Stock, 2009). The question of Kazakh identity 
has resurfaced as a major issue since 1991. The question of whether Kazakhstan 
is to be multinational, an ethnic pairing of Kazakhs and Russians, or just a 
Kazakh native land continues to create problems within Kazakh politics (Olcott, 
1997). In general, Kazakhstan has had to decide between a Turkic, civic, or 
Muslim society (Nazpary, 2002). Turkic-ness derived from the idea of Pan-
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Turkism and implies being closer to and uniting all the Turkic-speaking nations, 
such as Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and others 
(Roy, 2000), reviving Turkic links. Pan-Turkism was popular among the members 
of the Alash movement at the beginning of the 20th century, who were 
oppressed but began to emerge again in the 1980s (Akiner, 1995). Civic society 
meant for Kazakhstan to develop more non-governmental organisations and 
public associations after the collapse of the USSR and to position itself as an 
open and democratic society. The third option is to declare itself as an Islamic 
country (given that 68 per cent of the population were Muslim) and to look 
toward the Islamic world. According to the last National Census of Kazakhstan in 
2009, 27 per cent of people belonged to Christianity and 0.03 per cent practised 
Judaism (www.stat.gov.kz). 
 
The sense of Kazakhness was weakened by two ideas. The first doctrine is 
Kazakhstanness, which seeks to combine all the ethnos in the country into one 
nation. This concept was not accepted by Kazakh intellectuals, who felt that it 
risked combining all 130 minorities into an American-style single nation. The 
second is the idea of Eurasianism, which sought to enable the peaceful 
coexistence of more than 130 ethnic groups and different religions. This idea 
first emerged in the 1920s and 1930s with Russian immigrants stating that 
Russian civilization was not European or Asian, but Eurasian. According to 
Laruelle (2015), both ideas of ‘Kazakhstanness’ and ‘Eurasianism’ promote an 
easy integration of domestic and foreign policies. However, Eurasianism is a 
broader concept: the political aim of this idea aims at integration of the post-
Soviet countries into a kind of nostalgia for the past (Suslov, 2014). In this way 
Kazakhstan had developed the most sophisticated version of the post-Soviet 
“friendship of peoples” theory and turned it into an international brand 
(Laruelle, 2015, p.23). According to Abikeyeva (2006), by trying to instil the 
ideas of Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism, the West and the East fought for 
ideological influence: external powers tried to privilege one or the other of 
these ways of thinking for their own purposes. Nevertheless, the Kazakh 
identity, which struggled for purity, has been blurred in the wider concepts 
previously mentioned. It is obvious that Kazakhstan has been struggling to 
develop an identity through nation-building instruments. For Stock (2009, p.184) 
“this weak national identity impacted the nation image and the nation image 
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management”. Also, few Kazakhstani people accepted the concept of 
Eurasianism. However, it was understood by the rest as “evidence of a regime 
with an interest in ensuring interethnic peace” (Schatz, 2004b, p.130). Hence, 
the multi-ethnic dimension of Kazakhstan makes Kazakh identity vulnerable. 
 
 
Figure 6 The Monument of Independence in Almaty. The Scythian Golden Man. 
www.welovealmaty.com/monument-of-Independence.html. 
 
Per contra to political and philosophical ideas just discussed, Kudaibergenova 
(2014) argues that much of the country’s architecture and national symbols 
characterise the ancient history of the Kazakh tribes. For instance, the Scythian 
Golden Man has become a symbol of independence since its appearance as a 
monument (Figure 6) in Almaty’s main square, making it part of Kazakhstan’s 
brand (Kudaibergenova, 2013). The Golden Man, a Scythian warrior buried in his 
or her (it could be a man or a woman) golden armour was discovered by 
archaeologists in 1969 near Almaty. It has been dated as approximately from the 
4th-5th century BC. This highlights how historical symbols identifying Kazakh 
ethnicity may become branding symbols for the whole nation. 
 
The political power in place has been seeking to instil Kazakhstani patriotism 
and to replace the population’s sense of belonging to the Soviet Union with 
Kazakhstani citizenship and identity. The former president of Kazakhstan, 
Nazarbayev, stressed that Kazakhstan would be neither eastern nor western, 
neither Islamic nor Christian; rather, the state should be a bridge between all of 
them (Olcott, 1997). This position is still taken by the Kazakh authorities and 
48 
 
often promoted in the mass media. Being a bridge between different cultures 
and being multicultural sends out mixed messages abroad as well as hindering 
the creation of a clear internal identity.  
 
Starting from scratch, moving the capital from Almaty to Akmola (Akmola was 
renamed Astana in 1998 and became Nur-Sultan in 2019) for a number of political 
reasons, affected the consciousness of the Kazakh people. According to Schatz 
(2004b), relocation connected the country to Eurasianism. The position of 
Kazakhstan at the crossroads of cultures and the location of Astana at the centre 
of Kazakhstan intersected to ensure efficient logistics, communications, and 
security. The official rationale for transferring the capital from the south to the 
north was to avoid earthquakes and to distance the capital from political tension 
in neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, 
according to Sadyk (2015), this and other issues were only used to divert the 
attention of other non-Kazakh minorities from the main reason: Astana was 
closer to the geographical locations of the ethnically Russian population of the 
country. According to one of the leading demographers of Kazakhstan, M. 
Tatimov, the main reason for the transfer of the capital was the need to shift 
the centre of demographic gravity from the southeast to the northwest (Sadyk, 
2015). Schatz (2004b, p.124) argues that moving the capital “was intended to 
marginalize the rivals to Nursultan Nazarbayev, bolster his supporters, and 
simultaneously to gain access to important sources of international capital”. As 
Holm-Hansen (1999) argues, frequently moving the capital (four cities in one 
century) only goes to prove that Kazakhstan has an unsettled character as an 
ethno-political unit. It can be argued that this feature is also seen in the 
numerous amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK), 
as well as various attempts to rename the capital, from Astana to Nur-Astana or 
Nursultan, in the name of President Nazarbayev, which was finally realised in 
2019.  
 
2.3.1 Kazakhstan, Kazakstan or Qazaqstan? 
The name of the country (and its further projection through cinema), in any 
form of communication, is very important (Szondi, 2007). Today there are still 
endless debates about the correct spelling of the country’s name. Svanberg 
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(1996) argues that a correct spelling in English should be Kazak rather than 
Kazakh because, in 1991, the name of the country was transliterated from 
Russian. This is supported by Crowe (1998) who also uses the spelling Kazakstan. 
Moreover, if Kazakhstan moves to the Latin alphabet by 2025, the country’s 
name will be written as Qazaqstan. 
 
When the country’s name is used so often in English for communication purposes 
(Szondi, 2007), the Republic of Kazakhstan’s name becomes problematic because 
of the fact that some members of the public consider this to be a significant 
mistake. The name Kazakhstan was formally adopted by the government, so the 
rest of the world accepted it. This meant that this “mistake” still exists in 
citizens’ passports. Moreover, this issue makes it problematic not only for 
citizen’s identity, but also for the actual internal and external transformation of 
Kazakhstan. This misconception contradicts Smith’s (2001, p.7) argument: “a 
national symbolism is, of course, distinguished by its all-encompassing object, 
the nation, but equally by the tangibility and vividness of its characteristic signs. 
These start with a collective proper name”. Thus, nation building without a 
clearly defined and accepted spelling of the country’s name may reduce the 
chances of successfully creating an image.  
 
2.4 Language 
Kazakhs speak the Kazakh language which is a Turkic language belonging to the 
Kipchak branch (Svanberg, 1996). Language is still one of the most sensitive 
domestic policy issues in Kazakhstan. During both the Soviet period and under 
the Nazarbayev regime, Kazakhstan faced an enforced forgetting of Kazakh 
culture in favour of Russification (Burkhanov, 2017; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, 
2013). By 1995, knowledge of the language had been destroyed and city-born 
Kazakhs knew only simple and standard phrases in Kazakh (Akiner, 1995). In 
199311 the new constitution of Kazakhstan (ratified in 1995) confirmed the status 
of Kazakh and the status of “interethnic communication” through Russian 
(Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995). The new law adopted on 11 July, 
1997 (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Yazykah, 1997) allowed the Russian 
                                         
11 In total there have been five amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
since its independence.  
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language to be used on an equal basis with the state Kazakh language’s national 
and local self-government organisations. Burkhanov (2017) sees what lies ahead 
in respect of the next step in this two-generations’ old choice. In his view, the 
older generation, including the ruling group, will give preference to Russian, 
while the younger generation will come to prefer their native language.  
In the case of Kazakhstan, this issue is questionable. In just one century, 
Kazakhstan has faced three changes of script. In 1929 the country switched from 
Arabic to Latin. Twenty years later Latin was substituted by Cyrillic (Akiner, 
1995). In 2025 Kazakhstan will return to the Latin script again. Currently, apart 
from having two official languages (Kazakh and Russian) the problem has been 
exacerbated by bringing the English language into a trilingual language policy in 
2015. Adding a third language to the education process may be a threat to the 





In the past, the tribal structure of the Kazakhs was always based on the division 
of pasture land and annual migration routes, rather than cultural or economic 
diversity (Esenova, 1998). A tribal-type phenomenon is still relevant to modern 
Kazakh society. Kazakhs have three Zhuz (Hordes): Elder, Middle and Younger. 
Each of them consists of many tribes (clans). Every Kazakh family has to know its 
genealogical roots. Each family keeps its genealogical history – which is called 




Figure 7 Kazakh clan division. Three Zhuz. www.azh.kz. 
 
Kolstø (1999) notes that the Zhuz identity is ancient and more firmly established 
than the Kazakh identity. Such “inherently stronger loci of identity” (Sabol, 
2003, p.152) were established to differentiate ethnic Kazakhs from other groups. 
Belonging to one of the three hordes is tied to a commonly accepted idea of 
genealogy (Kesici, 2011). Hence, Kazakhs made boundaries and distinguished an 
individual’s identity among themselves.  
 
The priorities given to certain tribal groups have several negative effects. For 
example, according to Yilmaz (2014), Kazakh unification was impossible in the 
19th century because of the division into the three Zhuz. Russia used this 
division of Kazakhs to divide and rule as it was an easy way to control them. 
Even today, the young generation are keen to know another person’s clan. 
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Members of the same clans and Zhuz usually feel a strong responsibility to 
support each other and promote their interests (Kesici, 2011) rather than 
supporting Kazakhs as a nation. One may argue that clan division can affect 
someone’s career path and create disunity. For instance, between 1997 and 
2001 the composition of elites in Kazakhstan’s corridors of power consisted of 
38.5 per cent Middle Zhuz rural-born Kazakhs, 38.1 per cent rural-born Elder 
Zhuz, and only 11.5 per cent rural-born Younger Zhuz (Schatz, 2004a, p.100). 
After the collapse of the USSR, the first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
worked hard to privilege members of the Elder Zhuz, especially the Shapyrashty 
clan (which he belongs to). By doing so, he continued the practice of his 
predecessor, Dinmukhammed Qonayev, who also promoted this clan to high 
positions. Among successful appointments in the late 1990s was Kassym-Jomart 
Tokayev (Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Schatz, 2005), who became the second 
president of Kazakhstan after Nazarbayev in 2019. Clan disunity and hidden 
struggles between them in the political arena slows down nation building. 
 
Tribalism as a part of Kazakh history and the issues listed above are well 
documented in cinema, as we shall see. 
 
2.6 Cinema 
The history of Kazakh cinema is deeply interlinked with Soviet cinema. Kazakh 
film production first developed within the Soviet Union, thus forcibly impacting 
on Kazakh people’s consciousness. Raudino (2015, p.113), analysing Baltic 
cinema, argues that Moscow’s attempts “to cancel any culture other than the 
Russian in favour of the latter were unbearable, that is why any notion of Baltic 
cinema is incompatible with Soviet cinema”. As a former Soviet state, one may 
argue that it might also be applicable to Kazakh cinema, which has also suffered 
from coexistence with Soviet rule. All of Kazakhstan’s tragic history, and the 
Soviet policy of treating the titular nation as a minority in its land (Olcott, 
1997), had led to a loss of national identity which has subsequently meant that 
Kazakh cinema has used films as a means of retrieval.  
 
Significant steps in the history of Kazakh cinema date back to World War Two. In 
September 1941, the government institution - the Council of People’s 
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Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom) - permitted the founding of a national film 
studio based in Alma-ata, where a newsreel studio had been operating since 
1935. Later, Leningrad film studio (Lenfilm), Mosfilm and the Central newsreel 
studio had to be evacuated temporarily and relocated to Kazakhstan due to 
World War Two. These three studios were amalgamated in November 1941 into 
TSOKS, the Central United Film Studio (Nogerbek, 2013). In its train, this studio 
produced more than 80 per cent of all Soviet wartime feature films. At this point 
in 1944 the Alma-ata film studio was renamed as the Alma-ata Film Studio of 
Feature Films and Chronicles. It was to take until 1960 for it finally to be called 
Kazakhfilm studio (Kazakhfilm, 2018). In 1984 the studio was named after 
Shaken Aimanov, who was an outstanding director in Kazakh cinema. It can be 
suggested that the relocation of the Russian studios triggered a film boom in 
Almaty that benefited from the vast experience of Soviet cinema production. 
However, all of the films made had to be politically steered towards spreading 
the spirit of communism (Nogerbek, 2013), acting as ideological instruments to 
shape the ideal image of the Soviet citizen. Hence, Kazakh cinematography 
played an invaluable role in cinematic nation building in Kazakhstan. However, 
given the Soviet bias, some scholars argued (for instance, Jarvie, 2000) that such 
films were not sufficient for nation building and could only contribute to it.  
On the other hand, the coexistence with Soviet cinema spawned the birth and 
development of domestic cinema. Isaacs (2016, p.139) suggests that in the post-
Stalin era, film was used as an instrument to establish historical and cultural 
markers of Kazakh national identity through the reinterpretation and 
visualisation of myth, folklore, and historic heroes. He argues: 
The government’s aim has been to use film as means to provide an 
“official” interpretation of Kazakh nationhood; drawing particular 
attention to both Kazakhstan’s nomadic and warrior past and the multi-
ethnic civic dimension of its nationhood; a consequence of the forced 
Stalinist deportations of different ethnicities to the territory of 
Kazakhstan in the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, other voices have 
emerged in contemporary Kazakh cinema which offer alternative 
conceptualisations of Kazakh nationhood, identity, and nation-formation. 
These are principally based on religious and socio-economic 
interpretations of Kazakh nationhood.  
 
This is probably one of the critical interpretations of Kazakh cinema under Soviet 
rule. Hence, film served to interpret Kazakh nationhood and identity. The state 
encouraged the Kazakh people to imagine statehood through film as it was 
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represented and controlled from the “top”. State propaganda was, therefore, 
highly effective and the most powerful means of forming a national ideology 
through cinema. 
 
2.6.1 Different approaches to the development of Kazakh cinema 
This thesis will follow the chronological and thematic approach to classification 
established by Abikeyeva (2013) and Isaacs (2018) as it fits well with the needs 
of this study, defining the various phases of cinematic nation building in 
Kazakhstan. 
Let us now look more closely at the categorisation touched on briefly at the 
start of this section. Abikeyeva (2013) groups the history of Kazakh cinema in the 
following way: 12  
1) 1964-1972, the period of the Thaw.   
This was the period soon after the death of Stalin when Khruschev acknowledged 
some of Stalin’s crimes and the initiation of a more relaxed political period, 
hence the term “thaw”. Cinema then served as propaganda and the instrument 
of ideology;  
2) The era of Perestroika, 1988-1991. A political movement for reform within 
the Communist Party of the USSR. Perestroika led to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union;  
3) The first years of independence, 1992-1997;  
4) Nation building, 1998-2005. This last, she argues, is the beginning of the 
creation of a national idea.13  
 
The era of Perestroika, 1988-1991  
The need for a national dimension in Kazakh cinema had been felt since Soviet 
times. Heroes of films became symbolic during Perestroika in Kazakhstan. The 
influence of the Kazakh New Wave on Kazakhstan’s cinema is considerable 
(Beumers, 2010). As stated (Ibid), in 1983 the Russian film director Sergei 
Solov’ev of the famous Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) selected 
                                         
12 There are also chronological classifications by B. Nogerbek (2013) and Mowell (2014).  
13 The period 1972-1988 is missing in Abikeyeva’s classification (2013, pp.163-174). 
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Kazakh students for his course, including Rashid Nugmanov, Darezhan 
Omirbayev, Serik Aprymov, Ardak Amirkulov, Abai Karpykov, and Amir Karakulov, 
who are all now famous Kazakh directors. This group graduated in 1988 and 
started reshaping the Kazakh film industry. In 1989 at the International Film 
Festival in Moscow, Kazakh cinema was called “New Wave”. Young filmmakers 
had an opportunity to bring some freedom into their work and using the Kazakh 
language was a real novelty (Pruner, 1992). Before independence all Kazakh 
films were produced in the Russian language first, and then dubbed into Kazakh. 
The Kazakh New Wave opened up Central Asian cinema to the world (Abikeyeva, 
2006) through films such as Rashid Nugmanov’s The Needle (1988), which 
symbolised the death of the previous age (Abikeyeva, 2013).14 
 




In the film (see Figure 8), which captures the era, the famous singer of the band 
Kino, Victor Tsoi, who is an ethnic Korean, took on the role of Moro, a character 
                                         
14 Films with a similar impact include: Abay Karpykov’s The Little Fish in Love (1989), Amir 
Karakulov’s A Woman Between Two Brothers (1991), Serik Aprymov’s The Last Stop (1989), 
Darezhan Omirbayev’s Kairat (1991). 
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struggling with drug dealers in Almaty. In Birgit Beumer’s (2013) opinion, this 
was the first Soviet film to address the drug problem openly. Moro returns to 
Alma-ata where he visits his former girlfriend, drug addict Dina. Moro tries to 
treat her by taking her to the deserts of the Aral Sea.15 When Moro reveals a drug 
dealer’s identity, he is killed. Across the USSR more than nine million people 
viewed the movie in its first three months (Pruner, 1992). 
 
The Needle is described by Chernetsky (2003, p.151) as a film that “offers 
arguably the most thoroughgoing and radical appropriation of post-modernist 
aesthetics in the cinema of the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence”. The 
hero Moro’s words “We want change!”, which references his song Hochu 
peremen (I Want Change), somehow reflected the will of the society to change 
the system (Abikeyeva, 2013). Coincidence or not, the Soviet Union disintegrated 
three years after the film’s release. The drug addict Dina can be considered as a 
metaphor for Soviet society, which enters “heroin withdrawal” in its transition 
period (Abikeyeva, 2006, p.114). Hence, the Kazakh movie mirrored the social 
and political life in the almost-collapsed USSR. 
 
The first years of independence, 1992-1997  
The old system’s collapse, and uncertain future, affected filmmaking,16 including 
in Allazhar (1993). This social drama by Kaldybai Abenov reflects the uprising in 
1986 against the appointment by Moscow of the new ruler, Kolbin (see Figures 4, 
9 and section 2.2.1). The film was banned for many years as it contains 
politically sensitive scenes that might incite ethnic hatred. The character of the 
young student Azat is a portrait of Kairat Ryskulbekov, a real victim of 1986, 
acted by the famous contemporary film director Akan Satayev. Azat is advised by 
his uncle, a university staff member, to protest against the Moscow 
appointment. He joins other students and goes to the square. On radio channels, 
this event is reported as drug addicts staging a riot. Azat, trying to escape from 
the police, goes to his uncle’s house, but he is not eager to let him in. Azat, now 
labelled a murderer, is caught by the police, tortured, and wrongfully 
                                         
15 The Aral Sea is located in Kyzylorda region and connects Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (see 
Figure 1). 
16 Surzhekey, the Angel of Death (1991), Ravenous (1991), Lovers of December (1991), Allazhar 
(1993), Death of Otyrar (1991), Youth of Abai (1995), Zhambyl (1996), Cardiogram (1995), 
Shanghai (1996), and Killer (1998). 
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imprisoned. Under mysterious circumstances, Azat is then killed in a Russian 
prison.  
 
Figure 9 Still from Allazhar: Akan Satayev in the role of Azat. https://voxpopuli.kz/527-tsena-
nezavisimosti/. 
 
Nation building: 1998-2005  
This era began with the formation of a national idea (Abikeyeva, 2006). Creative 
intellectuals, including filmmakers, became the agents of the nation-building 
process. The films of this era17 were all examples of this. For instance, life’s 
difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union were described in Gulshat 
Omarova’s18 Schizo (2004) (see Figure 10). With no work, or means to make a 
living, people had to get by as best as they could. Disabled Mustafa’s nickname, 
Schizo, is short for schizophrenic. He has no father, but he idolises his mother’s 
boyfriend, Sakura, who exploits this by using him as a helper at illegal fights for 
betting purposes so he can profit from gambling. Although happy-go-lucky, 
initially Schizo is drawn to the money and lifestyle. However, on witnessing how 
Sakura’s fellow fight bosses carelessly get rid of a dead man after a fight, he is 
quickly disillusioned and is not prepared to tolerate such inhumanity and 
                                         
17 Aksuat (1998), Zamanai (1998), Leila’s prayer (2002), Don’t cry! (2002), Schizo (2004), The 
Hunter (2004), Renaissance Island (2004), Steppe Express (2005), Notes of a Railwayman 
(2006). 
18 A woman director acted in Suyirik (1984) in the main role. 
58 
 
indifference. Schizo ends up killing Sakura and is imprisoned. Thus, we have 
another film emphasising the vulnerability of those on the bottom rung of 
society. 
 
Figure 10 Still from Schizo (2004) by Gulshat Omarova. www.film.ru/photo/frames/shiza. 
 
 
The new era: 2005-2020 
I argue that this period of 15 years is one marked by many ups and downs and 
can be regarded as the new millennium of Kazakh cinema. Between 2005 and 
2019 the state-owned Kazakhfilm studio was the sole producer of all 98 feature 
films made during this time (www.kazakhfilmstudios.kz).  
   
An example is one of Akan Satayev’s most touching pictures, The Road to Mother 
(2016), based on real events (www.theroadtomother.com). This story takes us 
through all that Kazakhstan suffered through the 20th century: collectivisation 
and mass emigration, famine, World War Two, and the post-war period. The 
main hero, Ilyas, endures an endless series of tragic experiences: an orphanage, 
wartime deprivation and the Gulag. Yet, despite all this, he never loses hope of 





Figure 11 The poster of The Road to Mother (2016) in the USA by World Wide Motion Pictures 
Corporation. https://liter.kz/1883-film-doroga-k-materi-pokagut-v-ssha/. 
 
Kazakhstan had previously nominated the picture for the Academy Award and 
Golden Globe Award for Best Foreign Film. International circulation of the film 
seemed promising when World Wide Motion Pictures Corporation acquired North 
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American distribution rights for the film (see Figure 11) and announced its 
theatrical release in May 2019 in selected cinema theatres (WWMPC, 2019b) as 
well as its non-theatrical release in September 2019. WWMPC’s sub-distributors 
include Kino Lorber for DVD, video on demand, streaming, pay TV, free TV and 
new digital media, and Swank Motion Pictures (WWMPC, 2019a). The Road to 
Mother can be classified as a historical film, but with no nomadic or warrior 
element. This has become a distinct classification within the thematic approach 
to Kazakh cinema. 
 
2.6.2 Thematic approach 
Mette Hjort (2000, p.107) argues, with respect to Danish cinema: 
The theme of nation almost presents itself as a theme of this particular 
nation, and, as such, it provides a paradigmatic example of a topical 
theme and is inextricably linked to specific, explicitly acknowledged 
identities.  
In other words, when films flag a particular theme, this thematises the nation 
and makes it distinct. In this regard, four main themes proposed by Isaacs (2012) 
distinguish Kazakh cinema: nomadic/warrior; films with a multi-ethnic 
dimension; religious films based on Tengriizm; socio-economic films. According 
to Isaacs (2018), each of these classifications has reminded Kazakh people who 
they are, and, in this way, films became a bridge of identity between the 
government and the nation.  
 
These themes tend to have their own specific agendas. Films with a multi-ethnic 
dimension describe multinational diversity and its historical background in 
Kazakhstan, e.g., The Gift to Stalin (2008) and Promised Land (2011). The first 
film describes the painful fate of the little Jewish boy Sasha (Kazakh name 
Sabyr), who is saved from death in 1949 by his Kazakh grandfather, Kassym, just 
at the onset of a new wave of repression, executions, and deportations. Israeli 
writer David Markish, whose memories formed the basis of the film, acted as the 
elderly Sasha. The second film describes the deportation of other ethnic groups, 
in particular, Koreans, to Kazakhstan in the early 1930s. Also, the movie 
portrayed the legendary Kazakh hospitality. This theme of the nation, according 
to Hjort (2000), may be analysed via an intercultural approach. She (Ibid, p.111) 
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asserts that the approach is effective for a “contrastive mobilization of different 
national cultures” and draws the attention of the audience towards the issue of 
national identity. Kazakh movies with multi-ethnic themes have helped build the 
idea of ‘Kazakhstanness’ described in section 2.3. The various religious films 
tend to be based on Tengriizm,19 the pre-Islamic religion of the Kazakh nation 
that helped form its identity. Finally, socio-economic films, the trump card of 
the talented director Akan Satayev,20 tend to have a criminal connotation, the 
purpose of which is to highlight the lengths ordinary Kazakh people had to go to 
to survive after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
Nomadic/warrior films. 
In 2005 JSC Kazakhfilm released Nomad for an exorbitant budget close to $40 
million. Thus, although Kazakh historical movies narrate the rich history of the 
Kazakh nation, they can shape national identity and consciousness today. As 
Norris (2012, p.386) puts it: “Nomad is more about using the past for present-
day purposes”, calling all tribes of Kazakhstan to unite. One may argue that the 
glorification of “the nomadic lifestyle of Kazakh ancestors” led to its 
repackaging within new traditions (Waśkeil, 2019, p.59). The nomadic/warrior 
theme of Kazakh films underpins this “reconnecting with national roots or re-
imagining national identities” (Hjort, 2000, p.115). Kazakhs may reimagine their 
past through historical nomadic dramas. If ethnic history is the most powerful 
tool to protect the nation (Smith, 1995) then historical films emphasise the 
greatness of the nation (Smith, 2000).  
 
Nomadic or warrior films like Nomad (2005) (see Figure 16) or Warriors of the 
Steppe (2012) (see Figure 12) aimed to instil pride in Kazakh heroism throughout 
the centuries by recreating epic battles against Jungars (Laruelle, 2015).21 Some 
scholars (Yessenova, 2011) argued that Nomad served as an attempt to establish 
a new national brand for Kazakhstan, aiming at a global audience. However, it 
failed to do so, earning only $3 million worldwide and $79,000 at the US box 
                                         
19 Baksy (2008) by Gulshat Omarova and The Old Man (2012) by Yermek Tursunov. 
20 He produced such films as Districts (2016), two series of Racketeer (2007 and 2015) and 
Businessmen (2018). 
21 It was the population of the Jungar Khanate founded in the 17th century by the unification of 
Oirat tribes at the junction of the territories of modern Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Mongolia.  
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office after limited release (Norris, 2012). The Kazakh audience sharply 
criticised both the role of the Kazakh state in promoting the film and the fact 
that filmmakers were adopting Hollywood techniques at the expense of 
indigenous identity and culture. The film was packaged as a Western blockbuster 
with three American actors Jay Hernandez, Kuno Becker and Mark Dacascos in 
the leading roles, rather than Kazakh actors thus, it was argued, diluting Kazakh 
identity. 
 
The director Akan Sataev’s blockbuster, Myn Bala: Warriors of the Steppe 
(2012), depicts the story of young teenagers who are nomadic warriors. They are 
led by a boy named Sartay, who helped defeat the Jungars in 1729. After uniting 
the young warriors and fighting with Jungars, Sartay dies. This film portrays 




Figure 12 A DVD cover of Myn Bala: Warriors of the Steppe on Amazon. 
www.amazon.com/Myn-Bala-Warriors-Asylkhan-Tolepov/dp/B00EX465U8. 
 
The historical epic beat all records in the domestic market, earning more than 
$1 million in its first weekend (Holdsworth, 2012) and ranked second only 
to Avatar in the domestic box office (Dalton, 2012). The historical film screened 
at the Cannes Film Festival on 17 May, 2012, and was picked up consequently by 
an international distribution agent, Toronto’s 108 Media, for world sale 
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(Holdsworth, 2012). The same year, it won a special prize at the 31st Fajr 
International Film Festival in Tehran, Iran (www.kazakhfilmstudios.kz). 
Reviewed by Hollywood Reporter as a “Central Asian hybrid of Braveheart” 
(Dalton, 2012, n.p.), it was Kazakhstan’s official entry at the Oscars in 2013 in 
the Best Foreign language section. The chairman of the Canadian distribution 
company indicated that the video and DVD rights to the film had been sold to 
the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Middle Eastern countries (Oca 
Magazine, 2012) with a dubbed translation and became available in North 
America for video on demand (Usmanova, 2013). Compared to the previous 
release, Nomad, Myn Bala: Warriors of the Steppe was far more successful, with 
more of a Kazakh feel that reflected Kazakh identity. 
 
 
Figure 13 Still from Tomiris (2019). The actress Almira Tursyn in a costume of the Saks 
(Scythian) tribes. www.informburo.kz. 
 
The next film, Tomiris (2019), is about the events of the sixth century BC, when 
the Saks tribes, led by Queen of Massageteans, Tomiris, defeated the Persian 
king Cyrus 11 (Kazpravda, 2017). The main hero, Princess Tomiris, is wearing the 
Saks costume (see Figure 13), symbolising a Kazakhstan “brand” – the Golden 
Man (see Figure 6). Thus, the film reflects a distinctly Kazakh portrayal of the 
nation imagined through its nomadic past. Tomiris thus provides Kazakhs with a 
permanent, specifically historical Kazakh vision of themselves. This, in spite of 
the fact that Iranians criticised the historical facts of the film on the director’s 
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Instagram page (@akansatayev) before its release.22 Having spent ₸2.5 billion 
(£5,108,750) of Kazakhfilm’s money, the film grossed ₸480 million (nearly 
£980,500) in local markets in only one month and the number of daily theatrical 
screenings in the country increased to 800 (Smaiyl, 2019). Moreover, after its 
release, Tomiris became a particularly popular name for new-borns (Auezov, 
2019), further signifying the important role of the film in the nation’s 
consciousness. 
 
Subsequent films in the genre are The Kazakh Khanate: The Diamond Sword 
(2016) and The Kazakh Khanate: The Golden Throne (2019), two parts of an epic 
based on the novel trilogy by Ilyas Esenberlin, The Nomads (1976); there was 
also a 10-episode television version of the two films. The first film portrayed the 
birth of the Kazakh Khanate in the 15th century that was to result in the merger 
of the Kazakh Zhuz with the first Khans, Kerey and Zhanibek (see Figures 2 and 
14). In the sequel, the two Khans call on the nomadic tribes to leave the cruel 
ruler, Abilkhair Shaibani, by migrating from Desht-i-Kipchak to Mogolistan in 
Zhetisu,23 so that the two khans could build the Kazakh Khanate. 
                                         
22 Iranians believe that Tomiris has nothing to do with ancient Turkic tribes and she had Persian 
roots. The film is based on the historical account by Herodotus, while Iranians support the 
versions of Beros and Xenophon, which revealed that Cyris was not beheaded by Tomiris.  




Figure 14 The poster of Kazakh Khanate: The Golden Throne (2019) by Rustem Abdirashev. 
www.imdb.com. 
 
The producer of the series The Kazakh Khanate, Arman Arsenov, admitted that 
idea for a film in the style of Game of Thrones came after the words of Russian 
president Vladimir Putin: “Kazakhs have never had statehood. He [Nursultan 
Nazarbayev] created it” (Osharov, 2014, n.p.).  Putin declared this at the Seliger 
Youth Forum in 2014. Some political scientists say that Putin, with sarcasm, just 
repeated the words of the former president of Kazakhstan from 2011: “There has 
never been a ... Kazakh state, because it had no borders. Having marked the 
borders of the Kazakh state for the first time, we brought it to the United 
Nations. ... Never have the Kazakhs voluntarily built their capital” (Mamashuly, 
2014, n.p.). Both comments caused discontent and violent indignation among 
the Kazakh people. However, to counter this, Kazakhstani officials announced 
the celebration of the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate. The Guardian 
described it as: “an exercise in nation building for Kazakhstan” (Lillis, 2016, 
n.p.). Putin’s comments thus pressurised Kazakhstan into celebrating a date that 
had never been acknowledged before. But then Kazakhstan has not been behind 
in investing in anything that will promote the Kazakh brand. Every year millions 
are spent on celebrating the new capital’s birthday, not to mention this 
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investment in a major historical film. And the backing for Kazakhstan’s historical 
films has, without doubt, came mainly in response to the mockumentary Borat 
by Sacha Baron Cohen.  
 
2.6.3 Borat’s help 
Kazakhstani officials quickly grasped the lack of a national image after Sacha 
Baron Cohen's 2006 film Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit 
Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (20th Century Fox) (see Figure 15). The film 
became, in Saunders’ (2007, p.226) words, an “unbearable cancer on the visage 
of the new Kazakhstan”.24 
Indeed, Borat used to be so familiar to people’s consciousness that just the 
mention of Kazakhstan triggered immediate an association with this fictitious 
character. As Carpenter (2007, p.19) puts it, both for people who are aware that 
the hero is fictitious and for people who do not know about Kazakhstan, “this 
film’s depiction will automatically be the first bit of ‘knowledge’ about the 
country”. The mockumentary has earned nearly $262 million worldwide by 
portraying the country as a former Soviet backwater (Savodnik, 2011). For a 
country unknown to the rest of the world such as Kazakhstan, there was no 
option but to use soft power (Anholt, 2005) for the first time. The Kazakh 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs official, Yerzhan Ashykbayev, threatened legal action 
and declared that Cohen “is serving someone’s political order designed to 
present Kazakhstan and its people in a derogatory way” (Saunders, 2007, p.226). 
This position of the Kazakh officials shows that the country is autocratic and 
does not tolerate any criticism. Their attempts to counter Cohen attracted even 
more attention to the mockumentary. 
                                         




Figure 15 Still from Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of 
Kazakhstan (2006). www.hollywood.com. 
 
The conflict between Baron Cohen’s TV journalist character and Kazakhstan 
started earlier in 2000 when Borat first appeared on the Ali G Show on the 
British public service TV station, Channel 4 (Stock, 2009). After that, Kazakhstan 
placed a four-page commercial article in The New York Times “Kazakhstan in the 
21st century”, publishing evidence of oil production, the power of women and 
the education system in the country (2005), as well as a couple of commercial 
videos on CNN and the local ABC affiliate in Washington, D.C. (Fletcher, 2006). 
This act was defined by Saunders (2008, p.69) as “the battle for control of 
Kazakhstan’s national image”.  
 
The immediate reaction in the country after the Borat character appeared as a 
host on the MTV Awards showed that Kazakhstan believed that Western 
audiences actually saw the nation as whole in the way it was shown in the film 
(Stock, 2009).  
 
Kazakhstan feared to be “imagined” as the Kazakhstan portrayed by 
Borat. […] Therefore, Kazakhstan suffers from a certain lack of “national 
confidence”, leading to its external perception. The mentioned lack of 
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confidence is combined with a considerable lack of humour with regard to 
the post-modern irony of Borat. (Stock, 2009, p.184)  
 
 
Figure 16 The poster of Nomad: the Warrior (2006) by Wild Bunch distribution company. 
https://www.wildbunch.biz/movie/nomad/. 
 
Interestingly, the launching of Nomad in 2006 worldwide by the Kazakh 
government was an attempt to “hit back with a movie about its glorious past, 
fighting off the Mongol invaders” (Porter, 2006, n.p.). Although Kazakhstan 
became “the most high-profile victim” (Dinnie, 2016, p.114) and its national 
brand was “hijacked” (Saunders, 2007, p.240) by a mockumentary character, 
“the most expressive reaction to the film Borat was the development of Kazakh 
cinema” (Waśkiel, 2019, p.56). Therefore, Borat pushed the government to 
create the first movie for wide international circulation. Also, the Kazakh 
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director, Yerkin Rakyshev, produced a film Borat, My Brother (2013) as a 
response to the original movie. 
 
However, some film critics argued that Borat reduced the chances of Nomad’s 
chances, given its release was delayed, thus also delaying the more positive 
introduction of Kazakhstan to the world (Norris, 2012). It is claimed that if 
Nomad had been released on time, before Borat, the image crisis would have 
bypassed Kazakhstan, but this argument is difficult to prove. As can be seen 
from the poster (see Figure 16), if first impressions count, the red flag and the 
actor’s back do not truly demonstrate the real Kazakh identity and the history of 
the 18th century. Is it a red flag of the October Revolution, or is it a soldier of 
World War Two?   
Consequently, Borat helped to attract visitors and a boom in film-induced 
tourism. For instance, the November 2006 issue of the Kazakhstan News Bulletin 
by the Embassy of Kazakhstan in the United States published the launch of two 
Borat-themed holiday itineraries: “Kazakhstan vs. Boratistan” and 
“Jagzhemash!!! See the real Kazakhstan” (Saunders, 2008, p.78). Also, 
www.hotels.com reported in 2006 that Internet searches for accommodation in 
Kazakhstan had jumped 300 per cent just after Borat’s release (Mangan, 2006). 
Moreover, international arrivals increased from 3,468,000 in 2006 to 3,876,000 in 
2007 (Pratt, 2015, p.985). Furthermore, after the subsequent film, Delivery of 
Prodigious Bribe to American Regime for Make Benefit Once Glorious Nation of 
Kazakhstan, was released in October 2020, the Kazakh government reacted by 
turning the character’s catchphrase “Very nice!” into a new tourism campaign 
(Sullivan, 2020). In this way Kazakh officials invited tourists to see “Borat’s 
homeland”. Therefore, although the film created a rather unusual, negative 




Cinema is a constructor of national identity and can strongly impact on nation 
building. Nationalism, in turn, as a communicative space connects nationhood 
and cinema. The latter is a constructor of a national “self”. Self-definition of 
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the nation may be possible when the nation distinguishes itself from others. The 
paradigm of otherness helps to define national cinema. Also, state policy, 
including defending national films against Hollywood hegemony and the 
historical dimension of films, helps to qualify the films as national.  
 
The identity question is very pertinent for Kazakhstan: positioning itself as 
neither Eastern nor Western, but as Eurasian multi-ethnic country, has involved 
a difficult journey. On the one hand, Kazakh people see themselves as 
descendants of the Turks; on the other, they embrace their nomadic legacy 
reflected in literature and culture. Furthermore, the traditions and culture of 
the nomads that shaped the roots of the Kazakh national identity are 
inexplicably woven into the Soviet era. The language issue has divided the 
country into two polar worlds: the Kazakh and Russian. The Russianness of 
modern Kazakh society and the bilingualism of the Kazakh linguistic landscape 
makes self-identification problematic and nation building uncertain, leaving the 
national image undefined.  
 
It is undeniable that Kazakh cinema has lain in the shadows of the more 
transnational Soviet cinema. After independence, Kazakhstan as a nation won a 
chance to be branded for the international audience through films, transforming 
from “Sovietness” to the state that it is today.  
 
The development of Kazakh cinema has now changed significantly from a 
controlling centralised body - the State Committee for Cinematography in 
Moscow – in Soviet times, to one that includes producer-led productions as well 
as independent films. However, the post-Soviet collapse in the film industry 
meant it could not immediately adapt to harsh market demands. This is why, up 
until now, Kazakh cinema has focused mainly on historical dramas.  
 
There is an urgent need to examine the contemporary issues for Kazakh cinema 
and film policy in the present transition phase with the implications that it has 
for nation building. This thesis aims to fill in the research gaps outlined in the 
previous chapters by way both of empirical analysis and qualitative approach. 






This chapter outlines how this project was established and then responds to the 
limitations it faced, as well as reviewing the methods used. It begins with the 
project’s history and the timeline. From there, it moves on to the methodology 
and research methods. It shows how these are used to account for problems and 
gaps in Kazakh cinema industry as well as the role of EurIFF in the nation 
building of Kazakhstan. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the research design, 
explaining how I carried out field trips and data collection, which includes semi-
structured interviews with key individuals in the Kazakh film industry. I also 
point to general obstacles, challenges, ethical considerations, and limitations in 
conducting this research.  
3.1 Qualitative methodology 
Nation building and cinema are complex notions. As such, this research, like any 
other study, needed to have an appropriate research design.  
When choosing among three methods, it is crucial to understand the nature of 
each of them. For example, a quantitative method (a survey, for instance) 
provides a “quantitative description of trends” (Creswell J.W. and Creswell, 
2018, p.147). It aims to test a hypothesis that has been previously formulated 
(Flick, 2015). As became more evident throughout the project, the study of 
Kazakh cinema mainly has a descriptive character. Hence, the cinema's effect on 
nation building needs to be explored empirically by using qualitative 
methodologies. This thesis does not use quantitative methodologies as the data 
could not be analysed by running computer programs and could not be expressed 
by statistics only, although quantitative strategies are regarded by many as more 
scholarly. Moreover, my data referred to the meanings, characteristics, and 
description of things (Berg, 2004) as well as a complex and detailed 
understanding of the issue (Creswell, 2013). Besides, statistical analysis does not 
fit the research issue (Creswell and Poth, 2018). In addition, I was more 
concerned with people’s behaviour and life stories, which are more readily 
conveyed via a qualitative methodology (Silverman, 2017). However, as argued 
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by Bryman (2016), qualitative research is often criticised for being unstructured 
and lacking transparency (e.g., the way people are chosen for interviews or 
observation). I tried to overcome this by providing to my supervisors a list of 
potential interviewees (amended and updated several times), along with 
resumés of their role in relation to Kazakh cinema.  
As Patton (2002) discusses, there are three key types of qualitative data: 1) in-
depth and open-ended interviews; 2) direct observation; and 3) written 
documents. The qualitative methods that I used in this thesis consisted of semi-
structured interviews and observation to implement the research design. Desk 
research occupied an extensive period of this study. Academic papers, film 
policy documents (Cinema Law, Language Law, all legal documents concerned 
with the establishment of the State Centre for Support of National Cinema and 
the Expert Council), government documents (regulations, charters), mass media 
observation and the history of Kazakh cinema were thoroughly analysed. It 
should be noted that as the project was ongoing, the desk research continued 
throughout the PhD’s whole journey. Also, I used a research diary in the 
fieldwork (Scott and Garner, 2013) as a part of my research activity.  
With respect to the design of the qualitative research, many studies follow a 
traditional model based on the following:  Idea - Theory – Design – Data 
collection – Analysis – Findings. I largely followed the “research-before-theory 
model” set out by Berg (2004, p.19), where data collection and analysis come 
before theoretical framing. That said, the research was guided by some general 
considerations, including familiarity with relevant theories, hand in hand with 
the field research and the analysis of findings. 
 
3.2 Project history and the timeline 
The genesis of this project dates back to 2006 when I attended a session at the 
School of Young Democracy and Leadership in Berlin, funded by the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation. During this trip, I had an opportunity to watch the newly 
released film Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious 
Nation of Kazakhstan by Sacha Baron Cohen. After the film, I gave an interview 
as a Kazakhstani citizen to one of the local TV channels about my impressions, 
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which were twofold: at that point in my life I simply did not understand the 
humour or, indeed, the point of the film. Added to this, I could not understand 
why the creator of the picture had chosen Kazakhstan for this purpose and I was 
concerned about its effect on Kazakhstan’s image. I had no idea then that Borat 
would become a section of my future dissertation project. Although I was always 
an active fan of Kazakh films, I had never imagined that our films were so 
diverse, or Kazakh directors so talented, until I started this project. 
The proposal for this thesis was designed in the winter of 2016 and submitted in 
spring 2017. The scope of the project then was too broad and focused only on 
nation branding and Kazakhstan, as reflected in a number of successful events 
such as EXPO-2017 and the Asian Olympic Games 2011 hosted by the country; 
achievements in the space industry; and, finally, the stunning worldwide success 
of the young singer Dimash Kudaibergen, with his voice range of six octaves. It 
became clear throughout the research that there was a need to narrow down its 
scope. In May 2018, a decade after Borat had opened and touched upon a wider 
debate on the image of Kazakhstan, I decided to work specifically on cinema, 
remembering my experience of 2006. However, at the time of choosing this 
direction, I had no idea that Kazakh cinema was in a transition period and on the 
cusp of a new Cinema Law, which is expected to reshape film policy in the 
country. Secondly, I realised that a nation-building approach is more suitable to 
analyse Kazakh cinema rather than a nation-branding perspective. 
It goes without saying that this research landscape was constantly evolving while 
I was doing the research. The study benefited from many developments and 
changes. For example, the representatives of Kazakh cinema did not take 
unambiguously to the establishment of the State Centre for Support of National 
Cinema (SCSNC) in 2019, which was supposed to select the best projects for 
state funding, to ensure transparency and to lead the film industry from the 
centre. After the field trips and even during the writing-up period, there were 
ongoing corruption scandals around the SCSNC. The continuous tensions between 
the Joint Stock Company Kazakhfilm and the SCSNC, the two largest structures 
in the domestic film industry, and the information war between them continued 
until the dissertation’s final touches were being made. In July 2020, the Ministry 
of Culture and Sport announced that the SCSNC and JSC Kazakhfilm were to work 
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together and all important decisions for the industry would be carried out in this 
way. This significant development had implications for how the findings of the 
first research question might be viewed. The aim of the reforms in film policy 
and the Cinema Law (2019) was to get rid of the old Soviet system and create a 
film centre that would deal with issues separately as a standalone institute. The 
study researched the SCSNC as a new, unique, and separate entity and this 
recent decision by the Ministry of Culture and Sport undermined the whole 
purpose of the Cinema Law and the recent efforts made towards creating an 
independent industry.  
Although the focus of this thesis is contemporary, it is important to place it in an 
historical context. That is why the literature and academic publications I 
explored started from the early 20th century, when Kazakh cinema was 
established. It should be stressed that the analysis of Kazakh film genres and the 
different approaches (chronological and thematic) to analyse them were 
important starting points to see the links with nationalism theories, national 
identity theories and with cinema in Kazakhstan.  
This research aimed to analyse the key issues surrounding Kazakh cinema at the 
crossroads of transition, which entailed an investigation of two case studies: 
cinema production and the EurIFF. These cases explore their influence on nation 
building.  
Although the scope of the research was narrowed down in May 2018, the 
fieldwork did not begin until 2019 because of the need for extensive reading and 
writing. Secondly, it was almost impossible to plan ahead the dates of the field 
trips due to the late announcement of the dates of the EurIFF (see section 
5.3.1). As there was a vast range of material that I had not mastered yet, I 
decided to split the fieldwork in Kazakhstan into two parts. The first took place 
between 15 February and 3 March, 2019, in Almaty, the former capital of 
Kazakhstan, where I interviewed key industry figures, directors, producers, film 
critics and scholars. This trip enabled me to go deeper into the research and to 




The second stage of my fieldwork continued between 25 June, 2019, and 13 
July, 2019. Within this time frame, I travelled as an observer to the EurIFF in the 
capital city, Nur-Sultan. There I managed to interview organisers, participants, 
international jurors, and guests of the film festival as well the key figures in the 
cinema industry, such as the SCSNC leadership. After completing the field trip in 
Nur-Sultan, I came back to Almaty and continued interviewing.  
My first memory of a festival was attending the Pusan International Film Festival 
(South Korea) in 2008 as a journalist. I did this without realising that the event 
would become the basis for my festival knowledge for this research as well as 
giving me the opportunity to interview Nurzhyman Yktymbayev, the lead actor in 
The Gift to Stalin (2008), the drama by Kazakh director Rustem Abdirashev, 
which opened the prestigious festival. Eleven years later, I had a second chance 
to interview him as a researcher at the EurIFF in Nur-Sultan. Although these two 
festivals are the only ones I attended, they enabled me to learn the difference 
between reporting on and researching an event. Also, the two festivals provided 
me with valuable experience of being part of the cinematic culture of two 
industries: one of them leading the Asian sector, and the second one of Central 
Asia’s rising stars on the international stage.  
At the first attempt, it was hard to find a way of testing my arguments with the 
use of case studies. The research questions were too direct. Later, I collected a 
vast range of materials that laid the ground for further research. As stated by 
Yin (2018, p.84), it is essential to understand that “research is about questions 
and not necessarily about answers”. This suggested to me that I needed to ask 
the right questions. These are the questions I came up with. I have answered 
these critical questions in the four empirical chapters that follow.  
 
3.3 A case study approach 
When it comes to the strengths of qualitative enquiry, Scott and Garner (2013, 
p.8) suggest:  
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Qualitative research is best suited for answering research questions that 
lend themselves to the analysis of a relatively small number of cases but a 
more significant number of attributes/variables. 
 
Bearing this in mind, throughout the research in the first year, it became clear 
that to answer my three research questions (1. Who takes the decisions in the 
Kazakh cinema market and who controls it? 2.To what extent does the EurIFF 
contribute to nation building and to the projection of national identity? 3.What 
is the role of Kazakh cinema in nation building?) it would be more helpful to 
choose no more than two case studies to explore the issue. This study explores 
two central case studies (cinema production and the EurIFF) from a number of 
different angles, such as distribution, management, festival organisation and its 
audiences. Therefore, qualitative methodology is best suited to present this 
research and requires one to be more specific in one’s goals (Berg, 2004). To 
address this, I followed the approach taken in case study research. 
What a case study may consist of is much debated (Schwandt, 2018). Yin (2018), 
Swanborn (2010), and Gerring (2017) argue it can be anything – an event, an 
organisation, a person, regions, empires, or a nation-state. In this thesis, the 
Kazakhstan case is chosen as the main macro case, while cinema production and 
the EurIFF are considered as two micro cases. The research focus of a case study 
is “to develop an in-depth description and analysis of a case or multiple cases” 
(Creswell and Poth, 2018, p.121): it is explained that researchers carrying out a 
case study explore groups of individuals who take part in an event or activity, so 
I focused on people in both of my micro cases. Even exploring large entities such 
as the nation-state, one should not disregard that it is people who act and react 
within them (Yin, 2018). Moreover, it is suggested:  
 
Particularly, as is often the case in policy research, if the focus is on 
success or failure of policy measures, it is important to trace the ways in 
which behaviour is influenced by the interaction of people, and when and 
how behaviour changes. But also, more concretely, it is important to 
discover who helps or hinders whom, who tries to influence who, and 
which bottlenecks occur. (Ibid, p.26) 
This approach assisted me in analysing the current status of Kazakh cinema 
production with its hidden secrets and challenges. Furthermore, it helped me to 
discover who makes the decisions in the field and who influences the decision-
making process.  
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A case study is an empirical method that explores a “contemporary phenomenon 
(the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context” (Yin, 2018, p.15). For 
me, the case study was one of the most challenging methods of all social science 
approaches, as well as being time-consuming (Swanborn, 2010). In order to be 
sure of this chosen method, I examined the assumptions, fundamentals and 
justification associated with it, which are outlined in detail in Schwandt (2018).  
Also, the reason for choosing this method was due to its descriptive, causal, and 
inclusive framework. The definition of a causal case study is concentrated on a 
central hypothesis about how X affects Y (Gerring, 2017). This study, which 
explores the relationship of the cinema on nation building, is the causal case. 
However, I bear in mind that most case studies do not seek to assess a precise 
causal effect (Ibid, 2017) and there is no single comprehension of “case” in 
social sciences (Schwandt, 2018) and no single formula (Yin, 2018). That is why I 
did not try to determine the exact degree of the influence of Kazakh films on 
nation building.  
 
3.4 The data collection 
The main activity in qualitative enquiry is fieldwork (Patton, 2002). Initially, it 
was hard to accept that only the researcher can produce the data. Scott and 
Garner (2013, p.4) made plain why this is the case:  
 
Information and data are not just “out there” lying around like apples 
fallen from a tree, waiting to be “collected” by the eager researcher; 
rather, the researcher brings the data into existence through her research 
choices and activities, which unfold in reference to the research 
questions. In a word, the qualitative researcher produces data.  
 
Using this advice, I used a snowball technique as proposed by Bertaux (1981) 
where a respondent recommended the next one to me and shared their contact 
details. It is worth noting that most of the data were collected just a few 
months after the adoption of the Cinema Law in January 2019. Hence, the 
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material I collected reflects the situation before and after the law came into 
force, reflecting the real picture of Kazakh cinema in transition. 
 
3.4.1 Challenges 
As with any data collection process, both of my field trips faced enormous 
cultural, technical, and administrative difficulties. First, the question of gender 
was relevant. It would be much easier for the interviewer to set up a meeting 
with an elderly generation of directors and producers (the majority are male) if 
he/she was male or a foreigner rather than a local woman, like myself, wearing 
a headscarf, which can cause concern.25 Also, finding female directors who 
wished to take part in this research was not easy as the genders split in Kazakh 
cinema in favour of male filmmakers. The question of ethnicity played a role as 
well. All interviewees, except four foreigners and two non-Kazakhs residing in 
Kazakhstan, belonged to the titular Kazakh nation, however, nearly half of them 
were so-called “Russified” city-born Kazakhs with limited knowledge of the 
mother tongue. This fact underpins the arguments detailed in Section 2.4 about 
urban-based Kazakhs. 
  
Occasionally, there were individuals unwilling to assist me in my research or who 
were even obstructive. Some of the actors and directors were reluctant to give 
me an interview when they discovered that I did not have a Bachelor’s or 
Master’s degree in film studies. In Kazakh academic culture, a researcher is 
expected to have one speciality from the start and stick to it. This coincides 
with Caldwell’s (2009, p.222) argument that when the researcher “wears two 
hats”, interviewees do not want to disclose information to outsiders to the field.  
 
It took a lot of work to persuade some people, especially those in high positions. 
However, it was vital for developing a perspective from the inside (Creswell 
J.W. and Creswell, 2018). Furthermore, there were some cultural differences 
when dealing with Kazakh professionals. I bore in mind that beliefs, values and 
                                         
25 The majority of Kazakh people are ethnic Sovietised Muslims, who do not think you should make 
your religious beliefs visibly obvious. Such individuals believe it should just be seen as a state of 
mind rather than a religion to be put into practise. Secondly, the commonly held stereotype is 
that women in headscarves are not well educated and are also not likely to be studying abroad.   
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norms may lead to misunderstandings in elite interviews (Mikecz, 2012). Due to 
the Kazakh mentality, sometimes participants cancelled a meeting just hours 
before or else turned up late. For example, it took me more than one week to 
negotiate with one principal respondent and, finally, he cancelled our meeting 
just a few hours before the scheduled time. A researcher cannot plan a weekly 
or monthly timetable with interviewees in Kazakhstan as in the UK. For some 
frantically busy respondents, it was preferable to arrange a meeting just on the 
day, or sometimes just a few hours beforehand. I had to interview the renowned 
director, Rashid Nugmanov, twice, because our conversation lasted over an hour 
and he had another meeting scheduled.  
However, the toughest challenges I faced were the numerous changes that 
occurred in the rapidly evolving research landscape. The events have unfolded 
at such lightning speed, changing as I write, that it has impacted on the accurate 
researching of this subject. The SCSNC was continually developing throughout 
the writing of this thesis. Since the adoption of the new Cinema Law in January 
2019, the film production field has suffered modifications and alterations to 
some legal acts. When one chapter was nearly close to completion, the 
information in it became irrelevant to some degree. For instance, two prominent 
high-profile figures resigned in the space of one month: the Minister of Culture 
and Sport and the CEO of the SCSNC. Just one week after the completion of the 
fieldwork, the position in the SCSNC was taken over by another famous Kazakh 
producer, who was replaced again in November 2020. Overall, the numerous 
changes – such as the change of regime in Kazakhstan; renaming the capital; and 
the transition of film policy from the monopolist Kazakhfilm studio to a 
centralised brand, the new SCSNC – all impacted greatly on the research’s 
accuracy. This necessitated keeping close track of Kazakh cinema news and 
developments on a daily basis. 
To remedy the challenges posed by a combination of circumstances beyond my 
control, I decided to gather as much data and interview as many people as 
possible. Thus, during the festival, I had the further difficulty of balancing the 
need to rush between two venues to catch as many press conferences as 




Gaining access to “to closely guarded communities” and building trust is always 
problematic for researchers, especially when they try to build a bridge between 
academia and industry (Caldwell, 2009, p.2014) and between elite interviews 
and ethnographic practices (Herzog & Ali, 2015). Discussing social and cultural 
processes in interviewing film production workers, Caldwell (2008) explores 
distinct degrees of disclosure of information in different echelons of the media 
industry. Especially when it comes to difficult elite interviews, it takes much 
longer to negotiate with each of the industry workers, who may deliberately 
erect barriers (Mikecz, 2012). As Creswell J.W. and Creswell (2018) deduce, a 
researcher learns a lot by having to get permission to connect with institutions 
and organisations. Interestingly, though, with respect to my second case study, 
access to the EurIFF and its venues was relatively easy by sending a request by 
post to the Ministry of Culture and Sport five months beforehand, after taking 
into account Kazakhstan’s bureaucratic system. The late announcement of the 
dates of the festival meant I could not plan ahead. After numerous calls to one 
of the main organisers of the festival, Kanat Torebay, I succeeded in booking 
tickets, although the dates had not been revealed officially on the website, 
www.eiff.kz.  
 
Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021 caused challenges such as limited 




In order to answer all three research questions, desk research into the history of 
Kazakh cinema with recent mass media observation and commentaries was 
combined with semi-structured interviews. The full list of the interviewees may 
be found in Appendix A.  
There are certainly advantages and disadvantages to interviews. First of all, 
interviews as a qualitative inquiry allowed me to share the understandings and 
perceptions of the participants (Berg, 2004). This is the reason why I tried to 
interview people face-to-face. However, when people tell you stories, they 
provide the details of their personal experiences and therefore from within their 
82 
 
consciousness (Seidman, 2013). No wonder that Berger (2011) defines interviews 
as a dialogue between an interrogator and an informant. In his words, interviews 
are used in research because they give us data that we cannot get in any other 
way. However, Bryman (2016, p.493) suggests that “the interview relies 
primarily on verbal behaviour, and, as such, matters that interviewees take for 
granted are less likely to surface”. However, the interviews were taken 
alongside participant observation (see section 3.4.3) to circumvent this obstacle. 
All of the interviews in this study, except two, were undertaken face to face. 
This was a preference for me, though it is worth mentioning with respect to 
qualitative data, that the most crucial source is what people say, no matter how 
it is obtained, whether it be verbally or through a written interview (Patton, 
2002).  
Planning my interviews, I was thinking about the what, why, how, who, when, 
and where of interviewing (Seidman, 2013). I found the email addresses of the 
potential interviewees (if they had one) and sent an email indicating the purpose 
of my research. Making a networking visit in person ahead of the interview, as 
Seidman (1998) suggests, was not feasible due to time limits and geographical 
distance. The email correspondence was followed up with telephone calls or 
Facebook messages in some cases. One of the main privileges of interviews is 
that one can record it and, as long as one has a written record, it can be 
dissected in detail (Berger, 2011). I chose to conduct a series of interviews with 
Kazakhfilm directors, independent producers, and film professionals – 30 
interviewees in total. These were all recorded.  
It took a long time to choose which type of interview would be the most suitable 
for my research. Holstein (2002) distinguishes highly structured, standardised, 
quantitatively oriented survey interviews, semi-formal guided conversations and 
free-flowing informational exchanges, with all interviews being interactive. I 
found a semi-structured interview an essential way of conducting research 
(Gillham, 2005). However, following Holstein (2002), I did not limit all my 
interviews to semi-structured ones. In this respect I avoided the same questions 
for every participant due to the nature of my research and likewise avoided 
spending the same amount of time with every participant, as described by 




I prepared a set of questions in advance that covered the main topics the 
interviewee could address. I used mainly open-ended questions and tried to 
make it a guided conversation (Yin, 2018). This enabled me to access the ideas 
of the informants. Patton (2002, p.21) advocates “not predetermining those 
points of view through a prior selection of questionnaire categories”. For 
instance, my questions at the EurIFF sounded more general rather than direct. 
For example: What is the agenda of the festival? In your opinion, how does the 
EurIFF cope with its tasks and aims? What is the targeted audience of the EurIFF? 
(see Appendix D). I took this approach because the objective of the interview 
was not to test the respondent’s assumptions, but to be interested in his/her 
lived experience (Seidman, 2013). I chose this type of interview because they 
were flexible enough and could be modified for the respondents, allowing me to 
extemporise during the interview (Scott and Garner, 2013).  
 
My journalistic background had both advantages and disadvantages, which 
affected the direction of the research. This was particularly the case with 
respect to such a time-consuming activity as conducting an interview. On the 
one hand, my previous work as a journalist helped me communicate easily with 
people; I was able to negotiate and persuade them to cooperate. Also, I already 
had a useful network, which provided me with contact details of the potential 
interviewees. On the other hand, it also interfered because, at times, I 
interrupted the respondents by asking them too direct journalistic questions. In 
a few cases this affected the progress of the interview as the answers were too 
short. However, I decided, first of all to bear in mind Seidman’s (1998) message 
that interviewing provides access to the environment of people’s behaviour, 
which helps a researcher uncover its meaning. Secondly, interviews require our 
actions as interviewers to indicate that others’ narratives are significant. 
Thirdly, I have learned that the difference between qualitative interviews and a 
journalistic interview is that the first one aims at “listening hard to access the 
progress of the interview and to stay alert for cues about how to move the 
interview forward as necessary” (Seidman, 2013, p.82). In addition, as Holstein 
(2002, p.112) remarks, “the interview conversation is a pipeline for transmitting 
knowledge”, which I hope this thesis has achieved. Finally, I took into account 
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Caldwell’s (2009) argument that the professional identity of the researcher may 
impact on the disclosure of information, in particular during elite interviews.  
 
I avoided interviewing people by email because, as Seidman (2013, p.113) puts 
it, “spontaneity of oral responses” could thus be lost. However, one interview 
with the actor and director Doskhan Zholzhaksynov and producer Ilyas Akhmet 
took place over the phone due to the incompatibility of our schedules.26 I used a 
loudspeaker on my mobile phone and a digital recorder. As argued by Braun and 
Clarke (2013, p.79), a telephone interview can be regarded as an extension of 
the traditional method. However, Bryman (2016, p.203) suggests that although 
this method is quicker and cheaper, it has certain limitations. For example, the 
interviewer cannot be involved in observation, which works well during personal 
conversations. In addition to several disadvantages of telephone interviews, Frey 
and Oishi (1995, p.37) note that the telephone interviews are successful if they 
take no more than 50 minutes. Nevertheless, the conversation with the actor 
lasted for more than an hour and provided useful data (see Appendix A).  
 
In terms of the length of the conversations, most of my interviews lasted an hour 
or so. The longest one was two-and-a-half hours with an anonymous informant, 
whereas the shortest conversation, with Parliament Deputy Bekbolat Tileukhan, 
took just 17 minutes. No matter how long the interviews lasted, almost all of 
them gave me valuable insights and, most importantly, data to analyse.  
 
Following the advice given by my supervisors, I used two digital recorders in case 
one of them stopped working and took notes in my diary to accompany the 
audio-recording (King, 2009). These tips worked well in all cases.  
 
I carried out interviews, for the most part, both in Kazakh and in the Russian 
language in order to be as flexible as possible for my respondents. The 
percentage ratio of Kazakh/Russian interviews was 56 per cent to 30 per cent, 
respectively, with the rest either in mixed Kazakh/Russian or in English. 
 
                                         
26 Doskhan Zholzhaksynov gave me an interview over the phone on his way back to Almaty. The 
producer Ilyas Akhmet was interviewed later in October 2020, while I was in Glasgow. 
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I tried to include in the list of interviewees people with a variety of positions to 
make the research diverse (King, 2009). I divided the list into elite-level and 
expert-level of interviewees. The latter is an open conversation with people 
holding “expert knowledge” (Van Audenhove and Donders, 2019, p.179). Elite 
interviews are those who hold powerful positions (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
In this case, Parliament Deputy Bekbolat Tileukhan, Chairman of the Board of 
the SCSNC Andrey Khazbulatov, as well as the EurIFF organiser Kanat Torebay, 
comprised the elite-level block. I also sought an interview with political figures, 
such as the former and current Ministers of Culture and Sport of Kazakhstan, 
Arystanbek Mukhamediuly and Aktoty Raiymkulova. The first was extremely 
difficult to contact while, with the second, I did not manage to conduct an 
interview at all, due to some unforeseen circumstances.  
Apart from those mentioned above, I had the good fortune to interview key 
figures in the Kazakh film industry: the accomplished actor Asanali Ashimov and 
actor and screenwriter Nurlan Sanzhar; prominent director Satybaldy 
Narymbetov; the Kazakh New Wave directors Rashid Nugmanov, Darezhan 
Omirbayev and Sabit Kurmanbekov; the film critic Gulnara Abikeyeva; and many 
other participants of the festival. All of them were quite enthusiastic about 
telling their stories, and, so far as can be judged, were scrupulously honest. By 
focusing on senior speakers, I took it that I was able to explore the Kazakh 
cinema industry extensively by interviewing people who had been working in this 
field for a long time and knew all pitfalls of the industry. My list of the 
informants was not limited to those long in the field, but also promising up-and-
coming directors such as Adilkhan Yerzhanov, Serik Abishev, Zhandos 
Yespenbetov and the film scholars Baubek Nogerbek and Alma Aidar. In this way, 
I manage to get a range of views. 
Although some quotations from a couple of interviewees (for instance, Asanali 
Ashimov and Askhat Kuchincherekov) were not included in the final draft of the 
thesis, the information given by them gave me a valuable flavour of the topics. 
3.4.3 Observation and the research diary 
There is good evidence to suggest that observation is one of the most practical 
methods for qualitative research. As Scott and Garner (2013) put it, observations 
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cannot be easily counted and measured, but they can be written, spoken about, 
filmed, and explained. This feature of the method worked well at the EurIFF, 
where I was able to observe detailed examples of people’s habits, behaviour, 
performance, and the full range of interpersonal interplay (Patton, 2002). 
Furthermore, as described by Flick (2018), observation is when a researcher 
enters the field and tries to become a part of it. This is what I tried to 
implement to a great extent at the EurIFF by attending all press conferences and 
master classes. My aim was not only to visit the official events but to observe 
what happens backstage as it was a further data collection activity (Yin, 2018). 
I have chosen participant observation as a complementary activity (Scott and 
Garner, 2013) mainly for my second case study, because this method allows the 
researcher to understand the environment of the respondents more deeply than 
is entirely possible by using only interviews (Patton, 2002, p.22) as the 
researcher’s notes become “the eyes, ears and perceptual senses for the 
reader”. In this respect, the notes in my research diary helped me to paint a 
picture of the cases. I tried to make observations purely descriptive, though 
some thoughts and deliberations that I recorded were used as data to be 
analysed separately, thus reinforcing my methodological understanding (King, 
2009). Notes in the diary helped me to pay close attention to things that I had 
missed while listening to the recorded data. This is supported by Scott and 
Garner (2013), who note that observation is a method that allows us to check 
discrepancies that arise in other research activities. During the pitching of co-
production projects at the EurIFF, detailed description of every film from the 
mouths of film producers or dialogue and Q&A sessions with jurors helped me 
build an overall understanding of the extent to which the festival was 
transparent and equitable in terms of prize-giving and screenings. Also, I 
observed that there was a lack of foreigners in attendance, with all the guests at 
the press conferences and film screenings being invited participants in the 
contest. These facts added another element for reflection to my study.  
Furthermore, participant observation enabled me to get close to the informants 
and interact with them “in a variety of different situations” and “observe 
behaviour directly” (Bryman, 2016, p.493). This happened during a face-to-face 
interview with the film scholar Alma Aidar. When speaking about Kazakh films, 
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she noted how the auteur’s films, in particular, cannot compete with foreign 
products and cannot find their way to an audience, and in saying this her eyes 
were full of tears. This emotion was acknowledged and noted in my research 
diary. I paid attention to the eye movements, gestures, intonation, and pauses 
during interviews, which undoubtedly, could say more in some cases than the 
words. Therefore, participant observation added value and “flavour” to the 
project. Another example was when observing the backstage process of the 
EurIFF provided me with a deep understanding of the advantages and 
shortcomings of the event, which I will explore in greater detail below (see 
Chapter 5). 
3.5 Transcribing and translating data 
The transcribing process is time-consuming and so needs special attention. 
Transcribing the data from two visits to Kazakhstan together took almost five 
weeks. As both field trips involved 30 respondents, this activity took longer than 
I expected.  
I chose a conservative way to reproduce the data manually. First of all, 
contemporary software does not recognise the Kazakh language when you try to 
transfer audio files into written format. Secondly, the process of transcribing 
may unveil for the researcher new analytical thoughts which may be 
exceptionally helpful.  
 
All questions for semi-structured interviews were prepared in English. However, 
for Kazakh and Russian speakers, the questions were delivered in a language 
they were comfortable with. Some speech characteristics such as American and 
Australian accents (those of international producers in Chapter 7) were harder to 
understand.  
Although my bilingualism helped me a lot while conducting interviews, the most 
challenging aspect for me was translating data from Kazakh/Russian into English 
accurately. I needed to transfer a lengthy conversation into a coherent 
narrative. This meant that this specific process was labour consuming, given that 
I translated the transcripts myself. I tried to reflect in the quotes that I chose to 
analyse the tone and manner of the interviewee. However, I eliminated 
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repetitive thoughts, non-verbal utterances, and emotions to keep the data more 
focused. 
 
3.6 Data analysis 
Data analysis requires the researcher to discuss in detail the different social 
processes people use to support their social realities (Berg, 2004). Patton (2002, 
p.432) offers an excellent example of the traditional approach to analysis: 
 
Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. No formula exists for 
that transformation. Guidance, yes. But no recipe. 
I followed this approach and started the work of analysis by filtering the 
empirical information and excluding irrelevant materials. After a careful line-by-
line reading, I used the topical coding technique, the “pencil-and-paper 
strategy”, to query and make my data responsive (Bazeley, 2013). I labelled 
every passage of transcribed interviews with a thematic code, which enabled me 
to pull together similar information and sort it out accordingly. Some scholars 
(Creswell J.W. and Creswell, 2018) define this task as ambitious. As soon as I had 
analytic ideas and aims I wanted to pursue, I used a memo writing technique, 
which some scholars find provides “more depth and complexity than codes” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013, p.214). Also, I used dating and identifiable captions 
(Creswell J.W. and Creswell, 2018). It helped me to connect the selected data 
with research questions and to have a good sense of the scope of each theme.  
In this study, I interpreted the data with detailed descriptions. Descriptive 
interpretation plays a pivotal role in case study research (Ibid, 2018). Braun and 
Clarke (2013) distinguish between two ways of treating data extracts in 
qualitative analysis: 1) as illustrative examples; 2) by analysis of the content of 
the extract itself. The second interpretive form of analysis, proposed by Miles 
(2014), was more challenging to adapt at first as I stayed too close to my data. I 
tried to inform the reader by using quotations, whereas my aim was supposed to 
be to analyse them. Sometimes two types of interpretation were combined so 
that the study moved from its original descriptive meaning to a more 
explanatory model (Braun and Clarke, 2013).  
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In analysing my data, I tried to avoid disclosing only positive results (Creswell 
and Poth, 2018) and to be fair and honest. Also, as part of my analysis I watched 
every film which was relevant to this study and made my own evaluation. I used 
my own notes and accounts of the plot summaries in the thesis based on my own 
viewings. I chose a selection of relevant films for Chapter 2 by picking up the 
most interesting ones, in my personal opinion (I had watched them all before), 
from the work of key scholars who had researched Kazakh cinema (Abikeyeva 




In creating a qualitative research design, it is essential to consider what ethical 
issues may arise and to plan in advance how these things need to be addressed 
(Creswell J.W. and Creswell, 2018). Ethical clearance for this project was 
granted by the College of Arts Research Ethics committee in 2019 (100180060), 
which was given to protect the interests, rights and dignity of those who agreed 
to take part in my research (Flick, 2018). Informed consent forms (see Appendix 
E) were distributed via email in advance to the director Adilkhan Yerzhanov and 
the producer Serik Abishev, although they signed on the date of the interview. 
Other participants were given consent forms, as well as an information letter in 
English, Kazakh, and Russian, while I was explaining the nature of the research 
face-to-face. In the information letter (see Appendix F), I tried to include as 
much information as possible so that participants could decide on the nature of 
their involvement (Greener, 2011).  
When it comes to data management, I organised my data by keeping track of the 
participants, making sure that all consent forms were signed and kept in a safe 
place (Seidman, 2013). I labelled each of the audio files and saved them in a 
password-protected laptop for the time of thesis writing so no one would be able 
to access them.  
The anonymity of the participants is a crucial ethical issue. In the “consent for 
the use of data” form, each participant was given the option to remain 
anonymous. In this study, only one respondent wished to do so. His/her wish was 
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withheld, and I saved the transcribed interview without typing the interviewee’s 
name on my Word file (Flick, 2018). The respondent was informed that the data 
would be anonymised, and his/her confidentiality guaranteed.  
 Discussing some logistical considerations, Seidman (2013, p.53) suggests that 
the venue “should be one in which the participant feels comfortable and 
secure”. Some interlocutors invited me to their homes according to Kazakh 
hospitality, but I refused, as our ethical regulations state that a researcher must 
meet with the respondents in a safe public space.  Also, no criminal, dangerous, 
or forbidden activities that might harm participants or leave them vulnerable 
(Flick, 2018) were chosen for this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an overview of the methodological positions demanded 
of this research. It has reflected on the research design I chose in order to 
answer the research questions as well as the connection between these 
questions and the data collection and analysis processes. Moreover, the chapter 
has stated the reasons and justifications for choosing a case study approach.   
Further, the chapter has highlighted the challenges I faced during both field 
trips to Kazakhstan. After that, I explained the process of semi-structured 
interviews in line with using a research diary in observation. Following this, I 
discussed transcribing and translating data process and data analysis, 
highlighting the memos and thematic coding, which were both labour-consuming 
but enjoyable for me. Finally, I examined the ethical considerations.  
Adopting the research methods explained in this chapter, I will move on to the 
first empirical chapter where the original findings are presented. Chapter 4 will 
explore the thorny path of transition for Kazakh cinema with some historical 
background, paying special attention to topical and burning issues affecting the 




4 Kazakh cinema in transition 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is the first chapter of substantive findings and addresses my first 
research question: Who takes the decisions in Kazakh cinema market and who 
controls it? The question will be answered through in-depth analysis of the 
materials drawn from the interviews taken in Kazakhstan. To answer the 
research question, I will be examining views on the new Cinema Law, adopted in 
January 2019, in order to see how much it is likely to reshape the cultural policy 
towards cinema in Kazakhstan. The key question will be whether it can bridge 
the gap between the three parts of the cinema community: distributors, 
exhibitors, and producers. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the main challenges of film production as 
well as what influences the current state of Kazakh cinema from a cultural 
policy angle. The aim will be to look at issues within Kazakh cinema that 
obstruct the growth of the industry. It focuses on the dependency of the sector 
on its political, financial context.  
 
4.1 Debates around the Cinema Law 2019 
Up to 2019, there were only six articles in the Law on Culture that impacted on 
cinema production. These were set in place on 24 December, 1996, with further 
amendments on 15 December, 2006.27 The earlier law was far too general to 
have much significance. There was no specific legal framework to define how 
cinema should function with respect to production, distribution, storage, 
archiving or digitisation (Mukanova, 2017). There is little dispute, therefore, 
that film policy had long been unfit for purpose. Up to this point, the state did 
little more than issue a rental license for a film and assign it an age index.  
 
                                         
27 Under the general umbrella of culture (cinema, museums, literature, theatre, library, concerts, 
circus), it witnessed many amendments between 2006 and 2018. 
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In the early 1990s, the public organisation for professionals in the film industry, 
the Union of Filmmakers had proposed many projects for the purpose of bringing 
in new legislation. In the second half of the 1990s, a series of projects was put 
out to tender for the purpose of reforming the film industry. Despite countless 
attempts at implementation, the legislation was not passed.  One interviewee 
notes how, in the second half of 1990s, heated battles took place around cinema 
development: 
We argued a lot. Because I spoke up a lot about problems with respect to 
cinema, it had a negative impact on my career28 and life in general. The 
Law was not adopted at that time because the people who worked in this 
field and those who ran Kazakh cinema thought only about money. 
(Anonymous interviewee, 2019) 
This implies that those prepared to speak about urgent problems in the film 
industry put themselves on the leadership’s blacklist. The Law was not 
advantageous for the Kazakhfilm studio, because it would lose power and money 
if any amendments were made to the process of project funding. Personal 
interests were placed higher than those of the public. The suggestion here is also 
that the majority of filmmakers, who worked within the old, traditional system 
of Kazakhfilm, were not willing to change as they were too set in their ways. 
In another interviewee's opinion, the lack of legislative acts, film policy and 
activity in cinema led to the following problems:  
We have every director on his own, attempting to get financial backing 
for his productions, just negotiating somehow or other with those who 
distribute money. We have no strategy, no common vision, no governing 
body/council or board that could oversee the process. We do not have a 
national centre. Our cinema is like a ship without a captain. (Gulnara 
Abikeyeva, President of the Association of Film Critics of Kazakhstan,29 
interview, 2019) 
 Here, Abikeyeva is suggesting that there was no link between the older and 
younger generations and chose the term “a ship without a captain” to describe 
the disadvantaged position of many working within Kazakh cinema. She was 
flagging up the fundamental problem that Kazakh directors struggled to promote 
                                         
28 The informant thought that because of his frank views he was not offered jobs. 




their films internationally. If one makes a comparison with, say, the Institut 
Français in France, in its case there is worldwide distribution of non-commercial 
French movies via libraries, museums, universities and festivals. Also, state 
programmes such as UniFrance, French Film Festival USA, MyFrenchFilmFestival 
and Tournées Festival contribute to the international circulation of French film 
art (Harris, 2018). Although Kazakhstan did not have particular institutes to 
promote local films abroad, Kazakhfilm’s international cooperation department 
was making an effort to participate in international film festivals. However, 
these efforts were not sufficient to provide adequate promotion for Kazakh 
films.  
The chasm between film policy and cinema development spawned a new wave of 
discussions about the need for a Cinema Law. In February 2016, Senate Deputy 
Dariga Nazarbayeva, the elder daughter of the former president Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, ordered a draft of the Concept for the Development of 
Cinematography to 2050 to be worked on (Kazakh Research Institute of Culture, 
2017). The concept included a chain of regulations, as well as the Cinema Law. 
The main aim was for Kazakhstan to gain entry into the 30 best countries in the 
world in terms of the development of national cinema (Kazakh Research 
Institute of Culture, 2016). The new legislative actions, initiated by the Senate, 
were discussed over 2016-2018. More than 10 public hearings on the project 
were held in Almaty and Nur-Sultan organised by the Kazakh Research Institute 
of Culture for the Ministry of Culture and Sport (MCS). The draft of the new law 
was discussed by all leading Kazakhstani filmmakers, producers, and distributors, 
as well as experts from France, the USA and Russia. Also, the most advanced 
experience of leading countries such as the UK, Italy, Germany, Korea, China, 
and others were studied for the purpose of comparison (Kazakh Research 
Institute of Culture, 2018).  
 
The Cinema Law has three main goals. The first is to support the production of 
national films; the second, to ensure particular priority for national films over 
foreign ones in film distribution; the third is the release of Kazakhstani films to 
the world market, including via joint film production and co-production with 
leading world film companies (Kazakhstan, Parliamentary Debates, 2018). The 
overall task is to eliminate the monopolistic system of film funding through JSC 
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Kazakhfilm and to ensure equitable sharing of state support to all studios 
functioning in Kazakhstan. 
 
It is worth noting that the Law draft was supported by all 106 deputies of the 
lower chamber of Mazhilis in parliament. None of them abstained from voting 
and none of them was against it. New legislation, including the creation of a new 
film centre, spawned much controversy but more so among the filmmakers than 
the deputies.  
 
4.2 The State Centre for Support of National Cinema: 
Kazakh Cinema 
Due to the implementation of the Cinema Law, the government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan issued decree № 113 on 15 March, 2019, on the establishment of 
the State Centre for Support of National Cinema (A. Raiymkulova, personal 
communication, 5 April 2019). The chairman of the SCSNC set out the main task 
of the Centre as a need to develop national cinema and increase the number of 
film projects receiving state support: 
SCSNC will be engaged in the rental and screening of national films, 
including reproduction, dubbing, subtitling, or voice-over, and 
advertising. It will work on the participation of national movies at 
international film festivals, the organisation of Kazakh film days and other 
events aimed at promoting national films abroad. (Andrey Khazbulatov, 
chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, interview, 2019) 
Here he makes plain how the SCSNC sets multitasks and tries to establish clear 
systematic procedures. In addition to this quote, the official website 
www.kazakhcinema.kz underlines that the state does not only finance, 
distribute and release movies, it also deals with attracting investment to the 
film industry. If we compare this system to the UK’s, where the model of 
national cinema support was first elaborated in the early 20th century 
(Schlesinger, 2015), from its inception, the UK Film Council (UKFC) endorsed 
other film-related bodies such as the British Film Commission, British Screen 
Finance and the Lottery Film Department of the Arts Council, as well as the 
production and regional funding functions of the British Film Institute (BFI), 
implementing the idea of a unitary film body.  Secondly, the UKFC was a non-
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departmental government agency which worked closely with the government 
(Ibid). In this sense, the SCSNC replicates the UKFC as a unitary body regulating 
film-related issues in Kazakhstan (although the UKFC was closed down, and most 
of its functions were transferred to the BFI in 2011). As such, it can be said that 
the SCSNC combines the task of being a Film Institute along with being the sole 
operator of cinema state policy.  
However, some interviewees were very much opposed to the creation of a new 
film centre and funding model.  
It will be just like my pockets [shows his pockets]. You know, you see me 
hiding the money here, but when you look you discover my pockets are 
empty. It ends up being a secret pocket. All the money is kept in one 
place. The SCSNC should be part of the Ministry of Culture and Sport, not 
something separate. […] Otherwise, we will fall into the pit at some 
point. It will be the old story, someone will steal the money, or there will 
be some corruption scandal. This is the way it’s heading. You mark my 
words. The SCSNC has been created to steal money. (Nurzhyman 
Yktymbayev, actor, interview, 2019) 
This outspoken statement deserves a more in-depth examination. Corruption is 
an output of the country’s history, culture, social development, and 
environment (Brooks, 2016). Corruption may include different acts, such as 
“bribery, extortion, graft, embezzlement, and various forms of fraud. Acts such 
as patronage or influence peddling are widely practiced by many who hold 
political office” (Kratcoski, 2018, p.3). All of these types of corruption appear in 
the news daily in Kazakhstan. It is not likely, therefore, that film production will 
avoid corruption. There is, for example, the case where the highly respected 
actor and producer Tungyshbai Zhamankulov accused the former Minister of 
Culture and Sport, Arystanbek Mukhamediuly, of stealing money from the 
unfinished Phoenix project in 2016. As a result, the minister threatened the 
actor with prison. After being given exemption from criminal liability, 
Zhamankulov recorded a video asking President Nazarbayev to resolve the issue 
(Koskina, 2016). Even after such a shocking scandal, Mukhamediuly did not resign 
until the new president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, appointed a new minister in 
the spring of 2019. Some sources say that this was because Mukhamediuly was 
from the same Elder Horde as President Nazarbayev. If so, this supports the 
argument that tribalism (see section 2.5) and cronyism persist in the film sector, 
generating a struggle for power.  
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Take the example of another bribery scandal, when the director Adilkhan 
Yerzhanov, while receiving an award for Best Director at the closing ceremony of 
the 12th EurIFF in Almaty, accused the vice-president of Kazakhfilm, Serik 
Zhubandykov, of stealing $232,220 out of $290,27530 allocated by the Ministry of 
Culture and Sport (Tugelbayeva, 2016). These examples point to the possible risk 
of “black bookkeeping” where some funds are shared with higher officials. 
Discussing “persuasive” motives for bribery and fraud in the Post-Soviet space, 
Karklins (2005, p.72) argues:  
 
People in the post-communist region have certain patterns of thinking and 
acting that affect the level of corruption in society. […] People have many 
excuses for this: the acts they engage in are rather innocent, “everybody 
else does it,” they need to engage in them to survive, and they would lose 
out by not participating. The summary view is that “the system” makes 
them do it, they are forced to act in certain ways due to red tape, poor 
laws and law enforcement, and the unresponsiveness of the state to their 
needs. Often a bribe that expedites the resolution of a problem is 
considered normal. 
 
This is possibly one of the most commonly held beliefs within Kazakh society, 
given the system itself is seen by many to be corrupt. The film industry and 
those in control of film policy consist of people with a Soviet and post-Soviet 
way of thinking, where illegality, bribery and fraud were rife, putting a spoke in 
the wheel of the film industry.  
 
One of the most unexplained events was the quick change of leadership within 
the SCSNC, which influenced the course of policy within the organisation. Andrey 
Khazbulatov, who had been working hard on promoting and implementing the 
Cinema Law, was unexpectedly replaced by producer Gulnara Sarsenova just 
after the 15th EurIFF in July 2019. The new leadership reorganised the structure 
of the SCSNC as well as the whole staff. They also made a quickfire change of 
the English name from Kazakhstan Film Commission to Kazakh Cinema, while 
simultaneously changing the website from www.filmkazakhstan.kz to 
www.kazakhcinema.kz. This did not create much confidence in the stability or 
reliability of the management in cultural and film policy. Again, the new 
leadership, now under Gulnara Sarsenova, in May 2020, was accused of large-
                                         
30  $ equivalent to tenge was calculated with the average index of 2016, when EurIFF XII took 
place. It is £173,900 out of £217,000. 
97 
 
scale bribery with respect to fund allocation (Sagiyev, 2020). In November 2020 
Sarsenova herself was replaced by Yesetzhan Kosubayev, who previously headed 
the Ministry of Culture, Information and Sport in 2004-2006, led media 
companies, and organised various projects in the cultural field (Zakon.kz., 
2020b). Kanat Torebay, the executive director of EurIFF in 2019, who works 
closely with director Yermek Tursunov, was appointed as Deputy Chairman of 
the Board of SCSNC in December 2020. However, earlier, in July 2020, actors, 
filmmakers and honoured workers of Kazakhstan (including the new head of the 
SCSNC, Kosubayev) addressed a letter of complaint to the President of 
Kazakhstan, Tokayev, just after the appointment of director Akan Satayev to the 
post of President of Kazakhfilm Studio. They believed that the previous head of 
Kazakhfilm, Arman Assenov, was in charge for only 10 months and the Ministry of 
Culture and Sport did not let him work effectively (Auespekova, 2020). 
Interestingly, the former head of Kazakhfilm, Arman Assenov, revealed that the 
Ministry of Culture and Sport persuaded him to write a “voluntary” resignation 
letter offering the position of the head of the SCSNC on 8 July, 2020, after the 
bribery scandal with Sarsenova. However, he was suspended from Kazakhfilm 
but was not offered a new job promised by the Minister of Culture and Sport, 
Aktoty Raiymkulova (Hrabryh, 2020). Thus, frequently changing the head of the 
SCSNC reflects the never-ending hidden power struggles and internal intrigues in 
implementing film policy as well as ongoing corruption. However, one of the 
major innovations in the film industry implemented by the SCSNC that gives 
slight hope is a new electronic ticket system. 
4.2.1 Statistical data and the new electronic ticket system  
Statistical research in planning cinema production is vital. However, its role has 
been underestimated in Kazakhstan. Interestingly, these days, all of the 
statistics on the Kazakh cinema market are held by the Russian company 
Nevafilm, based in St Petersburg. The website of the company, 
www.nevafilm.ru, sells ready-made analytical annual reports on the 
Kazakhstani, Belorussian and Russian cinema markets.31 The next interviewee 
                                         
31 For instance, one analytical report costs ₽25,000 (Russian rubles), which is approximately £250.  
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explained how Russia gets access to all analytical data on the Kazakh film 
system: 
Nevafilm, being in Russia, has access to Russian distributors. That means 
that 99 per cent of our cinema comes through Russia. We do not have 
direct distribution with the West. […]  That is why all statistics on 
Kazakhstan are concentrated in Russia. This is our great misfortune. 
Nevafilm makes the money. (Bauyrzhan Shukenov, director of Arman 
cinema network, interview, 2019) 
Indeed, there is no single data source for the number of films imported and 
exported into the country, or where they are distributed or how often shown. 
There is no single source of information on the number of daily sessions, tickets 
sold or statistics on audience numbers. For this reason, it was impossible to get 
an objective picture of the film market or of film production and film 
distribution activities (Timurova, 2018). Along with this, box office statistics and 
film attendance are still rarely disclosed by its producers (Leontyeva et al., 
2019). Statistical data depends on the distributors' country of origin. A third 
point is that not only statistics, but all aspects of the Kazakh cinema market, 
and its distribution in particular, depends on neighbouring Russia (see section 
4.3). Moreover, it was Nevafilm who prepared a catalogue for the first 
Kazakhstan Pavilion at the Marché du Film at Cannes in May 2017 (Nevafilm, 
2017). We may assume that this dependency on the Russian market will be 
ongoing as Kazakhstan does not distribute films directly but only through Russia.  
Testimony from Bauyrzhan Shukenov is supported by the fact that all the 
available statistical recent research in the Kazakhfilm studio was done 10 years 
ago. The national report on the status of the film industry in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan – which is out of date now – was ordered by the Moscow-based Movie 
Research Company (MRC) in 2009. Along with this, the first vice-president of 
Kazakhfilm studio, Serik Zhubandykov, explained: “As a film production 
organisation there is no service in the Kazakhfilm studio structure which could 
collect requested statistical data and provide analytical processing” (S. 
Zhubandykov, personal communication, 26 March 2019). That said, since 2015 
the studio’s International Cooperation Department has been keeping a private 
record of all its films which have been included in international film festivals 
(Ibid). But this ad hoc data aside, it is clear that since 2009 there has been no 
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in-depth analysis of the film industry which would meet the criteria of a high-
profile marketing and research approach required by the government.  
In 2020, the SCSNC launched its electronic ticket procedure, based on the 
Russian unified federal automated information system, which has been working 
in Russia since May 2014 (Kazakh Cinema, 2020a). This, in turn, would possibly 
solve the issue of statistical data, enabling the research market to become 
independent. A visible example of such success is the comedy, Offline Holidays 
2, which was the first commercial product to be funded and distributed by the 
SCSNC. The film is a sequel to an earlier comedy where three young men create 
a village-camp project. In this camp, leaders encourage urban russified children 
to learn the Kazakh language and traditions while living in traditional yurts 
without gadgets. According to the new electronic ticket data, by the middle of 
January 2020 the film had grossed more than ₸200 million tenges (over £359,000 
or $469,750), while SCSNC funding came to 20 per cent of the total budget 
(Ibid). However, even though its use makes the box office transparent, it still 
does not solve the fact that Western films have dominance over Kazakhstani 
ones. Nevafilm, which gives industry data on all of the Commonwealth of 
Independent State,32 may, in this respect, produce more reliable and extensive 
data on the Kazakh film market.  
4.2.2 A new funding model compared to the old one 
Before the adoption of the Cinema Law in 2019, it was Kazakhfilm which 
allocated state funds between selected winners. After approval by the MCS, JSC 
Kazakhfilm used to receive the bulk of this funding. Of ₸5-6 billion (over 
£8,978,000 - £10,773, 000) of the annual state budget for film production, they 
received more than ₸4 billion (over £7,182,000) (Abdrakhmanova, 2017). During 
2015-2018, 20 features, 67 documentaries and four animated films were 
produced by order of the MSC (www.parlam.kz, 2018). Interviewees pointed out 
that the first problem with this was a slowdown of projects. As the famous actor 
Nurlan Sanzhar and screenwriter explained: “It takes seven to eight years for our 
                                         
32 CIS is the organisation that regulates the relationships between the post-Soviet states.  
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films to come out. The script of my last film, Oralman (The Returnee)33 was 
accepted in 2013, but we weren’t able to make it till 2017. This was just 
downtime while it waited for funding" (Nurlan Sanzhar, screenwriter for JSC 
Kazakhfilm, interview, 2019). This makes it abundantly clear that it took an 
unreasonably long time to produce a film with state funds. Although every 
country's cinema can face similar obstacles, many levels of bureaucracy may 
break and weaken the whole cinema architecture of the country. This issue 
demonstrates a low level of government encouragement in film production, 
which, no doubt, leads to a lack of interest.  
 
The second argument for the disadvantages of the old system given by the 
informants was the overfunding of historical films. In this regard, a 
representative of the 1990s New Wave, and one of the directors who works 
closely with French filmmakers, Darezhan Omirbayev, complains: 
I understand that we must have historical films, films about politics. 
However, they shouldn’t be prioritised over other films. First of all, the 
Government should support cinema to produce a real piece of art. Such 
films [historical dramas] never recoup their costs even if the whole of 
Kazakhstan, including small children and older adults go to see them two 
or three times. It’s a waste of money. (Darezhan Omirbayev, director, 
interview, 2019) 
Omirbayev made it clear that the Kazakh government wastes huge amounts of 
money on historical films, allowing them to dominate the industry with no 
economic benefit. This is obviously the case when we see that six out of 13 
feature films produced by Kazakhfilm in 2018 can be regarded as historical 
(Isayeva, 2019). The director Omirbayev, whose first profession was 
mathematics, calculates that the government loses money: “The film Nomad 
(see Figure 16) has swallowed more than $30 million. It could be spent on 100 
films if we divide it by $300,000. Kazakhfilm could have lived 50 years without 
any worries by producing five art house films per year” (interview, 2019). It is 
clear from this that Kazakhfilm, with its monopoly over state funds, was 
allocating money where it liked with absolutely no accountability with respect to 
the financial benefits. Here Smith’s (1998) argument on ethno-symbolism applies 
                                         
33 A film about a three-generation Kazakh family that decides to go back to the historical 
motherland from Afghanistan after many decades (see section 2.2.3). 
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(see section 2.1). Kazakhstan has tried to reconstruct its national identity 
through its historical films. These films, as symbols, played the role of “powerful 
differentiators” (Smith, 1998, p.191) from other nations. However, the idea that 
the recognition of ethnic heroes from the mythical past is not widely supported 
by filmmakers causes misunderstanding between two sides.  
Indeed, the state’s inability to recoup losses with such a small population is one 
of the biggest issues. As another interviewee states: “We have only 200,000 
cinema-goers in the whole of Kazakhstan. These are people who are serious film-
goers. There is a fierce struggle to claim this audience by Hollywood, as well as 
Russian, European and Kazakhstani film companies” (Anna Darmodekhina, press 
officer of Meloman company, interview, 2019). Making historical movies is an 
unbelievably costly experience for Kazakhstan with potentially low revenues 
domestically and internationally. Take the case of Australia, comparable to 
Kazakhstan, with a vast territory and small population. Australian films do not 
export well and have never competed at high levels with foreign films because 
local consumers are less interested in domestic films (Mackenzie and Rossiter, 
2018). Therefore, Kazakhstan needs not only to trigger more national audience 
participation to increase revenue for expensive historical pictures but also to 
generally lift its movie culture and raise an awareness of national films.  
In order to solve the burning issues of film production, the Cinema Law (2019) 
set out a new system of funding aiming to destroy the old stereotypes. This 
involved greater partnership working to assist in decision-making. The groups 
involved are outlined in a flow chart below (see Figure 17). The Expert Council 
(EC), reviews and selects the best projects and sends the recommendations to 
the Interdepartmental Commission, consisting of representatives from several 
ministries and deputies from the social and cultural sphere. They then send their 
decision to the MSC, which makes a request to the Republican Budget 
Commission to fund the projects. Finally, a State Meeting approves finance for 




Figure 17 Project financing scheme by the SCSNC from 2019 (Film Qazaqstan, 2019). 
 
 
There is a clear system for allocation of funds. Socially significant films are given 
100 per cent of their budget (children's films, social films, animation, debut 
films and historical films). Co-productions are financed within the limits outlined 
in relevant agreements with foreign companies. All other commercial films are 
to be given between 10 and 70 per cent, based on the terms required to attract 
investors and private capital. For the first time, the Law is taking into 
consideration a state requirement to balance the books. Companies that have 
received support for the production of socially significant films and debut films 
up to 100 per cent will be required to pay 20 per cent of the income from 
rentals to the SCSNC. The remaining recipients will return funds in an amount 
that is proportionate to the percentage of financial support.  
 
It is crucial to query why this publicly funded film selection process has to be so 
cumbersome and the implications that it will have on the film industry. The 
former leadership of the SCSNC explained: 
Let’s say the Expert Council would like 30 or 60 projects out of 80. But it 
doesn’t know the limits of the financing. Then it is not in a position to 
make decisions on financing films. This will lead to backlogs. So, the 
decision has to be made by authorised bodies like the Ministry of Culture 
and Sport, but only subject to agreement with this interdepartmental 
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commission. (Andrey Khazbulatov, chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, 
interview, Nur-Sultan, 2019) 
 
Although this type of model has never been in place in Kazakhstan before, we 
can perhaps learn from how such a system operates in other countries. It is 
illuminating, therefore, to look again at an international example. The New 
Zealand government, which regulates the New Zealand Film Commission (NZFC) 
through the NZFC Act 1978, works closely through its ministries to support film 
funding. For example, the Ministry of Business works to boost economic 
development by attracting various productions to the country. The Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage (MCH) controls government funding for the NZFC and 
appoints seven members of its board. However, as Ferrer-Roca (2018, p.358) 
observes there are power struggles similar to those that have surfaced in 
Kazakhstan’s Cinema Law. Although it is noted that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MFAT) seeks international opportunities and deals with co-
production agreements, “the NZFC is influenced by inter-ministry tensions that 
result from different policy priorities”. Therefore, one can detect clear alarm 
bells here, in that the same is likely to happen in the Kazakhstani Expert Council 
(EC) – as I will now discuss. In comparison to the NZFC, there are six ministries in 
Kazakhstan’s interdepartmental commission,34 which can lead to tensions that 
might be even greater than in New Zealand.  
 
Furthermore, the financial policy may restrict the release of different genres of 
films. Many studios, in order to get 100 per cent of funding from the 
government, will promote the production of socially significant films. Genres 
which are not popular in official Kazakhstani film production, for instance, 
horror films and psychological dramas, might not be developed. Moreover, all 
the income to the SCSNC from the invested-in films will be directed toward the 
development of the cinema industry and the creation of new films. For the 
public interest, this raises the question of how to promote quality films that are 
less likely to make a big profit. One interviewee, Alma Aidar, a doctor and senior 
                                         
34 The Interdepartmental Commission includes deputies of the parliament, representatives of the 
ministries of information and social development, foreign affairs, the national economy, and the 
Kazakhstan branch of the professional union of workers in culture, sports, tourism and 




lecturer in film history and theory of National Academy of Art, expressed her 
concern about art house films, which constitute socially significant films, saying:   
 
Art film will never bring money back because it is created for a particular 
specialist audience. However, we shouldn't treat it like money spent in 
vain because these films show intellectuals and specialist audiences 
abroad what Kazakhstan is like as a country. There must be a separate 
budget for the art films as they cannot survive without the state’s 
subsidies. How long will young filmmakers such as Adilkhan Yerzhanov and 
Serik Abishev be able to produce such films if they can only rely on the 
enthusiasm of the young? They need to be given the opportunity to 
develop as directors (interview, 2019). 
 
The former head of the SCSNC, Andrey Khazbulatov, revealed that they were 
preparing a grading system for films to secure a certain amount of funding for 
every film category. As for funding itself, during the defence of the Cinema Law 
project in parliament in September 2018, a bid was put in for ₸7.5 billion 
(£13,467,000 or $17,615,640) per year for cinema development, which was 
evaluated as “too much” by deputies of the Mazhilis (Kazakhstan, Parliamentary 
Debates, 2018). However, the recent pitching results from June 2020 show that 
only one art-house film (Village) out of 42 winners, managed to pick up state aid 
(Kazakh Cinema, 2020b).35 Here, one can see how film selection is driven by the 
market. Art-house films are mainly produced for film festivals, where Kazakh 
films are more popular, where they have potential market sales and a festival 
history that already gives a certain level of interest for a film. That said, the 
SCSNC has a long way to go in fulfilling its promised aim to “sell” all genres of 
film, rather than tokenistically endorsing a single art-house film.  
 
One interviewee offered yet another opinion on the advantages of state 
financing: 
This is a tremendous help for film producers. At present, because they are 
investing their own money, filmmakers produce light comedies full of 
jokes from KVN.36 If the government invested more than half of the 
finance, the filmmakers would pay more attention to their creative works 
and would shoot what they themselves have in mind. Commercial things 
                                         
35 Nine documentaries, two co-productions, eight feature films, five animations, 12 short films, and 
five debut films. 




would no longer be their first priority. (Zhandos Yespenbetov, freelance 
director, interview, 2019) 
 
This suggests strongly that, in the past, private filmmakers invested their own 
funds and the only way to hit the jackpot at the box office was to shoot 
comedies. The overwhelming prevalence of comedies in the country is the result 
of low-cost production ($150,000–300,000, or £112,700–225,400) which justifies 
expenses and earns money, given the small population. Statistics shows that a 
successful film can gross only from $500,000 to $1 million (£375,700 to £751,500) 
at the box office, and only 15-20 per cent of Kazakh films can be successful on 
the domestic market (Akhmetov, 2019) and those are solely comedies. With the 
participation of freelance producers in funding competitions, with state aid 
filmmakers could shift the focus towards other genres of films, such as crime, 
psychological and lyrical dramas, detective stories, fantasy and melodramas. 
However, the low box-office gross on these films means, currently, there is little 
chance of that happening.  
 
4.2.3 The Expert Council: how crucial is the selection stage? 
If in most countries state support for films takes different forms – direct and 
indirect grants (Ravid, 2018) – most of the funding schemes in the film sector 
originate from centralised funding using a commission-based role (Kolokytha and 
Sarikasis, 2018). Kazakhstan did not change the established tradition. 
The members of the EC are first and foremost the gatekeepers in selecting the 
best projects. One of the main concerns encountered in fieldwork was how 
transparent the EC would be in comparison to the old system and who selects its 
members: 
All decisions will be made by the same 10 people. After they step aside, 
they will simply be replaced by people close to them, so in my view very 
little will change. In the past Kazakhfilm’s editorial board supposedly 
decided which film to fund, but the final result would turn out completely 
differently. The one recommended by the Kazakhfilm editorial board 
would be ignored and out of nowhere, the ministry could fund a project 




This brings to light inequities in the system with respect to the decision-making 
process. It is reminiscent of the corrupt system that existed in the post-Soviet 
space, where fraudulent deals “are initiated by self-serving bureaucrats who use 
their power over the resources under their purview to enrich themselves and 
their cronies rather than work for public good” (Karklins, 2005, p.23). 
Furthermore, in Kazakhstan bribery in the government sector is mainly paid out 
of the potential funding itself, which is described by Langseth (2006, p.11) as a 
“kickback” or “secret commission”. It can be assumed that those projects 
suddenly appearing out of the woodwork were the result of secret connections 
with the upper echelon – the MCS. We can see, therefore, that previous film 
funding has never been either transparent or fair and was riddled with 
corruption at the top. It seems that the government made no attempt to rein in 
the activity of the MCS. And, at the same time, the Kazakhfilm editorial board 
did not complain to the upper echelons because they relied on funding from 
them and were afraid of fracturing relations with them. This supports 
Willemen’s (2006) argument that cinema’s power is hindered by being a state 
institution that must stick to state-controlled frameworks. This is why the 
filmmaking process in Kazakhstan is not independent. 
Serik Abishev’s predictions came true in the spring of 2019, when the SCSNC 
published the list of members of the EC (see appendix B). The list consisted of 
14 people related to cinema production, exhibition, and distribution. Decree 
№113 of 15 March, 2019, on the establishment of the SCSNC (Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019), provides no information on who selected and 
offered these particular people membership although, according to Andrey 
Khazbulatov, a former chairman of the SCSNC, it was the Ministry of Culture and 
Sport.  
 
Moreover, six members on the first list worked in JSC Kazakhfilm. Therefore, it 
seems that these six people could safely maintain the status quo along with the 
old system of film selection and its concomitant corruption and unfair decision-
making. This means that there would be no real change in this brand-new EC. 




They were selected so that each of them would fulfil their function while 
analysing how this project can be successful at the box office. Therefore, 
we have Galenko and Shukenov in the list who know the market and its 
specifics. That has not happened before. Previously, at Kazakhfilm, they 
looked only at the artistic value of the project. No one thought about 
rental. (Andrey Khazbulatov, chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, 
interview, 2019) 
 
This suggests that there were valid reasons for choosing these individuals, one 
being to make the board more market oriented. The advantage of such a quality-
based subsidy model is that only market-worthy projects will be funded. 
However, the other side of the coin is that it may lead to continuous conflict 
between those wanting to select high-quality films from an artistic point of view 
and those wanting to make money at the box office. By way of example, another 
respondent noted that: “Distributors are business people; they just think about 
the money. They [the SCSNC] want them to turn on the green light and give 
prime time to national films. That is all” (Doskhan Zholzhaksynov, actor, 
member of the first Expert Council, interview, 2019). By including distributors 
and cinema network owners such as Vadim Galenko (Meloman company) and 
Bauyrzhan Shukenov (Arman cinema network), all SCSNC film funding decisions 
in Kazakhstan will most likely be informed by market demand from the 
beginning. The result of this will be that film funding competition may depend 
primarily on market trends. 
On a more positive note, in order to avoid the above-mentioned issues, a new 
resolution signed by Prime Minister Askar Mamin on 17 February, 2020, amended 
the previous composition of the EC (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
2020) (see Appendix C). Seven members were excluded (Ashimov, 
Zholzhaksynov, Zhubandykov, Ibrayev, Kamenskii, Maemerov, and Kaiyrbekov) 
and substituted by eight new members, comprising 15 people instead of 14. This 
suggests that the evolving film policy by the SCSNC is becoming oriented towards 
increased “professionalisation” of the committee. Thus, for the most part, 
screenwriters have replenished the new line-up along with one animator.  
However, in August 2019 in the newspaper ExpressK a member of the previous 
EC, the producer Akhat Ibrayev, clarified the nature of a conflict between 
himself and the Union of Filmmakers, represented by the director Yermek 
Tursunov. “[I was subject to] court hearings, anonymous threats, intrigues. For 
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these reasons, I was forced to leave the Expert Council, but the attacks on me 
did not cease even after that”, he revealed (Ibrayev, 2019). It is worth noting 
that Tursunov, himself, very publicly announced his departure in February 2020 
via several republican newspapers, starting an information war with the new 
leadership of the SCSNC under Gulnara Sarsenova. Following Tursunov, the new 
chairman of the EC, Satybaldy Narymbetov, who had the right to two votes, and 
Bekbolat Shekerov both also left the Council. It may well be a struggle for the 
position of CEO of the SCSNC. The second reason for the war between these two 
sides may be that Tursunov got more opportunities for his own films from the old 
funding system through Kazakhfilm ($13 million). He received £9,769,600 for 
four films: Kelin (Daughter in Law) (2009), The Old Man (2012), Kenje (2015) and 
Keeper (2018) (Zakon.kz, 2020a). In 2019, the new system through the SCSNC, 
decided to allocate only funds of $1,177,800 (£885,145) for his new film, The 
Choice, whereas the director asked for more than $1,413,000 (£1,062,000) 
(Zakon.kz, 2020a). Therefore, the allocation of funds may be one of the main 
reasons for the struggle. 
According to Tursunov, the government spends annually $450 million 
(£336,984,750) just to employ the 30 SCSNC employees (Beisenalieva, 2020, 
n.p.), which is a staggering waste of funds, as explained:  
The Expert Council has an exclusively advisory voice, which in practice, if 
we are not careful, can ultimately become just a beautiful and 
comfortable shield, protecting private interests, creating behind-the-
scenes bureaucratic obstacles or enabling  decisions to be made by 
someone’s ‘call’. […] Even in the midst of work and discussion, we were 
faced with pressure from outside. The Council should not be affiliated 
with anyone. Neither the Ministry of Culture nor the heads of the centre 
have the right to interfere in the work of the Council at all. […] When the 
head of the centre [Gulnara Sarsenova] in the process of discussion is in 
the same room as the Expert Council and constantly passes on someone’s 
“wishes”, it outrages me.  
We can see again, therefore, how decisions are often influenced by private 
interests. From this it is clear that, although funding has increased, and the 
selection process has become more transparent, old “traditions” persist.  
However, these high-profile occurrences did not stop the biased process of 
project selection. Inner intrigues and struggle for power continue to be an issue, 
109 
 
where opposing parties do not wish to negotiate but cast blame on each other 
through articles in the media.  
In terms of international experience, most countries have been using a points-
based system in selecting the best film projects for funding. For instance, the 
BFI’s cultural policy pays more attention to the cultural impact of films. Each 
applicant must pass 18 out of 35 marks in a cultural test. The BFI sticks to five 
funding priorities for applicants: talent development and progression, risk, 
perspective, UK-relevance, and support for films with a strong cultural impact. 
This latter is concerned with supporting projects that address social, political, 
and culturally relevant themes (www.bfi.org.uk). A very similar system was 
proposed in Kazakhstan by the director Rashid Nugmanov at the discussion stage 
of the Cinema Law. However, the proposal did not pass.   
Selection criteria for qualifying as a “national” film is based on Article 14 of the 
Law. It states that the film is recognised as national if:  
 1) The film has achieved a high artistic level, satisfying the spiritual needs of 
the people, serving the public interest and gaining the recognition of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan through the art of cinema; 
 2) With respect to the production, distribution and display of films, at least 70 
per cent of the total work on the budget is carried out by film organisations 
registered in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan;  
3) The film is produced by a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan and (or) a 
legal entity that has been registered in the territory of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan;  
4) The film's authors (i.e., scriptwriter, director, cameraman, production 
designer, author of a musical work) comprise at least 50 per cent of individuals 
who are citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Zakon Respubliki Kazahstan o 
Kinematografii, 2019). 
According to the first criterion, it is not clear what “public interest” and 
“spiritual needs” stand for Kazakhstan. These notions may vary and may be very 
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subjective. For instance, one person may search for the meaning of life, while 
another may have need for faith. Also, these criteria support the argument by 
Elsaesser (2005, p.26) that any film company or institution wishing to be defined 
as national cinema is implying that it wishes to be regarded as entitled to state 
support. Therefore, any state-funded films, as Kazakh Cinema Law states, are 
national.  
However, the members of the first Expert Council, which functioned between 
May 2019 and August 2019, had a different opinion:  
I think it [the EC] should not consider only national cinema, because it 
narrows down the scope of cinema. Therefore, any topic, whether 
contemporary or about the past, needs to be considered in a broader 
context. (Doskhan Zholzhaksynov, actor, member of the first Expert 
Council, interview, 2019) 
According to the Law, other commercial films (not necessarily national ones) will 
only have funding of up to 30 per cent. Therefore, it may seem that the Kazakh 
film market is threatened again by a boom in historical films, which qualify for 
100 per cent funding. The result is a potential clash, given the criteria of the 
members of the first EC (May-August, 2019) did not fully match the four points of 
Article 14 of the Cinema Law. 
 
Another aspect that emerges here is the issue of socially significant films, which 
will get 100 per cent funding.  According to Article 1 of the Cinema Law, socially 
significant films are actual films, including historical ones, intended to raise the 
patriotic, spiritual, moral, intellectual, and cultural potential of society, 
including the upbringing of the younger generation: children's films, social films, 
animation, debut films and historical films (Zakon Respubliki Kazahstan o 
Kinematografii, 2019). For Adilkhan Yerzhanov, this point is confusing: 
 
In other words, this is a made-to-order film. Socially significant is publicly 
significant, and publicly significant means that it is useful to society now. 
Cinema about the past is not socially significant. It is historically 
significant. It is not useful to society at this moment. Yes, I agree it is 
culturally significant, but a socially significant film, in my opinion, and 
the opinion of the majority, is one that answers the most crucial 
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questions in our current society. (Adilkhan Yerzhanov, director, interview, 
2019) 
Here, Yerzhanov is contradicting what the Law states about this category of 
films. He stresses the words "at this moment" to indicate that a movie can only 
be significant at the time of shooting and release but after some years it can 
lose its relevance. 
As opposed to the point-based system offered by the director Rashid Nugmanov, 
the SCSNC launched a voting system based on the decision of the members of 
the EC. Between 30 September and 31 October, 2019, the SCSNC carefully 
selected 88 films out of 215 in seven categories37 for the second official pitching 
session (see Figure 18). A total of 21538 film projects in seven separate 
categories were considered (Kazakh Cinema, 2020b). In order to make the 
selection more transparent, the new leadership of the SCSNC launched a live 
online video broadcast to be available to anyone who wished to watch it 
between 27 February and 5 March, 2020. In the end, the EC recommended 58 
projects to the Interdepartmental Commission and the latter decided to fund 42 
films for about ₸6 billion (£10,872,600 or $14,092,500) in 2020 and 2021 (Ibid). 
Although this was seen as an unprecedented number of pictures supported, the 
result of the selection still proved disappointing. It became clear that the EC 
could not do anything other than make recommendations and 16 of these films 
(18 per cent) ultimately were rejected. Indeed, Article 13 of the Decree in 
addition to the Cinema Law states: “Decisions of the Council are drawn up in the 
form of a protocol, which is advisory in nature” (Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 2019). Therefore, the decision of the EC has no real power, leading 
one to question how big a difference the new Cinema Law is going to make on 
the ground. 
                                         
37 Feature films (66), debut films (38), documentary (34), short films (30), animation (19), 
international co-production (15), and art house films (13).  




Figure 18 Members of the new EC and the head staff of the SCSNC voting for projects on 22 
January, 2020, to be selected for a pitching session. www.kazakhcinema.kz. 
 
There is evidence that transparency of the selection process is being 
undermined. At the meeting of filmmakers in Almaty in January 2020, the head 
of the SCSNC Gulnara Sarsenova let slip the fact that: “Filmmakers and those 
who previously led Kazakhfilm know that there is still ‘telephone lobbying’ for 
projects. When they call and ask to promote a specific project, I can afford to 
refuse some callers, but not always” (Amanov, 2020). This argument supports 
what Yermek Tursunov stated above about ongoing interference in the EC’s 
work. Was this an acceptance of the fact that lobbying for projects has its place, 
or an admission of the inherent bias in decisions? Either way, it brings into 
question the fairness of the system. It raises the question of which calls could 
Sarsenova not refuse? The answer is probably calls from people who hold 
positions in the upper echelon.  
Besides the EC, the SCSNC has a Board of Directors, consisting of five people. 
Among them is Parliament Deputy Bekbolat Tileukhan, who previously acted in 
Myn Bala: Warriors of the Steppe (2012) in the role of the great Kazakh narrator 
and poet, Bukhar Zhyrau, and, in The Kazakh Khanate: The Diamond Sword 
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(2016), as the ancient Kazakh poet and narrator Kaztugan (see Figure 19). For 
Tileukhan, who is famous for his criticism of contemporary Kazakh films, a truly 
Kazakh national film should achieve the following:  
We must praise our positive side and conceal the negative. I don’t agree 
with revealing truths that may offend the nation. Our filmmakers must 
show the bravery and nobility of the Kazakh nation, not how it is used to 
screen the country’s shame and shadowy past. It is not acceptable to 
present the history of civilised Kazakhstan as if we were African tribes. 
(Bekbolat Tileukhan, Parliament deputy, interview, 2019) 
 
Figure 19 Parliament Deputy Bekbolat Tileukhan acting in the historical film The Kazakh 
Khanate: The Diamond Sword, 2016. www.inform.kz. 
 
It is worth noting that the film Kelin (Daughter in Law) (2009) by Yermek 
Tursunov has been criticised by Kazakh society and Tileukhan, in particular. The 
film, to his mind, showed scenes that were too intimate and positioned the 
Kazakh daughter-in-law’s image in conflict with an authentic Kazakh identity, 
despite the script being set around the third century AD, in the pre-Islamic 
period when Kazakhs as a nation did not exist. However, this film was well 
reviewed by The Hollywood Reporter as “it heralds the arrival of a new director 
from a virtually unknown part of the world, who is capable of marrying high 
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production values with innovative storytelling and a surprisingly modern feel” 
(Senjanovic, 2009). This emphasis on production values tallies with the concept 
of quality embodied in criterion 1 of the new Cinema Law (recognition of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan through the art of cinema). However, the review 
foregrounds the mismatch between the positive perception of some Kazakh films 
by the Western media versus a lack of appreciation by officials, who are among 
the leadership of the SCSNC as well as helping to point to a new direction 
removed from the too-narrow vision of film art, whereby nationalistic views 
have prevailed. 
4.3  Issues in the distribution system 
It is broadly recognised that the distribution system is a vital link that connects 
filmmakers with audiences throughout the whole cinema field. For people 
outside of it, distribution is understood as merely a physical way of transferring 
film to cinema theatres (Knight and Thomas, 2011). However, Kazakhstan’s case 
is more complicated.  
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a number of countries in it faced 
similar challenges as a result of a crisis in cinema. One parallel example is 
Bulgaria, an almost identical case to Kazakhstan, where the vertically integrated 
film industry, with its centralised financing, did not aim to make a profit out of 
film. Although Bulgaria is a rather small nation, the transitional period occurred 
there earlier than in Kazakhstan as, in 1991, the country launched an alternative 
to centralised film production, shifting funding power to a National Film Centre 
before adopting a Film Industry Act in 2003. Similarly, the new centre served as 
an administrative body fully controlled by the Ministry of Culture to manage 
production, distribution and exhibition. However, the older generation of 
filmmakers was not prepared to adopt new funding rules. The situation was 
aggravated by the distribution network rapidly disintegrating and being replaced 
by subsidiaries controlled by Western companies loyal to Hollywood films. Local 
Bulgarian films were simply not able to serve the needs of the domestic audience 
and this hopeless situation impacted on the nation’s cultural memory (Iordanova, 




A problem with the rental movie theatres started in Kazakhstan after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union when Kazakh cinema got into hot water, as this 
interviewee explains: 
In the 1990s, the connection between Kazakh cinema and its audience 
became fractured. The audience became influenced by foreign ideology. 
There is a big gap between the values of the older and younger 
generation. Everything has to have a national code. Each nation has its 
own characteristics. Our directors are short of these things. They cannot 
grasp the notion of roots. They cannot work out where they are. (Baubek 
Nogerbek, associate professor, doctor in film history and theory of the 
National Academy of Art, interview, 2019) 
Indeed, filmmakers did not worry about the future destiny of their films. After 
approval by Goskino,39 their pieces of art were circulated across the territory of 
the Soviet Union. This is the way Soviet films always used to make their revenue. 
In addition, the USSR regulated cinema theatres with a requirement of at least 
30 per cent of Soviet films being on screens. For Western films it was difficult to 
reach the Soviet viewership (Rakhmankyzy, 2017). They took their lead from one 
of the few states in the world that could control internal cinema rental, namely 
Norway. The Municipal Films Centre, established in 1919 in Norway, was set up 
in response to a system of private distribution whereby local theatres took 90 
per cent of all box office income. The Soviet system was described as “the only 
one comparable [to Norway’s] powerful public exhibition system” (Harris, 2018, 
p.237).  Kazakhstan’s problem was that although it had something comparable in 
Soviet times, it was unable to inherit the system after independence. 
Additionally, nowadays, market trends have changed and have had a tremendous 
influence on movie rental. The main problem is that in Soviet times everything 
was centralised – not only the creation of the film but also its distribution. Now 
it is a commercial market in Kazakhstan that dictates the rules. Rashid 
Nugmanov explained:  
Now all cinema networks without exception are 100 per cent privately 
owned. Moreover, it is impossible to force them to screen films in an 
orderly manner and to make film schedules on behalf of them. Their main 
activity is profit-making. Therefore, they only show the films which 
viewers will go to. (Rashid Nugmanov, director, interview, 2019) 
                                         
39 Goskino was founded in 1972 with its own four-point system of categorisation: third, second, first 
and the highest. The higher the category of the film, the larger was the circulation.   
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First, such a stance is very plainly an anti-market view of what audiences should 
see. Here, it is not the audience but the cinema theatres that choose. Relying on 
previous experience, cinema theatres filter potentially successful films for the 
market and for audiences. The general deficit of national film exhibition 
supports Abikeyeva’s (2001) view that the government’s exhibition and 
broadcasting policy in the country does not aim at some kind of promotion 
biased towards domestic cinema by giving it preference. However, it allows 
personality cult movies about Nazarbayev (see section 1.2) to circulate freely. 
There were some incidents when civil servants were forced to go to cinema 
theatres to watch the biopic film (Lahanuly, 2014). This example shows that the 
green light is given to Akorda-centric (White House) films, in other words, made-
to-order films. 
In Kazakhstan, films are distributed via six companies (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Top 6 distributors in Kazakhstan in 2017 (Leontyeva and Kuzmichev, 2018). 
 






1 Sulpak 81 71 6,233,100 15,372 
2 Meloman41 156 136 5,303,300 12,530 
3 20th Century Fox 
Kazakhstan 
14 14 1,852,000 4,530 
4 Good cinema 
(Prof.Solution 
Group) 42 
30 28  844,500 2,100 
5 Vol’ga 25 25 270,100 570 
6 Paradise 22 22 228,400 630 
 
 
As can be seen from the table above, the leading players in the film distribution 
market are the four representatives of the six major studios. The first one, 
                                         
40 This column illustrates how many people attended the films in 2017. 
41 Meloman is the Kazakhstani company that first distributed the Kazakh commercial film Loving 
Heart or Cocktail for a Star in 2010, which grossed $1 million (Anna Darmodekhina, PR officer 
of Meloman, interview, 2019). 
42 The legal entity of this brand is Prof Solution Group/Paramount and the rest of the package is 
Central Partnership (Leontyeva and Kuzmichev, 2018). 
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Sulpak, is a Kazakhstani brand of Interfilm Distribution located in Ukraine,43 and 
is responsible for UPI and Warner Bros. Meloman includes films by Walt Disney 
and Columbia/Sony. In third place is 20th Century Fox Kazakhstan (Leontyeva and 
Kuzmichev, 2018). Since March 2020, the entire package of films by 20th Century 
Studios transferred from Twentieth Century Fox CIS, based in Russia, to 
Kazakhstani Meloman (Chachelov and Bashinskaya, 2020).44 Independent Russian 
distribution companies lying fifth and sixth, such as Vol’ga and Paradise, work 
directly in Kazakhstan (Leontyeva and Kuzmichev, 2018). It is not hard to notice 
that Kazakhstan has only one distribution company of its own – Meloman. Hence, 
Russian and Western studios prevail in the Kazakhstani market, owning more 
than half of the distribution funds. According to Lobato (2012, p.2), “the 
distributor plays a crucial role in film culture – it determines what films we see, 
and when and how we see them, and it also determines what films we do not 
see”. Therefore, the Kazakh cinema market is controlled by foreign companies 
operating via the Russian market. Hence, national Kazakh films have very little 
chance of winning this battle against Western films.  
 
Another respondent reinforced the view that cinema networks do want to 
support Kazakh cinema, as market rules dominate:  
We need to get rid of foreign cinema in order to develop Kazakh cinema. 
Now Russian films have invaded even 10 per cent more than they did in 
the past. Now the heads of cinema theatres do think about screening 
Kazakh cinema, but earning money is their first concern. In such 
circumstances Kazakh cinema often loses its novelty and topicality. After 
watching Russian films, Kazakh films lose their appeal. It is pure 
psychology. (Anonymous interviewee, 2019) 
This statement implies that Kazakh films are very thin on the ground in cinema 
circuits and underpins the argument of the next interviewee, who said: “We 
schedule Hollywood films first. And then we give the remaining slots to other 
films, including Kazakhstani films” (Anna Darmodekhina, press officer of 
Meloman, interview, 2019). Additionally, my anonymous informant's idea of 
getting rid of foreign cinema is directly opposed to perfect competition theory in 
                                         
43 The head office in Kyiv operates in nine former Soviet Union states: Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan 
(http://www.interfilm.com.ua/). 
44 Since March 2020, Disney has been engaged in rental of 20th Century Studios in the CIS while 
Meloman is a distributor of Disney in Kazakhstan. 
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economics. However, recent research shows that Kazakh films could compete 
with foreign ones and were ranked third and fifth in the top five films exhibited 
in 2018 in the local market (Leontyeva et al, 2019). Moreover, in 2020, the 
comedy The Kazakh Business in Korea (2019) grossed ₸1,139,314,940 (over 
£2,317,000 or $2,675,970) in 45 days of theatrical screenings. Each episode of 
this comedy tells of the adventures of a businessman and his relatives in 
different countries like the USA, Kenya and Korea. The fourth part of the 
franchise set a new record and became the first Kazakhstani film to earn over ₸1 
billion in the domestic box office, bypassing the Marvel blockbuster Avengers: 
Endgame in Kazakhstan (Kapital, 2020). However, to win the battle against 
Western films, Kazakh filmmakers have to continue producing comedies. Only 
comedy can reach high rankings, whereas other genres still stay in the shadows. 
Furthermore, in 2019, the number of national releases in distribution was only 
44 out of a total of 374 (Kazakh Cinema, 2020a), which is less than 12 per cent, 
almost the same as a decade ago. In 2008, at screenings including film festivals, 
the proportion of Kazakh films reached 10 per cent, with 90 per cent being 
foreign (Beumers, 2010).  
  
 




After a slight decline in the production of national films in 2017, Kazakhstani 
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new films, including two co-productions with France and Kyrgyzstan (see Figure 
20). However, only 20 per cent of cinema-goers have watched them (Leontyeva 
et al, 2019). This fact contradicts the idea of “cultural difference” by Bhabha 
(see section 2.1). If this idea can be reached through a viewership interested in 
the nation’s cultural status, then the small audience would suggest that the 
power of national film is insignificant in Kazakhstan. Also, as a form of 
expression and representation of the nation, Kazakh films cannot fulfill their 
function in full force.  
One more example is the audience’s interests. Adilkhan Yerzhanov says: “Our 
film, The Gentle Indifference of the World, was in Kazakhstan's cinema 
theatres, but it had limited rental. It went badly. However, in France, it 
gathered about 30,000 spectators, bringing in about €200,000 [$238,893 or 
£179,000] so it paid for itself. Also, in Kazakhstan, there were only about 200 or 
even 150 spectators” (Adilkhan Yerzhanov, director, interview, 2019). This 
highlights that viewers' interest and choice play a vital and undeniable role in 
building box-office revenue. Secondly, it suggests that art-house films such as 
this may be more popular abroad rather than in Kazakhstan. 
 
It should also be noted that, these days, the two central cities, Almaty and Nur-
Sultan, make the majority of income, with 60 per cent of attendances and box 
office revenue (Leontyeva et al, 2019). This leaves the rural areas in the worst 
situation. As the head of the Cinema Rental and Marketing Department of 
Kazakhfilm studio, Gulzat Shurenova-Kalischuk, pointed out: “In the regions, we 
work with the Departments of Culture of the local city administration. They 
make a contract with us. This way, they screen films in special concert halls in 
small towns and villages – Houses of Culture – in DVD and AVI formats. Our films 
are shown all over Kazakhstan.” However, if you consider the fact that only 13 
per cent of people in settlements with less than 100,000 inhabitants have access 
to cinemas (Leontyeva et al, 2019), the system does not cover small villages.  
The distribution side may seem to be the one most influenced by the new rules 
of the digital market. Theatrical exhibition, in particular, is being forced to 
readapt itself to the growth of the Internet and the subversive process of 
digitisation (Pardo, 2015). However, in Kazakhstan digitisation of film 
distribution and exhibition also depends on the level of internet capacity:  
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We are not so good with the Internet, despite the reports of our 
government. We are still working with hard drives. Not a single cinema 
theatre has enough Internet power to upload a movie to a server with a 
good quality. (Anna Darmodekhina, Press officer of Meloman, interview, 
2019) 
Meloman still circulates films by post to small towns as the Internet capacity is 
not capable of sending the content online. This internet issue significantly slows 
down the circulation of films. Moreover, when the country has uprisings and riots 
against the government, as happened in 2019 after the presidential election, the 
Internet may be shut down for several days. 
To sum up, it can be said that the main problem is disunity in Kazakhstan’s 
cinema market. There is no Kazakh cinema distribution institute (Vlasenko, 
2018). Whereas in Western countries the distributor can enter the project at the 
script-writing stage and buy into the whole project for distribution at the 
beginning, in Kazakhstan this takes place only at the end.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed my first research question: Who takes the decisions 
in Kazakh cinema market and who controls it?  
This chapter described Kazakh cinema’s transition from the monopolistic 
Kazakhfilm studio system to the centralised state operator of film policy – the 
SCSNC. The recent announcement by the Minister of Culture and Sport, Aktoty 
Raiymkulova (July 2020), on the future mutual decision-making by the SCSNC 
and JSC Kazakhfilm studio has been shown to undermine the ultimate goal of the 
Cinema Law, which was to get rid of the previous monopolistic system of 
funding. Thus, the film policy itself has inner problems that impede a 
meaningful influence on nation building. 
If the state’s cultural policy, according to Higson (1989, p.44) is the way the 
nation “seeks to differentiate itself from others”, then the unique features of 
Kazakhstan’s cinema institute is incompatible with world standards of film 
industry development. This chapter has argued that corruption and bribery have 
been, and still are, the reason for the stalled or very slowly developing film 
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industry. The post-Soviet system, corrupted from above, does not allow Kazakh 
cinema to be independent and, therefore, competitive within the country or 
abroad. Until the system and its values change, it makes no sense to expect that 
the millions allocated for the development of cinema will reach their 
destination. The state, represented by the MCS, makes final decisions by tightly 
controlling the industry through the recently established SCSNC and strongly 
influences the policy of films (how and what to shoot). Here, one can see the 
influence of the mixture of political and economic power.  
This said, the SCSNC is offering a new model of selection and pitching sessions, 
which makes the funding system more transparent, although currently it is still 
held back by obstacles similar to the past.  
It can be predicted that socially significant films (historical films, debut films, 
children’s films, social films, and animation) determined by the Cinema Law will 
prevail over other genres because of 100 per cent state aid. Moreover, intrigues 
incessantly occurring between filmmakers who are blaming each other in the 
media do not allow the industry to expand.  
Secondly, the distribution market, including the cinema research market, does 
not belong to Kazakhstan. Previously, Kazakhfilm, as the primary possessor of 
state-owned films, could not address distribution opportunities for Kazakh 
cinema. One reason for this is that the country is completely dependent on the 
Russian stream of information. The distributor-centric model in Kazakhstan, 
where the lion's share is taken by Western companies, is used throughout Russia. 
The system itself resembles the former Soviet Union, where all important 
decisions were made in Moscow. Kazakh films in some places create a worthy 
competitor to Western and Russian films, being ahead at the box office – but 
these are currently mainly films of the comedy genre. Distributors, therefore, 
will not accept films of other genres for fear of rejection, because the country 
has only 200,000 active cinema-goers. As a result, it can be said that the SCSNC 
may have to pay cinema theatres to screen national films in order to justify its 
own existence, which is an additional burden on the state budget. If local films 
were able to access a wider theatrical exhibition circuit (as personality cult films 




This study is not limited to exploring cinema production. A film festival is a 
platform for film culture and is another dimension to measure the impact of that 
film culture on shaping the country’s image. The next chapter centres on the 
case of the EurIFF, where I will explore how significant its impact is for nation 




5 An examination of the EurIFF 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the past and present conditions of the film 
industry in Kazakhstan, focusing in particular on the new funding model within 
the Cinema Law (2019). The other way to examine the construction of a “film 
identity” as well as film culture is to focus specifically on a film festival, given 
they are considered a “useful means of building a city’s image and fostering its 
attractiveness” (Grunwell and Steve, 2008, n.p.) as well as useful for developing 
a country’s image. As was stated previously (see section 2.1), a nation may be 
represented by a city. The city is a constructor of the nation (Therborn, 2006). 
The city can “merge into the nation-building agenda of the state” (Leerssen, 
2015, p.15). Therefore, the role of the city in the nation-building process is 
crucial.  
  
This chapter seeks to answer the second research question: To what extent does 
EurIFF contribute to nation building and projection of the nation? It is the aim of 
this chapter to highlight how the Kazakh film festival differs from traditional 
European models. Section 1 extends the narrative of the history and escalation 
of the EurIFF as the first international film festival event through the end of the 
1990s and into the 2000s. Identifying the EurIFF as an alternative form of film 
exhibition, its influence on Kazakhstan's identity is explored in Section 2. In the 
third section I also look at the different challenges that shape today’s image of 
the festival.   
 
5.1 The history of the festival movement in Kazakhstan 
Numerous festivals have been run in the East and the West all year round, but 
each one is distinct (Iordanova, 2009). No one can estimate the real number 
because many festivals are not tracked (Turan, 2002), however, a decade ago 
the estimated figure of international film festivals was around 3,500 world-wide 
(Peterson and Ooi, 2010 p.322). Whether to develop film culture or to make 
money from the industry, film festivals have always been crucial.  
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If we look at the Cold War era, film festivals such as Moscow, Karlovy Vary, 
Havana and Tashkent were under the influence of the Soviet sphere, working 
independently and differently from those in the West (Iordanova, 2009). This 
meant that, before independence, Kazakhstan’s film culture co-existed with the 
Soviet Union and had to compete with other Soviet nations to connect with the 
world outside the Iron Curtain. Most Kazakh films circulated only within the USSR 
and could only reach the market of other socialist countries if they were lucky. 
Individual auteurs in the USSR did not have an opportunity to advertise their 
films. As a result, the number of independent cinemas was limited. Only the 
Karlovy Vary and Moscow film festivals were considered important film events in 
communist countries (Cudny and Przybylska, 2018). Thus, the colonial system did 
not allow Soviet countries to compete internationally.  
Film festivals became established in Asia as a form of cultural practice in the 
mid-1970s (Teo, 2009). However, the Central Asian region did not participate in 
independent film events. This was because the country was not an independent 
state. Kazakhstan, along with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Tajikistan had no simple means of holding large-scale events. If we speak about 
film festival culture, it arrived in Kazakhstan in the late 1980s. Small-scale film 
events such as Kazakh film weeks and Kazakh cinema days frequently took place 
in Kazakhstan and outside the country as well. Yet it was not until 1998 that 
Almaty, the former capital, pioneered its first film festival.  
 
Whereas in the West film culture developed fast, starting with the Festival de 
Cannes, which has remained one of the top A-list festivals (Ostrowska, 2016), 
film festivals in Kazakhstan are small-scale affairs, sharing little interaction or 
comparison with one another. The majority have different aims and objectives. 
For example, the Shaken Aimanov festival is unique in that it is Turkic cinema’s 
only international film event in the world. The Bastau and Ushkyn events are 
student festivals for debut films. The Baiqonyr International Short Film Festival 
is an important event for filmmakers from Central Asia and is the largest short 
film festival in the post-Soviet space (Kazakh cinema, 2020a). Of all these, the 
oldest and most established annual film event is the EurIFF. 
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5.1.1 The 15th Eurasia International Film Festival  
The EurIFF takes its name from the concept of Eurasianism. The name was first 
announced in 1994 by then president Nursultan Nazarbayev at Moscow state 
university and the idea behind this concept was an intention to build “solidarity 
and peace among people who belong to different ethno-linguistic, cultural and 
religious backgrounds”. This concept became the root principle of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy strategy, promoted by the authorities after their launch of the 
new multilateral organisation, Evraziiskii Soyuz (Eurasian Union) (Anceschi, 
2020) (see section 2.3). A key slogan, the “Heart of Eurasia”, was used at 
promotional events, thus attempting to place Kazakhstan in the middle of the 
Eurasian continent both geographically and culturally. The slogan was created 
after the publication of Nazarbayev’s In the Heart of Eurasia in 2006. The book 
is dedicated to the formation of the new capital, Astana. The idea of 
Eurasianism lay at the heart of events such as the Asian Winter Games in 2011, 
and the organisation of the OSCE Summit in 2010 (Waśkiel, 2019). One can see a 
similar attempt made with the annual EurIFF. 
The launch of the 1st EurIFF in 1998 offered the largest ever film forum in the 
territory of Kazakhstan, the Baltic countries, and Central Asia as a whole 
(EurIFF, 2018a). However, the gaps between 1999-2005 and 2009, when the 
state did not hold the festival, marked a gradual decline. Only in 2010 did the 
event become active again (see Figure 21). Since its relocation from Almaty city 
to the capital, Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana) in 2017, the southern capital has 
launched a separate Almaty Film Festival headed by the director Akan Satayev, 
which is also international and supported by Almaty’s local administration. 
However, due to the fact that it has only been in existence for three years, the 
new Almaty festival has not yet managed to build on the city’s earlier well-
known countrywide credentials. 
 
The EurIFF itself is relatively young compared to its A-list counterparts. 
However, the Copenhagen International Film Festival (CIFF) and the Festa del 
Cinema di Roma (FCR), launched later (in 2003 and 2006, respectively) in 
Denmark and Italy, are bright examples of two cities trying to put themselves on 
the global map of film festivals (Pedersen and Mazza, 2011, p.140). This suggests 
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that the age of the EurIFF may not make much difference when it comes to its 
popularity and it may still enrich film culture.  
 
 
Figure 21 French actor Gérard Depardieu at the 10th EurIFF in 2010 in Almaty. 
https://brod.kz/news/vspominaya_evraziyu/. 
 
The success of the festival, to a large extent, depends on the organisational 
process. Prominent figures such as the director Rashid Nugmanov and film critic 
Gulnara Abikeyeva organised the EurIFF at different times. The latter acted as 
the EurIFF art director for a total of 10 years, heading the festival from 2005 to 
2013. He said: 
 
We had three categories of people. First of all, there were selectors. 
There are only about 10 of them in the world. Then the pool of about 30 
foreign journalists from different countries. Finally, 20 film experts, 60 
people in all, a large group of film professionals. We focused on the range 
of expertise required to make film professionals think, write, and reflect 
on Kazakh cinema. (Gulnara Abikeyeva, President of the Association of 
Film Critics of Kazakhstan, interview, 2019) 
Abikeyeva indicates here that the festival team did a lot to make Kazakhstan 
recognisable through mass media and becoming a platform for selectors. Since 
that time, the EurIFF has proved that it has great resources for building 
international relations, although it was not able to become a real business 
platform. If we compare it with its counterparts in Europe – the Copenhagen 
International Film Festival (CIFF) and the Festa del Cinema di Roma (FCR) – local 
city administration, government, tourism agencies and film industry 
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organisations were involved and interested in creating these events (Pederson 
and Mazza, 2011). It was almost the same with the EurIFF, although this was 
created more by filmmakers’ sheer enthusiasm along with government support. 
Non-involvement of tourism agencies at the beginning shows that the country did 
not aim to make revenue from the festival but was more interested in 
popularising Kazakh cinema for an invited international audience and the local 
audience of the host city. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s culture of 
internal/indigenous tourism was not so developed at the end of the 1990s. But, 
this was not the festival’s only significance. 
 
5.2 The festival’s reputation and how it is perceived 
With respect to the EurIFF’s reputation one should note the following: it is the 
oldest one in independent Kazakhstan; within the CIS space, it comes second 
only to the A-listed Moscow Film Festival accredited by the International 
Federation of Film Producers’ Associations (henceforth, FIAPF), the only self-
appointed international film festival regulator; and it has been given specialised 
competitive status among all post-Soviet states (FIAPF, 2019).  
 
In 2006, the EurIFF applied for endorsement as a specialised competitive festival 
by the FIAPF, which was founded in 1933. In contrast to this, many festivals, 
such as Toronto, Sundance, and Rotterdam, avoid applying for FIAPF support 
because they are able to, and so prefer to secure their own supply chain 
(Iordanova, 2009). International film events, in order to get quality films for 
their competition programmes, were under the authority of the FIAPF. By the 
middle of the 1950s, 21 production companies comprised the Europe-based FIAPF 
(Fehrenbach, 2019). This organisation started to interfere and control the chain 
of major festivals. What is more, many criticised the FIAPF for its restrictive 
rulings based on short-term decisions related to location when accrediting films 
(Iordanova, 2009, p.27). Even the FIAPF’s Edinburgh Film Festival programmer, 
Mark Cousins, called the A-list “pointless” because some of those listed in the 
group were inferior to Sundance, Toronto, London, or Rotterdam (Ibid, p.155). 
Even so, EurIFF officials are very proud of being accredited by the FIAPF and 




International recognition by the FIAPF has signalled the growing maturity of the 
festival. Compared to the Melbourne Film festival in Australia, where the desire 
for FIAPF endorsement was motivated by gaining “access to those international 
films that were only available to FIAPF accredited events” (Stevens, 2016, p.35), 
the EurIFF just sought international acclaim and to equal itself with counterparts 
all over the world. On the other hand, the EurIFF’s recognition by the FIAPF was 
predictable because the organisation recognised only one film festival in each 
country regardless of its size (Ibid, 2016) and the EurIFF was the biggest and 
most influential in Kazakhstan. Sanctioning by the FIAPF builds an expectation 
that the festival “represents recognised operational accountability. […] It 
represents to participants the expectation of a known and approved quality of 
interaction” (Fischer, 2013, p.82). Moreover, the EurIFF’s accreditation both by 
the NETPAC (Network for the Promotion of Asian Cinema) and FIPRESCI 
(International Federation of Film Producers’ Associations) organisations has 
established the festival’s legitimacy in film culture. Film festival membership 
within external organisations establishes them as a favoured site of exhibition to 
visitors (Ibid), thus giving the event credibility.   
 
Further recognition has been gained via the International Film Guide, which was 
last published in the UK in 2012 (Smith, 2012), when it included the EurIFF in its 
list of the leading 73 international film festivals45 along with Abu Dhabi, Berlin, 
Busan, Cairo, Cannes, and other film festivals.  
In recent years, the festival focused on films from Central Asia and the 
Turkic world, but this year the remit was broadened to encompass films 
from Europe, Asia, and the CIS countries. (Ibid, p.279) 
 
Smith underlines that the EurIFF’s coverage broadened only in 2012. It can be 
suggested that the Shaken Aimanov festival took over Turkic world cinema from 
the EurIFF in 2012, so the latter could switch its attention to the rest of the 
world.  
 
                                         
45 However, the festival directorate had the wrong information about it and kept informing the 
readers through the festival website (https://eiff.kz/eng/home/festivali/) that the International 
Film Guide included the EurIFF as one of the 35 leading festivals of the world in 2012. 
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Since its inception, the EurIFF has seen its primary duty as catering for both 
local and global audiences. The programmes, round-tables and master classes 
involved the participation of film critics, experts, journalists of Variety and 
Sight and Sound. Back in 2006, James Bell, the editor of the Sight and Sound 
international film magazine of the British Film Institute, when invited to the 
third EurIFF, recalls the festival as “a little post-Soviet, a little Asian, a little 
European” (Bell, 2006, n.p.). Although 13 years have passed since this 
observation was made, many things have not been changed. It still lacks a strong 
sense of its individuality and, in fact, quite to the contrary, presents itself as a 
modern, global festival. The event has thus branded Kazakhstan as having a 
somewhat mixed identity. This suggests that the extent of the festival’s 
contribution to nation building depends on the internal national identity of 
Kazakhstan.  
The main difference that was observed at the anniversary festival in 2019 was 
that, for the first time, the event began to work closely with the Union of 
Filmmakers of Kazakhstan.  
If before many filmmakers considered themselves to be guests, from this 
year onwards, the Union of Filmmakers is wholly engaged with the 
organisation of the entire competitive programme and the selection of 
guests. We plan that, from now on, the SCSNC will work throughout the 
year on the creation of a future film festival which collaborates closely 
with other film festivals. (Andrey Khazbulatov, Chairman of the Board of 
SCSNC, interview, 2019) 
Before 2019, the EurIFF had to deal with the tendering system, which meant any 
organisation could participate, offer the lowest price, and win the tender. As a 
result, the festival had new organisers every year and was unable to develop 
because each new group of organisers had to start from scratch and therefore 
could not benefit from the experience and the feedback of previous promoters. 
Rashid Nugmanov, who worked as a general director of the festival between 
2015 and 2017, points out:  
The tender practice is not suitable for festivals. We really need to abolish 
it. Each year, no one knows who is going to be in charge. What it needs is 
a permanent, fixed office throughout the year. There are always requests 
from new filmmakers around the world on how to submit a film. Inquiries 
also come from new festivals wanting to be partners and participate in 
exchange programmes. So, it is not helpful that it has to start afresh 
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every year, and is simply wasting money. (Rashid Nugmanov, director, 
interview, 2019) 
Further empirical evidence from this research demonstrates many examples of 
basic mismanagement. The state treats the festival as a one-week event of the 
year with no understanding of how it should fit into best practice world-wide. It 
is also clear from researching current and previous websites of the EurIFF 
(www.eurasiaiff.com in 2017, www.eurasiafestival.kz in 2018 and www.eiff.com 
in 2019) and the completely different Eurasian Film Festival in London 
(www.eurasianfilmfestival.uk) that readers and audiences were confused and 
repeatedly misled by incorrect contact details. Moreover, the abbreviation EIFF, 
which the festival used in 2019, is the same as the famous Edinburgh 
International Film Festival. Those interested in the Kazakh festival are not aware 
of these internal organisational pitfalls. Such errors inevitably leave a negative 
impression of the event.  
With specific reference to the tender system, it took until 2019 for the Union of 
Filmmakers of the RK to insist that the ministry and the SCSNC should organise 
the event more efficiently on a long-term basis.  
Previously, this festival was like a ball. Any institution could win a tender 
to organise the festival: today a violinist, tomorrow a pianist, the day 
after tomorrow, a drummer. […] It is not about money; it is about 
attitude. Only a compassionate organisation should be allowed to do it. 
We said, “Give us how much you can give. Who is more eligible if not The 
Union of Filmmakers?” It is our work. We have put our lives into Kazakh 
cinema. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 
2019) 
Torebay made abundantly clear his view that the tender system, organised by 
the MCS, was not beneficial for the development of the festival. He (see Figure 
22) described Aiman Mussakhajayeva, the president of the 14th EurIFF in 2018, 
as a “violinist”; Mussakhajayeva is now the head of the Kazakh National 
University of Arts in Nur-Sultan. He further makes clear that the Kazakh film 
festival industry no longer tolerates leadership from outwith the cinema circuit. 
This said, though this was a distinctive feature of the EurIFF before 2019, it was 
not, in general, so for film festivals. Also, one can argue that the tensions 
between “commerce and creativity” (Hesmondhalgh, 2019, p.33) are observed 





Figure 22 Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF. Nur-Sultan, 3 July, 2019. 
www.eiff.kz. 
 
Kazakhstan has three main aims for holding the festival: 
The concept is to promote Kazakh cinema. Filmmakers from several 
countries come here, and we can show them our cinema. They then go 
out and spread the word about us. Secondly, we want to compare 
ourselves with what is going on in the world, with what kinds of films are 
being produced, given cinema is constantly evolving. Pure art, pure 
cinema can only be seen at festivals. The third issue is interaction. Given 
the number of participants, it gives us the opportunity to establish new 
friendships. They influence us, and we them, resulting in several projects 
and new ideas. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF, 
interview, 2019) 
Bearing in mind that most of the festivals aim at self-promotion, Torebay is 
suggesting that there is no fundamental difference between the purposes of the 
EurIFF and other events in the world. Probably, its main feature, along with all 
festivals, is this mutual influence. In this regard, the EurIFF is situating itself in 
relation to “others” at the same time as it distinguishes itself from “others”. 
Such a view reflects the analysis of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the code 
of cultural difference discussed earlier (see section 2.1). In this respect, the 
EurIFF, as a constructor of national identity and integral part of culture, has the 
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means to influence cinematic nation building, provided there are no obstacles 
placed in its way.  
5.3 Challenges  
Any event, not just film festivals, can have certain challenges. The former 
director of the Buenos Aires International Festival of Independent Cinema 
(BAFICI), Eduardo Qintín, recalled how challenging it was to organise the event 
during Argentina’s economic crash in 2002. Although even cash machines did not 
work and there was no funding, the festival still survived. This was achieved 
because cinephiles organised financial support campaigns and many people paid 
their own travel costs (Antin, 2009). The COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 across the 
world ruined the plans of many film festivals, including Cannes. The way they 
got around this was by switching to online platforms. Similarly, the EurIFF (which 
was not held in 2020 due to coronavirus measures) witnessed both financial and 
other no less curious challenges in 2019.  
5.3.1 Announcing the dates 
Timing is one of the first things to consider in conducting film festivals (Fischer, 
2013). Since its inception, the EurIFF has always been a one-week festival. Over 
the last three years, the festival organisers moved its presentation from the 
usual September slot to mid-summer, simply because 6 July is the capital’s main 
holiday. This holiday itself was moved from 10 June to 6 July in 2006 to coincide 
with the birthday of President Nazarbayev, which speaks to his personality cult 
(see section 1.2). It is no surprise that the government moved the dates of the 
event to July with no consultation. If Fauve (2015, p.111) treats the nation 
branding of Kazakhstan “as one of the communication strategies employed by 
the Nazarbayev regime”, moving the dates of the festival to Nazarbayev’s 
birthday also communicates quite clearly that the country’s cultural policy is 
dictated by the regime’s authoritarian power.  
 
What is more, many A-list festivals (Venice, San Sebastian, Warsaw, Tokyo, and 
Cairo) usually take place in autumn to increase tourism (Grunwell and Steve, 
2008, p.2). Clearly, it is beneficial to the EurIFF if they are able to plan their 
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dates similarly in order to benefit from the tourist season in summer in order to 
attract more people to the festival.  
 
Figure 23 From left to right: Chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, Andrey Khazbulatov, 
President of the EurIFF, Yermek Tursunov, programme director Eleonora Granata and 
Director of the Department of Culture and Art of the MCS, Abil Zholamanov. Photo taken by 
the author. 
 
In 2019, the festival started on 29 June with a press conference at 11pm (see 
Figure 23). Although the dates of the EurIFF were announced just one month 
before the start,46 the representative of the MCS did not think it was too late: 
 
Maybe it was delayed because of the creation of the SCSNC. Nevertheless, 
despite those financial circumstances, these people [the organisers] were 
negotiating in advance with all cinema professionals worldwide. So, I 
don’t think it was late. (Abil Zholamanov, Director of the Department of 
Culture and Arts, Ministry of Culture and Sport, press-conference 
interview, 2019) 
These comments imply a limited understanding by the government of how the 
late allocation of funds can cause circumstances that significantly affect festival 
planning. It also reveals its “do-it-yourself” approach and shows the event to be 
                                         
46 In 2019, the EurIFF announced the dates of the event rather late. In spite of my repeatedly 
contacting the organisers via an official letter through MCS and telephone calls from November 




driven top-down. Despite the late fiscal organisation, the dates were not pushed 
by the state. However, according to EurIFF officials, politics was the main 
reason for the short notice: 
 
Just politics. There is no other reason. In February, the government 
resigned. Then, one month later, our president resigned. Then 
presidential elections. Probably more attention has been paid to these 
factors. Nobody thought about the festival at that time. (Kanat Torebay, 
executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
This makes plain that that the destiny of many festivals is driven by many factors 
outside organisers’ control such as: changes in government policy, economic 
crashes and technological changes (Porton, 2009). Another example is the Hong-
Kong Film Festival where political and economic circumstances (bird flu, crash in 
the stock market, unemployment) contributed to dent its overall image after 
1997 (Teo, 2009). If, in the past, the EurIFF had been faced mainly with financial 
problems, this time, its problems were exacerbated by political factors. 
Slambek Tauekel, the creator of the EurIFF, who wrote its regulations and 
became the first programme director, argued that:  
There should be a regular Festival Directorate as is generally the case at 
international festivals. At the moment they just announce the festival 
dates in a rush just one month ahead. How are they going to get anyone 
to come? (Slambek Tauekel, director, interview, 2019) 
Clearly, not enough effort is put into familiarising the audience with festival 
dates and general planning in advance. Following the argument that high-profile 
international festivals have traditionally been known for fixed annual dates (de 
Valck, 2007) then it is obvious that, if the EurIFF aims to achieve A-list festival 
status, the state needs to follow global trends in organising a large-scale 
international film event. The EurIFF failed to establish a timing strategy which 
schedules a festival at a specified time of the year to ensure stable finances and 
predictability (Fischer, 2013). By the same token, the late announcement of the 
dates affects the international image of the event and does not inspire 
confidence that it is a credible festival despite its FIAPF accreditation. It is 
worth noting, also, that they have not been under pressure to establish such a 
timing strategy as exists in some other countries. This is because the EurIFF does 
not have any parallel circuit within Kazakhstan (except the new Almaty Film 
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Festival), unlike Montreal and Toronto in Canada, which “maintain a parallel co-
existence” (Iordanova, 2009, p.30). This means the EurIFF does not have any 
rival competition or overlap in terms of dates.  
 
However, the SCSNC explained that the only reason for the event starting late 
was funding: 
 
It is all connected with financing, with approval. We revised various 
schedules and plans. We also had to work hard to keep these dates [30 
June–6 July]. Due to the delayed financing, we knew the event might 
need to be put back. (Andrey Khazbulatov, Chairman of the Board of the 
SCSNC, interview, 2019) 
This supports de Valck’s (2007, p.207) argument that “festivals depend on many 
other factors for their survival; they necessarily have to compromise”. Having 
multiple tasks and disputes between various interests has reduced the festival’s 
power as a strong cultural voice. Khazbulatov’s words also invite comparison 
with the challenges that the Bangkok Film Festival had to face. Like the EurIFF 
in East Asia, the Bangkok Film Festival was also launched in 1998. The Tourism 
Board of Thailand (TAT), which was the main sponsor of the event, insisted that 
the festival dates be switched from September 2002 to January in 2003 because 
it was the only month that the TAT had nothing else on, not to mention a bribery 
scandal connected with a US company. The US Department of Justice arrested 
two American citizens for bribing the governor of TAT with $1.7 million in order 
to award Los Angeles-based Film Festival Management Inc. the contract to 
organise the festival (Rithdee, 2009, p.122). Though there was no large-scale 
official scandal in relation to the EurIFF, the system of kickbacks is so endemic 






Modern international festivals are mainly funded through public-private 
partnerships. As a result, most of them have adopted the institutional system of 
the non-profit organisation. Some uncommercial film festivals are funded first 
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and foremost through national or local governmental support (Rhyne, 2009). 
Likewise, EurIFF funding comes entirely from the government budget rather than 
private sources. However, the festival’s planning process was a chaotic affair in 
comparison to the clear and pre-planned funding process of other international 
festivals: 
 
The most important thing was that we knew that the festival would be 
held anyway. It was clear to us that we would organise it. Indeed, we 
have been preparing for this without any advance funding – talking to 
people, hotels, cinema theatre networks since winter. When we finally 
got the money, the only thing we did at the last moment was the signing 
of formal legal agreements. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the 
EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
This shows that the late allocation of money did not entirely affect the level of 
the organisation. This approach to film festivals is relatively unusual and may 
seem odd. Also, this quote indicates that the EurIFF was regarded as a success 
thanks to the organisers’ network, experience, and negotiating skills. If you 
compare this to global A-list festivals, such as Venice, Cannes, Locarno, Karlovy 
Vary and Berlin, they all function as official, state-sanctioned forums, which are 
also reliant on the financial and ideological support of the country (Stevens, 
2016). In this regard, the Union of Filmmakers was completely dependent on the 
state and had to manoeuvre between government and private organisations in 
order for the festival’s sole organiser to meet the festival’s objectives. 
 
To survive, the Eurasia festival, which has a non-commercial character, had to 
cut down on the usual things that are generally organised on an annual basis. 
Although funding schemes available to the festival are not generally out in the 
public domain, EurIFF officials have made such figures available for the first 
time: 47  
 
The budget allocated was half of what was given in the previous year's 
budget. Less than one million dollars. […] Our new president [K. Tokayev] 
also said we needed to reduce image-based events. That is why our 
budget was less. It depends on your approach. We revised the budget and 
sacrificed a lot of what we would normally do. However, thank God, we 
                                         
47 No funding reports or any statistical data of the EurIFF from the previous years are available.  
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managed to organise the event. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the 
EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
In general, it is argued by film scholars that a film festival is a costly event as it 
needs a huge budget (Bosma, 2015). Although according to Cousins (2009, p.156) 
the biggest festivals have a budget of £10 million, he notes that: “two of the 
UK’s festivals cost over £1 million” excluding the travel expenses of film 
professionals. Yet another example is the Hong Kong International Film Festival 
where the government contribution was only 52 per cent in 2005, and 55.8 per 
cent in 2007 (Cheung, 2009, p.110), unlike the EurIFF which has 100 per cent 
state support. That said, the support is relatively low for a large event, 
compared to, for example, Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it did not prevent the 
festival from inviting well-recognised film stars.  
Celebrity and glamorous stars have always participated in the EurIFF. For 
example, in 2018 the festival was attended by the French actor Vincent Cassel 
and Serbian filmmaker Emir Kusturica. The Hollywood actors Nicolas Cage and 
Adrien Brody visited the EurIFF in 2017. As argued by Wong (2015, p.135), some 
Hollywood stars charge festivals for their appearance. Clearly, they are not 
showing up out of politeness. If the famous Rome festival paid “an outrageous 
amount” (Wong, 2011, p.135) to Nicole Kidman, then what can we say about an 
unknown festival’s commercial step in inviting Adrien Brody? 
In 2019, expenses were limited to Russian and Turkish actors, although the 
festival opened in a glamorous Western style, with a red carpet and famous film 
stars in front of the cameras. Celebrities attending the EurIFF in 2019 included 
the Turkish actor, Burak Özçivit, known for his role in the series about Sultan 
Suleiman, The Magnificent Century (2014); the Russian filmmaker Sergey 
Bodrov; the Russian actors Dmitry Dyuzhev and Anton Makarsky. See below for 
the picture of crowds of admirers and fans surrounding the handsome Özçivit 
(Figure 24). As Pedersen and Ooi (2010) put it, when stars visit the city, it 
becomes glamorous and the subject of media attention. So, inviting stars helps 
publicise the event, and, as a consequence, the country itself. Thus, the EurIFF’s 
policy towards inviting celebrities contributed to the festival and the country 




Figure 24 Fans of the Turkish actor Burak Özçivit breaking through the barriers and fighting 
to take a selfie. Photo taken by the author. 
 
In spite of this, inviting film celebrities to the EurIFF caused some indignation. 
“There is no benefit for Kazakh cinema spending millions of dollars to invite 
world stars; who needs it?”, says the director and the instigator of the EurIFF, 
Slambek Tauekel (interview, 2019). Similarly, another respondent notes: “Last 
year we spent millions of dollars to invite world stars – what is the benefit to our 
cinema?” (Sabit Kurmanbekov, director, interview, 2019). It is believed that 
Kazakhstan paid $300,000 to have Steven Seagal in 2006. A Kazakh producer, 
Maira Karsakbayeva, who lives in Canada, complained that Kazakhfilm did not 
organise any programme for Hollywood stars so as to benefit from their visit 
(Baitukenov, 2010). Hence, famous film stars served to attract visitors but did 
not justify the expense. These are the only associated costs, which involved the 
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EurIFF spending the lion's share of its budget. The Korean director Han Jon Gil 
noted that the festival had lavish parties almost every day. “This is a great joy 
and unusual for me. At other festivals, I don’t remember having such events” 
(Han Jon Gil, Korean director, interview, 2019). But for many, such lavishness is 
seen as a setback for the festival. The executive director of the EurIFF 
highlighted another issue, flagging up huge contrasts in who does and does not 
get paid: 
Most of the guests are my friends. I have invited most of them myself 
because they do not ask for a salary, whereas big stars ask for money and 
require business-class tickets, etc. For example, this time, we have not 
paid the jury members, although the job is not an easy one. I tried to save 
money, and by the end of the festival, I will distribute the rest of the 
amount between the jury members as a surprise. (Kanat Torebay, 
executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
International jury members are only supposed to get a small honorarium for their 
valuable work. The world film festival circuit rarely calls on jurors to work for 
free. Almost the same situation took place in 2017:  
 
I was forced to leave the post of general director literally five days before 
the opening of the festival due to insoluble contradictions with the 
leadership of the Ministry of Culture and Sport and brought the festival to 
an end with my highly professional team acting as “volunteers”. (Rashid 
Nugmanov, director, interview, 2019) 
 
However, the international film festival circuit does have an example of where 
an event used unpaid labour. For instance, three coordinators of the Hong Kong 
International Film Festival worked voluntarily in the early days (Cheung, 2009). 
Clearly, there is much evidence of the financial issue of the event relying heavily 
on the organising committee’s goodwill and their friends’ responsiveness. 
Networking and international friendship amongst the film world saved the event 
in this case.  
Festivals can raise money (Bosma, 2015). If the EurIFF earned money, it could 
have justified its expenses. When the president of the EurIFF was asked about 
the possibility of the festival earning money, he articulated a peculiar point of 
view: 
 
The festival is not just a rental film that immediately pays you back after 
one month. It works long term with a completely different system. We 
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will see the benefits later. (Yermek Tursunov, president of EurIFF 15, 
press-conference interview, 2019) 
 
On one hand, his view supports the argument given by Dovey (2015, p.8) that 
“for filmmakers only interested in financial returns … film festivals hold little 
charm”. On the other hand, more attention is paid to the financial impact of the 
festival because it is easily assessed and employers need cost justifications 
(Allen et al., 2002, p.25). This indicates that the EurIFF does not operate for 
profit and does not expect to provide the government with any return. Nor does 
it intend to cover operational costs as the event does not have sales and 
registration fees (see Chapter 6).  
 
The fact that, in contrast to European self-funded festivals, the EurIFF receives 
100 per cent government support explains the state’s influence on the festival. 
This is the same in Turkey, where “the larger the festival, the bigger the control 
by central government” (Akser, 2014, p.146). However, it also illustrates the 
Kazakh state’s interest and involvement in the EurIFF as the leading festival in 
the whole Central Asian region. It is the same situation with the Pesaro film 
festival in Italy as well. The result is that there is no pressure to get revenue at 
the box office (Willemen, 1981/1985). Neither festival has to return any profits 
to the funding body. If we take the argument of Dickson (2018, p.148) that 
“festivals must evidence their value and accomplishments in both commercial 
and cultural terms” then, in this respect, the EurIFF aims to provide “social and 
cultural benefits” in order to measure the overall impact of the festival (Allen et 
al., 2002, p.25), rather than focusing on financial revenue.  
 
 
5.3.3 Festival staff 
Staff service plays one of the core roles on the festival circuit. Usually, festivals 
cannot afford to hire staff permanently. Even larger festivals run with fewer 
than 20 staff (Iordanova, 2009). Iordanova (2003, pp.122-123) also recalls her 
impressions from the Berlinale visit:   
A visit to Berlinale headquarters outside of the season, in April 2003, took 
me to the nearly empty large edifice on Potsdamer Platz, where the small 
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group of full-time festival staffers clustered in one of the top-level 
corners of the building, occupying no more than five to six rooms. All the 
rest was empty with prime office space guarded by a concierge 
downstairs. 
Yet another example is the Cannes festival, where the staff reaches 300 only 
during busy days (Beauchamp and Béhar, 1992). The EurIFF, as a young film 
event, has not employed permanent staff since its inception. Every year, there is 
a new team with no connection to the previous one due to the tender system. 
Overall, more than 30 people worked at the 15th festival, not including members 
of the selection committee. In this respect, the EurIFF is no different from other 
major festival. 
5.3.4 From Almaty to Astana. From Astana to Nur-Sultan? 
Film festivals are tied to their space (Harbord, 2016). They not only play an 
essential role in the film business, they are also important for their host cities 
and countries. As Cudny (2018, p.197-198) suggests, the substantial 
socioeconomic processes that take place here establish a “festivalization” of 
these places. An example of the influence of a film event on city branding is 
Rotterdam Film Festival. It has helped to promote Rotterdam as the film capital 
of the Netherlands (de Valck, 2007), whereas the Copenhagen film festival has 
been said to “provide Copenhagen as a city and Danish film with visibility” 
(Pedersen and Mazza, 2011, p.157). A city’s identity, per contra national 
identity, is formed by determinants such as architecture, culture, traditions, 
lifestyle, and geographical location, all of which are “special to that city” 
(Yaldız et al, 2014, p.222). Some cities have a stronger image than the country 
in which they are located. “The city’s culture is not always easy to distinguish 
from the culture of the country as a whole, but cities are simpler, smaller and 
easier to think of as a single entity” (Anholt, 2007, p.59). Moreover:  
 
A successful and popular film festival can contribute to the place brand by 
generating awareness of the place and showcasing its ability to 
successfully stage events. The festival will also give the city a ‘film 
identity’, for example, Sundance is known as the independent film 
festival. In many countries, a film festival suggests that there is a – 





In this regard, the central question is: to what extent can a film festival 
contribute to national identity and nation building and to what extent is it 
successful in this? If the festival can build film identity” as, for instance, with 
the Transilvania International Film Festival, which represents a Romanian 
identity (Sălcudean, 2017), then the host city can be an important part of 
creating the image of a country. Thus, building a city identity is a primary role 
of a festival, which plays a secondary role in brand building for the whole 
nation.  
In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the importance of location is huge. Cudny (2018, 
p.198) is absolutely to the point in explaining why “festivalization” has been 
momentous for former Soviet countries:                                                                                                                                                                                                        
After the collapse of communism and the social liberation movements of 
that era, these countries experienced the introduction of a new market 
economy and democratic liberties. Therefore, these cities needed to find 
ways to thrive in a new economic system by generating streams of 
revenue and branding a city for tourism purposes. 
Consumption of place, as a part of tourism, relates to identity as well (Miles, 
2015). If the festival directly relates to city branding, then it is possible that 
changing the location of a festival will have the effect of breaking the chain of 
influence on a particular city and on the associated nation branding.  
There are few examples of moving a festival from one city to another. Some 
festivals, such as Pusan, have been moved within the city itself (Harbord, 2013), 
while others have been relocated to a different city. For instance, the Moscow 
International Film Festival (MIFF), founded in 1935, “alternated location 
between Karlovy Vary and Moscow” (Mezias et al, 2011. p.172). In this regard, 
the relocation of the EurIFF needs in-depth examination.  
 
One of the organisers of the EurIFF expressed nostalgia that the festival is not 
held in its former locale any more.  
Usually, the festival was always held in Almaty. Now the government funds 
more social projects. This year our festival was the only big cultural event 
which the government needed due to Capital Day. That is why we are holding 
this festival for the third time in Nur-Sultan [formerly Astana]. (Kanat 
Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
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The point that emerges here is that the EurIFF has had to face several 
challenges. First of all, the festival was unexpectedly moved to Astana in 2017, 
to be held from 22-28 July, due to an EXPO event taking place there.48 This was 
driven by the MCS, which wanted the two events to coincide as EXPO 2017 had 
been taking place in Astana since 10 June (Beumers, 2017). The same happened 
with the second EurIFF in 2005 when the festival, taking place on the eve of 
presidential elections, was used to raise the image of the president (Nogerbek, 
2006). These examples show that the EurIFF sometimes served as a political 
instrument to fulfil the state's needs. Secondly, the fifth festival in 2008 was 
held in Astana for the first time, after moving from Almaty 
(www.kazakhfilmstudios.kz). This shows that shifting the event back and forth 
between two cities created a lack of consistency and stability.  
Furthermore, as film festival scholar Marijke de Valck (2007, p.137) notes: 
The physical location of the festival is very important for the festival’s 
image of cultural difference and it is used in festival marketing strategies 
to compete with other film festivals. Location, the element most central to 
a festival’s image, is usually reflected in the name. By and large, festivals 
are named after the city where they take place.  
Interestingly, in contrast to Cannes, Venice, Locarno, Toronto, and many other 
internationally regarded festivals, the EurIFF was not renamed after Nur-Sultan, 
nor Almaty. If we consider de Valck’s argument, this may not prevent the EurIFF 
from building its own image and, by association, the country’s image also. 
However, it should not be overlooked that although film festivals contribute to 
place branding, their primary aim is to promote films and film culture rather 
than cities (Peterson and Ooi, 2010). A festival and city brand can be mutually 
beneficial to each other in terms of building an image, as in the case of the Hong 
Kong International Film Festival, whose status was enhanced by Hong Kong’s 
reputation (Cheung, 2009). As de Valck and Loist (2009, p.187) describe it, “the 
city, much more than the nation, is the spatial entity that has come to define a 
festival’s identity”. Thus, it is worth considering the extent to which the Nur-
                                         
48 EXPO is a world trade exhibition, which has taken place every five years since 1851. It has huge 
impact as a mega-event on the development of tourism infrastructure and attracting investment 
to the host-city as well as creating an image for both city and country. 
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Sultan brand contributes to the EurIFF and the extent to which the city benefits 
from the event.  
 
Having been associated with warm and beautiful Almaty for such a long time, 
the EurIFF had cemented its place there, which had served as a home for the 
whole of Kazakh film since the 1930s. Then, after having to adjust to Astana, 
just two years later the name of the new capital was renamed Nur-Sultan after 
the life-president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev (see sections 2.1 and 
2.4). The Eurasian festival had just started getting used to a new space, when 
the new name of the capital sent out confusing messages for those who had just 
recently become familiar with the event. For example, the EurIFF is still called 
the Astana festival in the FIAPF’s listings (FIAPF, 2019) on its website. Now, the 
festival crew needs to rebuild not only its brand at the new location but also, 
once more, with a new name. Not a good start, given festival locations are a 
central point in the festival network (Stringer, 2003). It was argued by Fauve 
(2015, p.111) that “Astana has become a national symbol of Kazakhstan”. Now 
efforts expended on the branding of Astana have gone to waste, as people have 
had to get used to the new city name, Nur-Sultan. Given some Kazakhstani 
people still call the capital Astana, the difficulty of branding the festival in Nur-
Sultan doubles both locally and internationally. If “the festival brand and the 
city branding are interconnected and they are built organically” (Sălcudean, 
2017, p.212), the city needs to build its own identity before the EurIFF can even 
begin to brand it once a year. When the festival’s name is branded, it is “a 
hallmark of quality” (de Valck, 2017, p.79). All the challenges have affected the 
overall image of the festival as well as the country. From all this, one can see 
that politics, location and the international market do not come together to 
optimal effect. 
There were seemingly sound reasons for shifting the venue of the EurIFF. The 
primary intention was to reflect the professional and cultural status of the city 
in Central Asia and CIS countries. As well as this, in theory, it was done to save 
money and spend it appropriately. However, Kanat Torebay questions how valid 
this was: 
In my opinion, if it was in Almaty, the budget would be like this [raising 
his hand high above his head to suggest plenty]. We would have organised 
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it in a more sophisticated way. Many of our filmmakers and directors are 
in Almaty. But we had to bring them all to Nur-Sultan for this festival. I do 
not want to offend anyone but, basically, the place for the festival is 
Almaty. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 
2019) 
The British scholar Birgit Beumers shared his opinion after visiting the 13th 
EurIFF in Astana. She recalls that “the lack of a network of critics which would 
be able to coordinate and support such an event in Almaty with its superior 
cultural infrastructure, was a downside of the relocation to Astana” (Beumers, 
2017, n.p.). This is an example of what Rhyne (2009, p.14) calls “mediating the 
interests of governments in managing their subjects and resources” with regard 
to festivals. Moving the festival to Nur-Sultan increased rather than reduced 
financial costs. It is also fair to say that moving the festival to the capital city 
changed the whole character of the event. Cinephiles, and all people related to 
the cinema network were, not surprisingly, shocked to hear about the 
relocation.   
The effects of relocating a festival can be illustrated in the case of Berlinale as 
well. Berlinale moved to the Potsdamer Platz after the German government 
moved from Bonn to Berlin in 1999. The initial plan was that the festival’s new 
location could be both a symbol and an entertainment centre for the newly 
united Berlin (de Valck, 2007). Again, there is a parallel between political and 
cultural changes in Germany and Kazakhstan, though their motives differed. The 
Berlin film festival had been struggling with space in West Berlin because of the 
growing number of visitors (de Valck, 2007), whereas the Kazakh government 
relocated the EurIFF in order to advertise its relatively new capital to the world. 
Take the example of Poland, which moved its national festival from the 1000-
year-old Gdansk to Gdynia. Cudny (2018, p.204) describes details that emerged 
from changing the place of the festival: “More specifically, the festival, which 
was once held in small rooms, lost the aura of a film discussion club when it 
moved to the much larger space of the main stage in the Music Theatre in 
Gdynia”. One can make a parallel between these two occasions. Gdansk and 
Almaty, respectively, have half a million and nearly two million inhabitants. One 
more similarity is that Gdynia was only set up in 1926 (Cudny, 2018) and Nur-
Sultan was founded in 1830 but was much younger compared to Almaty. 
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However, both of them are comparatively new in comparison to their 
counterparts, Gdansk and Almaty. The next thing that needs in-depth analysis is 
geographical distance. Gdynia is a city neighbouring old Gdansk, and so is much 
easier for the relocation of the festival, whereas Nur-Sultan is an 18-hour drive 
from Almaty (see Figure 1). That is why, as our interviewee Torebay revealed, it 
adds costs to cover aeroplane tickets to bring filmmakers from Almaty. An 
additional difference between these two relocations is a political one. One can 
say that moving the festival from Gdansk to Gdynia was an attempt to avoid 
connections being made between the festival and the shipyard of the Solidarity 
movement in Gdansk (Cudny, 2018). When it comes to the Kazakh festival, the 
state just wanted to popularise the capital and use the pre-established 
credentials of the event in Almaty.  
While Teo (2009) sees the success of three major East Asian film festivals 
(Pusan, Hong-Kong, and Singapore) in their locations, the EurIFF being held in 
Nur-Sultan could borrow the slogan of the capital, “the Heart of Eurasia”, and 
take advantage of its location. However, at the moment, there is little evidence 
that the EurIFF has become a defining feature of Nur-Sultan, or vice versa. 
Therefore, the idea of Eurasian-ness is limited at the festival. 
In 2017, when the EurIFF moved to Nur-Sultan for the first time, the capital was 
eager to show guests its EXPO exhibition. That is why all other venues, such as 
the Marriott and Wyndham Garden hotels, were used to accommodate guests 
and to hold discussions and master classes. The Chaplin Cinemas were chosen for 
film screenings as they were close to the EXPO exhibition centre on the left bank 
of the river Yesil. In 2019, however, it was no longer considered necessary to 
hold the event near the EXPO: 
This year we thought to make everything comfortable for our guests and 
participants. Previously, the practice was different when participants 
were accommodated in several hotels. Films were screened in several 
cinema theatres. This year we decided to accommodate the guests in one 
hotel and organise screenings only in a single movie theatre located 
nearby. It was all very comfortable and convenient. I think this is 
something we will stick to in the future. (Kanat Torebay, executive 
director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
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Harbord (2013) asserts that the topography of a place can be changed to suit the 
needs of an event. However, in the case of the EurIFF, according to Torebay, it 
makes use of existing places. Local practice in the festival city connects it to the 
global circuit. In this regard, the film festival is, again, local, and global at the 
same time. 
Interestingly, the EurIFF has organised its events in different venues every year. 
Only for the past two years have the opening and closing ceremonies been held 
in the Kazakhstan concert hall in Nur-Sultan, whereas the Chaplin Cinema 
theatres are the main venues for film screenings. In 2019, films were screened in 
the cinema network in the Khan Shatyr centre (see Figure 25). However, this 
exhibition site is not the festival’s annual fixed location. The reason for this is 
that many festivals cannot function as a working enterprise with other 
continuous operations under way throughout the year (Iordanova, 2009) and 
therefore only the EurIFF is allowed a temporary exhibition space.  
 
Figure 25 From left to right: the Khan Shatyr shopping and entertainment centre, which was 
designed by the British architect Norman Foster. Still from www.youtube.com. Rixos 




The same situation was noticed in Berlin at Potsdamer Platz, where press 
facilities were located in different buildings, without a single place that could 
serve as a centralised organising hub. Such a scattering of activities can lead to 
“decentralisation of the festival” (de Valck, 2007, p.79). Another example is 
Dubai International Film Festival, where event-goers are faced with the 
challenge of travelling from Madinat Jumeirah (the place for the box office and 
press conferences) to Emirates Mall (cinema theatres) due to city congestion 
(Guerrasio, 2008, n.p.). In the case of the EurIFF, the five-star hotel Rixos 
President Astana (see Figure 25) served as a venue for a press centre, press 
conferences and master classes, as well as accommodating and catering for all 
the guests. In this regard, the work was well centralised and, most importantly, 
convenient for guests.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to explore how the EurIFF fits into a nation-building 
context. Given that most film festivals have “built specific brands for 
themselves” (Odabasi, 2018, p.74), this analysis has addressed my second 
research question: “To what extent does the EurIFF contribute to nation building 
and projection of the nation?” Based on my visit, this part of the study allowed 
an extensive investigation of the event, including interviews with festival 
insiders. The analysis has focused on people who worked closely on organising 
the EurIFF behind the scenes and those who actively participated in the event. 
This case study has explored how the specific socio-cultural contexts – 
mentality, ideology, and attitude of the country – influenced the engagement 
with this festival.  
Instability is clearly the main factor that hinders development of the event. 
Firstly, the yearly change of leadership and festival staff prevented the 
establishment of experience and feedback from previous years. Secondly, last- 
minute funding and the late announcement of festival dates reshaped the course 
of the event and had a negative impact on the image not only of the event but 
on Kazakhstan’s in general. Thirdly, the decision to move the festival from its 
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cultural and historical capital, Almaty, to the administrative capital, Nur-Sultan, 
to promote EXPO 2017 and the new capital proved that major decisions 
regarding the EurIFF are entirely dependent on government interests. The 
official reasoning behind this was to lend the event weight by setting it in the 
capital city and reinforce its position as an outstanding event. The EurIFF could 
be used politically in this way because the government, as the main funder, 
dictates the rules. In this way politics affects the management of the festival’s 
image. As a result, the location of the festival goes against the needs of both the 
festival and the international market. It may be that if the festival remains 
located in the capital, it would become more Nur-Sultan-centric, but it is still 
uncertain whether the EurIFF can find a place to call home in Nur-Sultan. This 
makes identity building for the festival problematic.  
 
If moving the capital from Almaty to Astana, as argued previously in section 2.3, 
shows the country has an unsettled character as an ethno-political unit (Holm-
Hansen, 1999), the same may apply to Kazakhstan’s film policy regarding the 
EurIFF, which was frequently moved between the two major cities. Hence, all its 
challenges reduce the extent to which the EurIFF can contribute to effective 
nation building in Kazakhstan. 
 
This chapter found that the organisational process of the annual EurIFF is quite 
unusual and distinct from its counterparts in European countries. The next 
chapter will look at the component phenomena of the festival, such as 






6 The EurIFF’s programme and audience 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an essential understanding of the EurIFF’s 
emergence in Kazakhstan along with its significance and the major challenges it 
had to face.  
This chapter now looks at how films are selected at the festival by examining the 
roles of curators and international juries. This will involve a close examination of 
audience composition and how its various perceptions have impacted on the 
evolving image of the EurIFF. In the course of this, I will explore how the festival 
itself helps to define and separate out distinctly different audiences. One can 
see how this will become increasingly important, given that the final section 
investigates how participants at the festival understand the event and what 
impact this has on the role of the EurIFF in Kazakh film consumption. In doing 
this, the chapter, along with the previous one, will answer the second research 
question: “To what extent does the EurIFF contribute to nation building and 
projection of the nation?” 
In other words, this chapter will examine how the Kazakh example of a film 
festival model fits within existing understandings of the global festival circuit. I 
argue that festival programming and audience perceptions may shape 
Kazakhstan's image.  
 
6.1 Programme  
Film festivals are an essential exhibition network. Moreover, a festival can be 
defined by its films (Wong, 2011). But then, on the other hand, an understanding 
of cinema can likewise be shaped by film festivals (Ruoff, 2012). Hence, films 
and film festivals are interconnected and help define each other. Programming, 
apart from being a fundamental part of a festival, is a key factor in shaping this 
understanding. To understand film festivals, it is crucial to understand the scope 
and power of programming (de Valck, 2012). Bosma (2015, p.70) defines the 
programme as “the product” of the festival, while de Valck (2007) distinguishes 
that programming is, firstly, a cultural practice. It is essential to study 
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contributors such as programmers (Wong, 2011) to examine what role festivals 
play in defining cinema. 
 
6.1.1 Curation 
Film festivals are often characterised as constructors of cinematic taste. Stevens 
(2016) has distinguished two dimensions of the notion of taste – personal and 
cultural. Both work to construct taste within the festival environment, which is 
different from curating in theatres or curating an archive (Bosma, 2015). Let us 
consider Stevens’ view (2016, p.138) first of all: 
If events function to construct taste, they equally operate as sites where 
such taste can be recognised and apprehended by an audience. The ability 
of spectators, whether professional or civilian, to comprehend the 
construction of taste privileged by film festivals is integral to the 
validation of such celebrations as culturally relevant and artistically 
worthy.  
If film festivals work as the leading creators of taste, then how is this taste 
formed and who constructs it? In Bosma’s (2015) words, it is the film curator who 
singles out films for public screenings at a festival. The curator has two primary 
responsibilities: to create an eye-catching programme and to attract a broad 
audience; in general, to “create added value”. Curation brings together film and 
audience, allowing them to interact (Bosma, 2015, p.69). The EurIFF has been 
faced with different programme directors each year and, therefore, every year 
it is triggering different tastes. The Italian film producer, Eleonora Granata (see 
Figure 26), invited to be a short-term programmer for the 15th EurIFF, recalled 
that she wanted to bring the best films of 2018-2019 to Kazakhstan. She was one 
of the most authoritative selectors and producers in Hollywood. She had been a 
programmer and co-director of festivals all over the world and had tremendous 
experience, including seven years at the Berlinale and Venice festivals. Also, 
Granata had experience in post-Soviet films. Thanks to her work in Estonia, the 
Tallin Black Knights Film Festival was included in the A-list festivals accredited 




Figure 26 On the left is the programme director of the 15th EurIFF Eleonora Granata at the 
press-conference, 28 June, 2019, in Nur-Sultan. Photo taken by the author. 
 
It has been difficult because we wanted to select three or four times 
more and there were so many films. The festival would really like to 
streamline and find a common discourse within the film, selecting those 
that could give a cohesive image of the festival programme. That was the 
real difficulty – trying to focus on all those separate films and find some 
common ground between them in order to represent this year's best 
achievement in art. (Eleonora Granata, programme director of the 15th 
EurIFF press-conference interview, 2019) 
 
This suggests that the EurIFF’s approach to programming was no different from 
other festivals. They sought films that would be of interest both to its organisers 
and its audience. This is very much proving Bosma's (2015) point. Succeeding in 
presenting an appealing programme is one of the significant challenges for the 
festival curator because the festival is where the image can be built or 
destroyed. Granata’s words also reinforce the idea that “festival programmers 
select films that they consider worthy of being seen” (de Valck, 2012, p.26). The 
curator took her responsibility seriously and sought “to recognize and create 




Although films may be extremely different from one to another, they may 
have some common denominators that connect them. Such connections 
are similarly reflected in what is happening in the world and our society 
with all the conflict that we have today. Our top priority, of course, was 
creative achievement. Let’s take the case of controversial films. In such a 
case people hate it or love it. This leads to a strong emotion which means 
it is giving you something that you actually take away with you from the 
cinema. So that was what we were looking for. (Eleonora Granata, 
programme director of the 15th EurIFF press-conference interview, 2019) 
Granata implies that the EurIFF shapes “what films we as audiences and scholars 
will see, what films we respect or neglect, and often, how we read such 
cinematic works” (Wong, 2011, p.1). Bosma (2015) argues that strategies, like 
presenting quality films and building a bridge between them and the audience 
and the outside world, are subjective and personal. That is why the selection 
process is a compound of idealism, aspiration, and intuition. Therefore, this 
process is “mysterious” (Bosma, 2015, p.72). If we analyse the EurIFF’s 
curatorial practice from this point of view, the strategy of the festival can be 
subjective just as it is for other international film festivals. 
As a gatekeeper of the event, Granata's taste, in favouring the best films within 
European and Asian cinema, played a significant factor in the choice of films for 
the festival. Again, as the above quote suggests, in her view, EurIFF films are 
local and global at the same time. Her taste determined the whole structure of 
the 15th EurIFF and how the audience perceived these films. This supports de 
Valck and Loist’s idea that the curation of the festival depends on the 
programmer’s “ideas and ideals” (2009, p.182). In this respect, the EurIFF serves 
as a filter for authentic personal taste (Bosma, 2015). Moreover, Granata’s view 
has implications for Kerkinos’s (2009) explanation of film/curator interaction: 
the programmers’ voices are reflected in their choices, that is to say, their 
thoughts on the intellectual value and aesthetics of the film are akin to resolving 
a complex puzzle, where each film chosen connects with the others to produce a 
certain representation and discourse. The programmers’ voice is “heard” 
through the selections for festival competitions.   
But there are others involved in the decision-making. The international Selection 
Committee also helped to form the content. In 2018, the Selection Committee 
consisted of, primarily, Kazakhstani film critics and directors, but it broadened 
out in 2019. It was made up of the following: Claudia Landsberger, a member of 
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the European Film Academy and of the selection committee of the Berlinale 
Competition Programme and the Hamburg Film Fund; Alicia Simon, film curator, 
journalist; Janpietro Balia, curator of international film festivals and film critic; 
Matteo Jenkinson, film director and Oleg Boretskiy, a film critic from Kazakhstan 
who worked with Eleanora Granata. All of these figures were extremely 
important for the event because of their wide film festival experience. As Czach 
(2004, p.84) puts it, “programming is precisely about tastemaking – on an 
individual, national, and international level”. In the case of the EurIFF 
personnel, local and global intersect in a shift from domestic towards 
international experience.  
The list of participant countries was wide-ranging. Apart from the primary 
contest, which was a combination of films and animations from Kazakhstan, 
France, Macedonia, Italy, the Philippines, China, Russia, Israel, Ukraine, 
Australia among others, there was no evidence of the active participation of the 
host country’s films in the main competitive programmes. Only two films from 
Kazakhstan, one in the main competition and one in the short-form and 
animation contest, made the schedule. The chairman of international jury 
members described the list of films as “Fantastic,” adding: “I am very impressed 
with this list. It is going to be really hard to judge this and make a choice. 
Eleonora has given us the opportunity to engage in some really great, serious and 
beautiful material” (Tamas Toth, chairman of the international jury of the 
EurIFF, interview, 2019). For all that, according to data provided by Ayan 
Naizabekov, the programme coordinator, the 2019 EurIFF was not very 
competitive, selecting 65 films out of only 100 applicants. By way of comparison, 
in 2018, the EurIFF selected 42 films out of 1,100 applicants (Eurasia Film 
Festival, 2018b).49 A possible reason for the low number of applications was the 
late announcement of closing dates. Late funding by the Kazakhstani authorities 
(see the sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2) impacted on the expansion of the festival 
because the more films that apply, the greater the choice. It can be assumed 
that the EurIFF had to invite the foreign curator to ensure a high-quality 
programme. 
                                         
49 12 feature films out of 500 applicants and 30 short films out of 600 applicants. 
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Another factor to be considered regarding film choice at international festivals is 
local restrictions and censorship. Some consider European festivals to be 
characterised by a lack of political independence, with a top-down approach 
dictated by government agendas. Examples of this can also be found on the 
Asian continent, such as Hong Kong International Film Festival, where the local 
government controls the festival remotely (Cheung, 2009). Government-
sanctioned forum lists operate in Venice, Cannes, Locarno, and Berlin, which 
sometimes pursue national rather than cinematic concerns by choosing films to 
endorse a particular country (Stevens, 2016, p.30). Although the EurIFF did have 
a top-down approach dictated by the government (in terms of dates, changing 
location, and late funding described in Chapter 5), there were no restrictions or 
censorship issues when it came to programming and curation:  
I have to say that the unique quality of Eurasia is that the organisers 
allowed me complete freedom along with good resources and good 
people; there was no censorship, no restrictions. This is very important 
because sometimes you have to take care – “Oh no, no, no, you can't say 
this” – but here in Eurasia, it was really great. I asked first, “Do you have 
any censorship?” “No, just go ahead and get the best. Bring the best 
creative films of the world here. Nothing else matters”. And that's why I 
hopefully managed it, thanks to this freedom, this space. I am very proud 
of this programming. (Eleonora Granata, programme director of the 
EurIFF, press-conference interview, 2019) 
She clearly makes the point that the festival did not engage with any form of 
international politics and was free from censorship. Indeed, the curator has to 
take full responsibility if they allow the screening of films that are banned in 
their country of origin, given that it is not just that the film may have been 
banned but also the filmmakers may be jailed (Bosma, 2015, p.76). In contrast 
to the EurIFF, the Dubai and Abu Dhabi International Film Festivals in the UAE 
faced challenges of censorship and local restrictions (Akser, 2014) as films with 
violence or sexual content were completely taboo. Restrictions by UAE 
censorship laws were recently lifted on festival films (Guerrasio, 2008). A 
curator has to overcome these kinds of restrictions (Bosma, 2015). The film 
curator of the 15th EurIFF was happy to be free from any such issues having 
experienced them numerous times elsewhere. Although festival policy is severely 
impacted by the Kazakh government, it does not interfere with the creative side 
of the event, such as scrutiny of curation with respect to the content and 
selection of films. 
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A further factor is how festivals have been the space where the interests of 
nationalism and internationalism meet (Rich, 2013). Granata also supports Rich’s 
argument that “film festivals bring the world to town, and they also bring your 
town to the world” (2013, p.158). In the case of the EurIFF, Kazakh film makers 
and festival organisers could benefit from the international experience of 
organising such a mass event.  
However, another interviewee took a different point of view on the selection 
process:  
We have selected the best films that were winners of the largest A-list 
festivals in the world so that the residents of the capital could go and see 
what real cinema is. Maybe those young filmmakers taking their first steps 
are then able to look back critically at their work. (Yermek Tursunov, the 
president of EurIFF 15, press conference interview, 2019) 
Interestingly, the EurIFF held the Asian premiere of the black comedy-thriller 
Parasite (2019) by Korean Bong Joon-Ho, one of the world’s best directors. In 
May 2019, the contemporary satire was the first Korean movie awarded the 
Palme d'Or at the Cannes Festival. The film also won Best Picture, Best Director, 
Best International Feature and Best Screenplay at the Oscars in 2020 (Yeung and 
Seo, 2020). The EurIFF programme scheduled Parasite between Cannes and the 
Oscars, creating a link in the chain of the film’s festival history and international 
awards. As argued by Iordanova (2009, p.31), the programmer’s job depends on 
personal networking. Curator Eleonora Granata’s international experience and 
her connections helped the EurIFF to screen prestige films such as Parasite, 
which lifted the festival’s status. Nonetheless, according to the FIAPF’s 
regulations, A-list festivals must screen at least 14 new films every year in their 
official competition (Iordanova, 2009, p.28), which is one of the fundamental 
rules of programming (Ruoff, 2012). However, the EurIFF did not have official 
premiere films in its main competition programme in 2019. The Kazakh-made 
The Secret of a Leader had taken part in the Busan film festival and in the A-list 
Moscow Film Festival in April 2019, where it received the Grand Prix. By covering 
the films of a geographically vast area, the EurIFF has a “strong international 
character”, where audiences want to see world films rather than programmes 
with a regional colour for the local population (de Valck and Loist, 2009, p.187). 
In this regard, the EurIFF followed the example of global film events.  
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The festival’s scope is another means of analysing the event. One of the 
distinguishing aspects of film curation is the territorial scope of a programme 
(Bosma, 2015). Film festivals may screen regional and national as well as 
international content. In this connection one of the interviewees pointed out: 
The only rule of Eurasia is determining the country of origin of the films. 
Everything else is free game for everyone. The main competition is that of 
films coming from Europe and Asia. Other than that, everything else is 
completely open. (Eleonora Granata, programme director of 15th EurIFF, 
press-conference interview, 2019) 
The EurIFF prioritises its content by geographical criteria (Slocum, 2009 p.147). 
Examples of the clustering of film festivals can be found among Latin American 
and African festivals. In both cases, the geographical proximity of a country 
played a central role in its selection, showing films to be grouped and presented 
according to a prescribed logic (Kerkinos, 2009, p.173). In the past, paying 
tribute to its name, Eurasia, the original idea was that the Kazakh festival would 
move from year to year between the capitals of CIS countries, but the initiative 
was not supported by other republics and the idea was dropped. Needless to say, 
if shifting the location of the festival to the capital changed the character of the 
whole event (see section 5.3.4), moving the EurIFF across post-Soviet countries 
each year would have caused an endless cycle of challenges at international 
level. However, in 2019, the festival tried to fully reflect its initial concept, 
which was to build a “platform for successful cooperation between Asia and 
Europe” (EurIFF, 2017b) and to establish a cultural bridge between East and 
West (EurIFF, 2018b), combining movies from two continents (EurIFF, 2019). 
Here the idea of Eurasianism (see section 2.3) echoed in the festival. Viewing 
the idea as the main concept behind the festival, Kazakhstan, despite renaming 
its capital twice in two decades, showed no desire to rebrand and stuck to the 
old name of the event.  
 
6.1.2 International jury 
Alongside film curators, international jury members provide world access for the 
chosen films. The EurIFF, as the most prominent film event in Kazakhstan, was 
always criticised not only for its organisational issues, but also for award 
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proliferation. For instance, scholar Birgit Beumers (2017, n.p.) recalls one of the 
drawbacks of the 13th EurIFF: 
If a festival has to be subordinate to ministerial commands to bring in 
some [stars] and exclude others [critical voices], then cultural bridges will 
only be partially made and thus prone to collapse. And by this, I mean 
cultural bridges, not just of regions and territories, but also of various 
social and political views, both dissenting and conformist voices. Eurasia 
13 did not do itself a favour by awarding a patriotic film over an artistic 
product, and by excluding a number of less conformist filmmakers and 
film historians alike from the competition.  
The executive director of the festival, Kanat Torebay, also recalled the bizarre 
system of award distribution at earlier events: 
When Azimov [Sergey Azimov, independent producer and director, head 
of Kazakhfilm 2002-2007] was the head of JSC Kazakhfilm, they organised 
the EurIFF. It was nonsense that you could not find anywhere in the 
world. They produced the films, conducted the festival itself, and 
awarded their own directors. It was not right. Then it went in the 
completely opposite direction. We started distributing awards only for 
guests. This was also wrong. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the 
EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
All this may suggest that the festival has compromised the judges’ impartiality. 
Beumers and Toreby both argue that earlier festivals had an unfair judging 
strategy that ruined the image of the event in the international arena. Attempts 
were made to avoid this in 2019. Then, three distinct juries worked at the 15th 
EurIFF: the main jury, the short form jury, and the independent jury of NETPAC 
joined by an International Federation of Film Producers’ Associations (FIPRESCI) 
representative. The international feature competition jury presiding over the 
main competition consisted of five people: Tamas Toth, the chairman (Hungary), 
Kirill Grebenshchikov (Russia), Liu Zhe (China), Talgat Temenov (Kazakhstan) 
and Hervé Schneid (France) (see Figure 27). This composition of jury members is 
impressive. If Tamas Toth and Talgat Temenov are famous directors in Hungary 
and Kazakhstan, respectively, Hervé Schneid is an editor who has worked with 
the directors Sally Potter, Lars Von Trier, and Mike Figgis, who won the Oscar for 
best editor in 1992 for Delicatessen. For more than 20 years Liu Zhe has been 
organising the Chinese film festival with the poetic name China Golden Rooster, 
also known as the “Chinese Oscars”. Kirill Grebenshchikov has been a Russian 
actor since 1992.  
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Some international festivals have experienced criticism for appointing particular 
jurors. For instance, there was a questionable choice of jurors at the Antalya 
Golden Orange Film Festival and many Turkish filmmakers were unhappy about 
the choice of films and the fact that some were censored (Akser, 2014 p.151). 
The distinctive feature of the EurIFF is that jury members are invited and 
appointed by the directors of the event rather than by selection.  
 
Figure 27 The main international jury members from left to right:  Hervé Schneid (France), 
Liu Zhe (China), Tamas Toth, the chairman (Hungary), with programme director Eleonora 
Granata and the president of the 15th EurIFF, Yermek Tursunov. Photo taken by the author. 
 
The criteria for selecting winners differ from festival to festival. The chairman 
of the jury revealed his thoughts about his vision of selection criteria: 
I'm in search of how classic films are made. Wherein lies their particular 
secret? What certain magic something does this film have that makes it 
relevant for future generations? I wonder how films capture time. My 
approach differs from those who think that the film should emotionally 
affect one, or that they are looking for depth. That is also very important, 
of course. But I just have a specific approach – I’m looking for longevity, 
or something... I'm in search of a high level of thinking. That's what I dig 
for. […] They can be of different genres, different languages, different 
approaches, but which contain holistic artistic work. Integrity is the most 
important thing for me. By way of these films, strange as it seems, I am 
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attempting to delve into myself to find out who I am. (Tamas Toth, the 
chairman of the international jury of the 15th EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
 
The main criteria used by jurors are quite specific. Jury members’ choices 
clearly depend on personal taste and cultural preferences (de Valck, 2010). One 
of the critical points in Toth’s quote is that the work of the jury is not a 
criticism but analysis of these films, although it can be subjective. Toth is a 
close friend of Yermek Tursunov and Kanat Torebay, the organisers of the 
festival. Toth graduated from VGIK film school in Moscow with the directors of 
the Kazakh New Wave, Serik Aprymov, Ardak Amirkulov, Rashid Nugmanov and 
others. “I have known Yermek for a long time. Our views coincide in many ways. 
I think that's why I was invited to chair the jury. I feel like I am at home”, said 
the chairman. It was necessary to look further into this because, given the award 
proliferation and the role of networking in selecting judges, there are doubts the 
selection of winners would be unbiased:  
Call me sentimental. But I learnt to analyse film on my home turf. All art 
is subjective. So, I don't have any qualms about saying that, if I feel close 
to a Kazakh film in any way, then we will choose it. Maybe our decision is 
subjective. However, what kind of decision won’t be? When we talk about 
cinema, there is no jury that can be totally objective. There is nothing 
that is totally objective. (Tamas Toth, chairman of the international jury 
of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
This statement is in line with de Valck's (2010) argument that decisions are 
ultimately subordinate to subjective assessments, even if competitive 
programmes are set by experienced, international standards. One may argue 
that festival awards are “programmed” by the event. Not by direct manipulation 
but by the subtle ways that festivals work (de Valck, 2010); nor in the sense of 
manipulating jury decisions by direct intervention, but in all sorts of more 
nuanced ways, such as how juries choose films and set assessment criteria that 
match their views. When asked about making a fair decision, the executive 
director answered: 
If our films are influential, let them win. If our movies are a bit weak, 
guests can win. Everything must be transparent and clear. Although I 
know all jury members, most of them are my friends. I demonstratively 
avoid them. Myself, as the director of this festival, and Yermek Tursunov, 
as the president of this festival, have no right to interfere. Participants 
also follow personal ethics in the film industry. They also do not come 
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over to jury members. Nobody can influence the jury. (Kanat Torebay, 
executive director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
The testimony received suggests that decisions need to be made justly as a 
fundamental principle for the EurIFF team, which consisted of five people from 
Hungary, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and France. The EurIFF has grown up 
compared to the 2000s. For example, Bauyrzhan Nogerbek (2006, n.p.), a Kazakh 
film scholar and Chairman of the Selection Committee of the second EurIFF in 
2005, complained that after the event all the prizes were distributed according 
to the principle “from the oldest to the youngest”. He meant by this that the 
main prizes went to Russia as it was an older brother, while the rest of the 
awards went to former Soviet Republics. “Saddest of all: not a single film from 
Europe or Asia received an award at this so-called Eurasian film festival. […] It 
turned out, as always, to be a local, all-Union mini-film festival” (Nogerbek, 
2006, n.p.). If we go by de Valck's (2010) argument, the system of international 
judgement at the festival is often not democratic because jurors from Western 
countries used to dominate the festival. If we look at earlier festivals, the 
suggestion is that judgement was unfair due to old fashioned Soviet-style 
traditions. It seems one cannot win. 
During the festival, different cultural tastes among jurors can cause 
disagreement (de Valck, 2010). However, the chairman of the international jury, 
Tamas Toth, announcing the Grand Prix winner, declared that the decision was 
made without a dissenting voice, with all five jurors coming to a mutual 
conclusion.  
The Grand Prix of the 15th EurIFF went to the Kazakh film The Secret of a 
Leader by Farkhat Sharipov (see Figure 28). The film is about Kanat, a 40-year-
old man who experienced a mid-life crisis. He was sent from his job to attend 
leadership training, where the coach instructs him on how to succeed and 
become a leader. Kanat meets his classmate Danik, who is now a manager. Danik 
finds in Kanat a friend with whom he can go to the bar and drink. One night they 
spend the evening with prostitutes, and some days later Kanat sees on the TV 
news how a father was looking for his lost daughter. Kanat immediately realises 
it was one of the prostitutes and that she had disappeared on the night they 
met. Kanat talks it over with his influential friend, who convinces him to keep 
quiet about it. The film poses a question to its audience about the degree to 
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which someone is prepared to sacrifice their integrity in order to solve their 
financial problems. It is worth noting that the film is full of swearing and it is 
the first time in Kazakh cinema history such a film was funded by the state and 
won the Grand Prix at a Kazakh festival.  
 
Figure 28 Still from The Secret of a Leader. www.koreanherald.com. 
 
One can argue that a Grand Prix represents the festival’s image (de Valck, 
2010). Sălcudean (2017, p.207) sums it up best when she argues that the 
Transylvania International Film Festival became a Romanian brand and 
represented Romanian identity by paying particular attention to Romanian films. 
By this measure, the Grand Prix and the 15th EurIFF had a real Kazakh identity. 
However, it is interesting how this Kazakh-made film overtook Parasite, the 
winner of the Palme d'Or at Cannes in 2019 and an Oscar winner in 2020. It 
seems that the argument by Peterson and Ooi (2010, p.321) is pertinent here: 
“for a film festival, certain types of films would be more warmly welcomed 
because they are seen to fit well with the city, as portrayed through the city 
brand identity.” Indeed, The Secret of a Leader captured how bribery and the 
chaotic way of life of Kazakh officials win over decency, honesty, and humanity. 
The story of the film shows the true identity, not only of Almaty where this 
movie was filmed, but also the whole of Kazakh society, mired as it is in 
corruption. One might argue here that jury members voted for screening the 






Its audience is who a festival is designed for. According to Ruoff (2012), the 
public, not the films, makes the event. The festivals are even defined as “a site 
for holy pilgrimage for its audience” (Stevens, 2016, p.143). It is often film 
critics, scholars, journalists, and film professionals who are associated with the 
audience (Odabasi, 2018). However, one of the functions of the festival is to 
provide the space for a film to be discussed by both specialists and non-
specialists alike (Harbord, 2016). Furthermore, the identity of the audience is 
divided into domestic, international, and professional (Sălcudean, 2017, p.201). 
Both groups can demonstrate a high level of diversity (Bosma, 2015). That is 
why, in the section below, I will explore the perception not only of film 
professionals but also visitors, the viewership, cinephiles and participants. 
 
6.2.1 Audience engagement in theatre-screened films 
A progressive film festival is a unique space for films and spectators (Bosma, 
2015). Peranson (2009) distinguishes two models of film festival: the business 
model and the audience model. However, most festivals have elements of both. 
I argue that the EurIFF has a mixed model. As Wong (2011, p.54) suggests, “the 
most audience-friendly festivals are those that are smaller, less business-
oriented, and local, whose objectives are showing good films to an appreciative 
audience”. This is the present view at the EurIFF: 
The festival is primarily there for filmmakers. For those who work in this 
area. Secondly, there is a community in our society, which loves film. It is 
for this audience. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the EurIFF, 
interview, 2019) 
Here, Toreby indicates that the EurIFF has specific goals and a targeted 
audience. This idea is supported by Odabasi’s (2018) argument that every film 
festival is organised with a specific audience in mind. On the other hand, the 
audience determines how and for whom festivals matter (Ruoff, 2012). However, 
the key question is how well the EurIFF interacts in practice with its audience 
and consequently how that audience perceives the event. 
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One may argue that the audience can be explored through cinema theatres. 
Many festivals use open-air screenings whereas the EurIFF uses cinema theatres. 
Film screenings were held in halls 2 and 3 of the Chaplin Cinema theatre (see 
Figure 29). It is located almost 20-minutes’ walking distance from the Rixos 
President Astana hotel – the main venue for Q&A sessions, press conferences and 
master classes and just 10 minutes’ drive from Kazakhstan Central Concert Hall, 
the venue for the opening and closing ceremonies (see section 5.3.4). With 
respect to its audience, setting aside foreign guests specifically invited and 
sponsored with travel and accommodation costs being met, the festival cannot 
brag about its extensive coverage and foreign attendance. This clearly impacts 
on the nature of its audience. 
 
The EurIFF's audience in cinema theatres includes local actors and directors, film 
producers, contestants, volunteers, and residents of Nur-Sultan, rather than an 
itinerant international audience. This shows that EurIFF has limited promotion of 
the Kazakh film industry to an international audience except for invited guests. 
This is not so different from the Sydney and Melbourne festivals in Australia, 




Figure 29 The Chaplin Cinema in the Khan Shatyr shopping Mall, Nur-Sultan. www.eiff.kz. 
 
The festival’s interaction with its audience was minimised for a number of 
practical reasons. Film screenings were accessible to both press and guests with 
a special badge for accreditation and tickets for festival-goers. A limited number 
of seats was available for the general public as the number of guests, their 
friends and relatives, and international jurors almost reached the capacity of 
the small cinemas. Films were available from 10am until noon in this theatre and 
there were no repeat screenings. All of this reduced access to the wider public.  
The executive director of the festival revealed that for the first time in the 
history of the festival it had many spectators: 
It was unexpected. The cinema theatre in the Khan Shatyr shopping mall 
was packed out. People were sitting along the stairwells to watch films. 
This is the first time we have had a situation like this in Eurasia. People 
are really interested in it. (Kanat Torebay, executive director of the 
EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
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We need to look closely at this. In comparison to previous years, when the 
audience lost interest in attending the festival and the majority of seats 
remained vacant, it was noticed that the 2019 festival witnessed far higher 
demand for free tickets. This was not because tickets were free, given that the 
EurIFF charged for film screenings only once, in 2015, when it attempted to 
make the event closer to international standards.50 
The cost of tickets was set at half the usual for cinemas, and for students 
it was only ₸100 [£0.20]. All proceeds went to cinemas through the rent of 
halls. Previously, Eurasia simply bought these halls for budget money. The 
fact that the entry was free is a fiction, nothing is free. The festival 
simply used the same taxpayers' money to pay for screenings at steep 
rates. But the Ministry of Culture and Sport reacted extremely negatively 
to this initiative and banned the sale of tickets from then on. What 
considerations it was guided by is a question for them. (Rashid Nugmanov, 
director of the EurIFF in 2015, interview, 2020) 
The above quote reflects the unwillingness by the state to recoup the costs and 
to profit from the EurIFF, even though the admission price was low. By way of 
comparison, global festival circuits often provide free admission when they 
cannot sell a certain amount of tickets. For instance, the Copenhagen festival in 
2003 attempted to sell 30,000 tickets, then reduced this figure to 20,000. In the 
end it sold 15-16,000 tickets and handed out the rest for free (Pederson and 
Mazza, 2011, p.150).  
The Kazakh audience is not ready to pay the entry fee for the festival, according 
to another interviewee: 
The level of our audience is too low. They have gotten used to 
Hollywood's cheap comedies. The audience should be educated, 
cultivated. It is one of the goals of the festival. (Kanat Torebay, executive 
director of the EurIFF, interview, 2019) 
What Torebay is implying is that EurIFF officials are afraid of having empty halls. 
In the past, even with free admission, halls were often only half full. From 
international examples, although some festivals have additional sources of 
funding, film screenings do not generate substantial profit for them (de Valck, 
2016a). Also, according to Stevens (2016, p.167), “the ability of a festival to 
train its audience is essential in sustaining the event and assuring its cultural 
                                         




legitimacy”. Therefore, it can be said that the EurIFF has a long-term aspiration 
to establish and maintain the cultural validity of the event and “train its 
audience” in order to make a profit in future. 
 
Figure 30 Film screenings at the Chaplin Cinema. www.eiff.kz. 
 
Sometimes, even members of the audience who had tickets could not get a seat 
because the actors had invited so many relatives and friends. This caused some 
friction, given “the audience is not located outside of these sophisticated 
relations” (Odabasi, 2018, p.74). One may argue that the organisers did not 
expect such a big viewership as it had never happened before. The younger 
generation, and even some producers, had to stand at the entrance and, 
sometimes, even sit on the floor along the stairwells (see Figure 30). The festival 
director had to apologise through a video post on the official EurIFF account on 
Instagram (@eiff.kz), saying that next year they would plan for this better, along 
with the cinema theatres. Often such negative impacts can be addressed through 
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“awareness and intervention” (Allen et al., 2002, p.25), such as the festival 
director achieved here via social media.   
Another shortfall of the festival was that films overlapped with press 
conferences as well as master classes. In this regard, the EurIFF was close to 
failing to “give more people the opportunity to familiarise themselves with 
‘other’ cinemas” (de Valck, 2013, p.105). Clearly, this impacted on the EurIFF 
audience’s ability to expand, severely restricting the influence of the festival on 
viewing choice. 
On the other hand, audiences and filmmakers have plenty of opportunity to 
interact at press conferences. Quintin (2009) questions the value of this, noting 
that the public’s views are often ignored with respect to prize-giving outcomes. 
But, if we take the example of the press conference with Farkhat Sharipov, 
director of the Grand Prix winner The Secret of a Leader, this is shown only to 
be partially the case. After he said that he had to cut many exciting episodes 
due to the time limits, people asked him to publish the original extended version 
of the movie on YouTube. After the EurIFF he did partially fulfil these requests 
by making the film available at online cinemas free of charge, though it was not 
the extended version that had been requested. This is strong evidence that 
promoting such audience participation can impact on the festival’s aims and 
objectives, thus supporting the idea that the content of a festival impacts on its 
organisation (Bosma, 2015). After the screening of The Secret of a Leader, 
festival-goers had the opportunity to ask Sharipov questions and express their 
opinions. In this way, the spectators had a circumstantial influence on the 
structure of the festival itself, over time. To this degree, the policy of engaging 
the audience with filmmakers worked well at the EurIFF. 
A lack of statistics significantly inhibits the development of the EurIFF. It was 
not possible to compare attendance numbers for every year of the festival 
because the number of festival-goers has not been recorded or presented 
officially since the inception of the EurIFF. However, according to Kanat 
Torebay, executive director of EurIFF, the 15th festival has an approximate 
record of attendance figures of 10,000-12,000 visitors.51 This data is based on 
                                         
51 In the early 2000s, EurIFF, through a directive from universities, forced students to fill the hall 
when screenings of the Grand Prix film took place.  
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information from the Chaplin Cinema. Due to the small seating capacities of the 
cinema halls at the shopping centre, only 70-80 people could watch one movie at 
a time, so 140-160 people in two separate halls watched films at the same time. 
According to organisers of the festival, in previous years the event hired three or 
four cinema theatres but witnessed very low attendance. Not keeping records 
(including information on gender distribution, age, nationality, country of origin 
or education) ignores Odabasi's (2018) convincing argument that the festival 
audience should be closely monitored. Therefore, it was not feasible to track 
audience demographics (Odabasi, 2018) or to make a comparison of expenditure 
and income. This reflected a lack of managerial control over the festival and its 
marketing. Furthermore, the impact of a festival is often measured by evidence-
based quantitative measures such as premieres, tickets sold, international 
audience, and tourist expenditure (Dickson, 2018; Bosma, 2015). This last 
feature is essential in measuring the economic impact of the festival (Allen et 
al., 2002) and was not available at the EurIFF. If the quality of the data for 
marketing decisions is low, this raises the question of adequate marketing (Ibid, 
p.188). These findings support the earlier argument described in section 4.2.1 on 
the lack of research and statistical data on Kazakh cinema. The absence of 
statistical data both on Kazakh cinema and the EurIFF hinders approaches to 
marketing to fix the problem and plan for the future.   
 
6.2.2 The professional audience  
At the Cannes film festival only film professionals are admitted to screenings 
(Wong, 2011), whereas the EurIFF allows both the general public and 
professionals access. However, the festival had systems in place, in certain 
situations, to divide the professional audience from the general public. This was 
made possible outside of the screening circuit. It was achieved by way of an 
accreditation system for journalists and other visiting guests which allowed them 
entry free of charge. Press tickets were distributed very quickly on the first day. 
One can argue that a gatekeeping mechanism such as this accreditation system 
played a significant role in audience segregation. Although media 
representatives did not have any privileges at the opening and closing 
ceremonies and just sat along with the general public, only journalists had 
access to closed press conferences, such as with the Turkish actor Burak Özçivit. 
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It was stated in section 5.3.2 that inviting celebrities to festivals advertises the 
event and, as a consequence, the country itself. The example of the EurIFF 
suggests that popularising the event through star power was possible only with 
the help of mass media, bypassing the audience itself.52 
Moreover, press conferences were held immediately after each other at the 
Rixos President Astana so media representatives and guests could not leave the 
hotel (see Figure 25). The flow of journalists and guests, which Bosma (2015, 
p.75) describes as “crowd control”, was monitored by volunteers.  
 
6.2.3 Volunteers 
If a festival develops and expands, it will need additional staff recruitment, 
whether they be paid or volunteers (Allen et al., 2002). Festivals depend very 
much on the latter (Iordanova, 2009). Often their input, rather than that of paid 
employees, has become a peculiarity of many cultural events (Derrett, 2004). 
The 15th EurIFF recruited a considerable amount of “free labour”, as Iordanova 
(2009, p.35) calls it. It was noted that “pure altruism”, devotion to work (Allen 
et al., 2002, p.147), and a possible route to professionalisation pushed 
volunteers to work. The volunteers’ input in the EurIFF was inestimable in terms 
of administrative work. 
                                         





Figure 31 Volunteers in red T-shirts at the festival. www.eiff.kz. 
 
There is the potential for volunteers to help brand the festival. As Dickson (2018, 
p.152) reveals, Valletta Film Festival initially attracted the local Maltese people 
as a valuable source of voluntary labour work. This approach “understood 
festival branding and volunteer recruitment as mutually supported strategies”, 
which allowed the event to flourish. However, at the EurIFF, volunteers were 
sometimes recruited to make up for a deficit of visitors at press conferences, 
given that journalists and cinephiles were sometimes a minority. When attending 
the festival, it was noticed that the organisers had chosen students aged 
between 15 and17. The moderator called them together and distributed 
prepared questions to each of them (see Figure 31). They were then instructed 
on how to ask questions so that attendees would think that their questioners 
were particularly keen on a particular oeuvre. I kept records of this in my 
research diary: 
Mr Sakulinskiy tried to make the volunteers sit randomly and organised 
the distribution of at least one question to each of the participants. 
Organisers wanted to impress the participants and avoid a shameful 
situation in case any of the participants weren’t asked a single question. 
When the press conference started, the moderator said: "These people 
gathered here have watched all your films and have some questions." 
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However, in fact, not one of those sitting had watched their films. 
(Research Diary, 4 June 2019) 
This situation is not unusual for Kazakhstan. Students are often instructed what 
question to ask and what not to ask with many rehearsals when government 
officials pay a visit to major events. It is not known what the guests felt about 
the artificial, trained questions at the EurIFF, where volunteers served not only 
as assistants but also as “reserve journalists”. However, sometimes even big 
festivals can witness the same situation with empty halls with one or two mass 
media representatives participating (Odabasi, 2018). Moreover, the EurIFF’s 
experience coincides with Dickson’s (2018, p.161) argument: 
Festival volunteer participation is rewarded with more festival 
participation, which shifts them into a different type of participant – as 
an audience member. As such, during festival time, volunteers alternate 
between being festival workers and festival audiences. In the light of the 
duality, one could argue that the festival volunteer occupies a central 
position wherein they socially construct different meanings of the festival 
as both insider/worker and outsider/audience.  
Certainly, the volunteers at the EurIFF served as an audience as well, with the 
potential to act as critics of the festival from two perspectives. However, in 
reality, the case of the prepared questions shows an explicit manipulation of 
these formal events. Therefore, in some cases, there was a contrived rather 
than truthful dialogue between the “audience” and participants. In this respect, 
the EurIFF’s volunteers did not influence any genuine branding of the festival as 
in the case of the Valletta festival. It was an unfortunate attempt by the EurIFF 
officials to try to make up for gaps in the guest audience by way of volunteers, 




The event is also designed for participants and the success of the event depends 
on them (Allen et al., 2002). Because professionals, or film-participants, attend 
films by colleagues they are also part of the audience. The first thing that this 
professional audience pointed out was the hospitality and the opportunities 





Figure 32 From left to right: Top, British actor Martin Swabey, French actress Emilie 
Piponnier. Below, Belorussian director Mitriy Semenov-Aleinikov and Uzbek director Shokir 
Kholikov. www.eiff.kz. 
 
It is a beautiful experience to be in contact with a culture of which I had 
previously had no idea. Not only is it the occasion for the people who visit 
to spread the word about the beautiful country, but it is also the chance 
for the people of Kazakhstan to have access to a different point of view of 
the world. (Martin Swabey, British actor, press conference interview, 
2019) 
This quote shows that the festival is the occasion for a voice to make itself heard 
around the world not only by way of different people being involved but also 
through the different films chosen in the festival. In this regard, Rich’s (2003-
2004, p.158) argument relates to describing the festival as “the place where we 
can learn how other people think and act and live, how the world is functioning 
outside our village, how other people speak, what other cultures treasure”. 
However, considering the small number of international visitors to the festival, 
which is limited to invited filmmakers, other participants, or international jury 
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members, spreading the word about Kazakhstan to the outside world, in the way 
Swabey describes, is clearly restricted to a small number of people. 
The level of interest of the Kazakh audience was the second thing noted by film 
professionals: “For me, your audience is perfect. They are genuinely interested 
in the movie. I really enjoyed this,” said Shokir Kholikov, Uzbek director at the 
same press conference (see Figure 32). His standpoint was supported by the next 
speaker:  
This is my first visit to Kazakhstan. I really like the level and interest of 
the viewer in the festival and am very impressed with the programme 
itself. (Mitriy Semenov-Aleinikov, Belorussian director, press conference 
interview, 2019) 
This quote suggests real interest on the part of the interviewee per contra to the 
manipulated interest by the volunteers described in the previous section. 
Although, the interest of Kazakh spectators in theatres was high enough 
compared to previous years, supporting the argument that the culture of 
cinephilia is maintained by the audience (Wong, 2011), the film professionals 
might not know that much of the audience at the press conferences had been 
trained to ask questions in advance and may not have even watched the films 
they were asking questions about. Secondly, the range of films the Kazakh 
audience could watch was limited, as stated previously, due to lack of repeated 
screenings.  
Other participants suggested that the festival had triggered an interest in 
Kazakhstan in general, expressing a desire to see more of the country after the 
festival: 
The festival has completely changed my mind about Kazakhstan. 
Honestly, I didn't know anything about Kazakhstan, but now I know that 
Kazakhstan is a modern country and tries to continually improve. It is the 
way for other people to know about your country. This festival is so 
friendly. You have a great festival. It is so real, you know. (Mirabbas 
Khosravinezhad, Iranian director, interview, 2019) 
Festivals, indeed, provide “authenticity and uniqueness” (Derrett, 2004, pp.32-
33), something that is picked up by visitors. In this case, the emotional impact 
and testimony of the participant may express their degree of satisfaction with 
the event. Richins (1997) advocates the role of feelings in consumers’ decision-
making. If one considers the participants as festival’s consumers, then it is 
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possible that visitors would boost the number and quality of the films. This, in 
turn, may develop festival-inspired tourism. However, the limited number of 
tickets, as was the case in 2019, may reduce consumers’ satisfaction. 
Park et al. (2011) identify five factors for measuring the service quality at film 
festivals: responsiveness, additional facilities, quality of facilities, programming, 
and approachability. Khosravinezhad’s comment suggests that the participants 
were satisfied with responsiveness, the programme and accessibility. Moreover, 
all these observations indicate that the festival could shape the understanding of 
Kazakhstan. In addition, the above quote supports Brubaker’s (1996, p.7) 
argument (see section 2.1) that a country “structures perception”. In this 
regard, EurIFF contributed to raising awareness about Kazakhstan.  
The interviewee’s comment also suggests that the film event, despite all the 
challenges listed in this chapter, could “enhance image creation” (Martínez-
Ruiz, et al., 2011, n.p.). If, for instance, we compare the EurIFF with Gdynia 
Film Festival (GFF) in post-communist Poland, that event offers an efficient 
means of promoting Polish cinema. As Cudny (2018) points out, the Polish 
cinema industry could not function well without the Gdynia festival. Moreover, 
the festival is one of Gdynia’s three cultural brands along with the Music Theatre 
and Poland’s Open'er Festival. In Kazakhstan's case, though, as argued previously 
in Chapter 5, the EurIFF is still not the brand of Nur-Sultan, or vice-versa. Yet, in 
spite of this, it is important to emphasise that Kazakh cinema and the EurIFF are 
very much in need of each other.  
Khosravinezhad continues: 
I found a new audience for my short films. It is so crucial for Kazakh 
people to watch my films and for me to watch Kazakh films. We have the 
same stories as the Kazakh nation. I think that this festival, as the biggest 
festival in Asia, may be considered an A-class festival. (Mirabbas 
Khosravinezhad, Iranian director, interview, 2019) 
Indeed, the beliefs of Tengriism (see section 2.2.3), the pre-Islamic religion, 
consisting of shamanism, sky and ancestry worship are historically mutual held in 
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both countries (Abikeyeva, 2006).53 These films could develop religion-based 
films, according to Isaacs (2018) classification.  
Also, this quote suggests that EurIFF can be a social constructor, connecting the 
history of two nations, fulfilling the idea of Eurasianism and the concept of the 
festival itself. Here, Lee’s view (2016, p.172) is pertinent. Events organised by 
the festivals build social connections between participants and festival officials. 
The latter may encourage further creative cooperation and bring the same 
participants back to the EurIFF, a possible outcome which is certainly an 
advantage. In spite of this, the ambitious aim of entering the A-list looks 
unattainable at the moment. Iordanova (2006, p.28) sums up it best when she 
describes the FIAPF’s regulations: 
The FIAPF operates a film festival franchise of sorts: it allocates 
territories to film festivals around the world (no more than one festival 
per country and no more than two A-festivals per region). It also makes 
sure there is no overlap in the dates of A-festivals. […] It should not 
specialize but should cover all aspects of filmmaking; a feature 
competition with at least fourteen films without genre limitations is a 
requirement.  
The EurIFF meets the criterion of no genre limitations. Yet it may be assumed 
that the event will not accept, for example, LGBT-related movies due to the 
way they conflict with a Kazakh conservative mentality. Accepting this genre 
would generate a scandalous conflict with the Ministry of Culture and Sport as 
well as wider society, which would see it as EurIFF propaganda for LGBT issues. 
Furthermore, given the state’s manipulation of venues and dates, it is highly 
unlikely that the festival will lay claim to the FIAPF’s A-category any time soon. 
Summing up the types of festival-goers using de Valck’s (2007) definition is 
useful for our conclusions here. She distinguishes six types of cinephiles based on 
visiting several film festivals over the years: 1) the lone list-maker, who 
carefully researches ahead to decide on films to watch; 2) the highlight seeker, 
who follows others’ advice to ensure seeing the films most generally recognised; 
3) the specialist, avoiding the mainstream; 4) the leisure visitor, who just comes 
to escape and relax; 5) the social tourist, looking for human interaction;  
                                         
53 For example, the concept of ancestor worship can be seen in the Iranian film Bashu, the Little 
Stranger (1989) by Bahram Beizai (Abikeyeva, 2006). 
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6) the volunteer, working free of charge to get experience. As we can see from 
the previous analysis, only the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth categories can be 
found at the EurIFF. If the festival is small, the audience is restricted to certain 
types of festival visitor (de Valck, 2007). Cinephiles across the world rarely visit 
the EurIFF if their travel costs are not covered.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the programme and audience engagement at a state-
run EurIFF as well as their impact on the nation building of Kazakhstan. The 
chapter addressed my second research question: “To what extent does the 
EurIFF contribute to nation building and the projection of national identity?”  
The EurIFF, as a Central Asian regional showcase, organised the programme with 
enthusiasm. The festival benefited from the rich experience of a foreign 
programmer, who left her own signature on the 15th EurIFF. Following the 
experience of countries with strong filmmaking traditions, a team led by a 
foreign curator managed to select the best films of 2018-19 for its audience 
without being restrained by any censorship. Domestic curatorial practice 
intersected with international. However, the event attracted low numbers of 
applications compared to previous years, even though the only rule for 
filmmakers was geographical belonging. The reason for that was, again, late 
funding by the government, as described in Chapter 5.  
Although this festival was criticised in the past for being too focused on giving 
prizes to its guests, the 15th EurIFF international jury members, who were 
invited and appointed rather than selected, worked fairly to avoid political 
issues. Despite this, it is still clear that the judgments were very much 
subjective, as in any other film competition event.  
The 15th EurIFF brought together different categories of an audience from film 
professionals to the general public and volunteers. The interaction of the 
audience and the festival was challenged by the low capacity of only two cinema 
theatres and a lack of repeat screenings. Secondly, the overlap between 
screenings, master classes and press conferences split the visitors between the 
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two venues. Consequently, only a small portion of the film-viewing community, 
including local cinephiles, could watch the bulk of the films, which covered a 
wide range of genres. There is a specialised film audience emerging in 
Kazakhstan, although it is very small and demographic data is not available.  
Despite low attendance, the 15th EurIFF witnessed fully booked cinema theatres 
for the first time in its history. The free ticketing system had not attracted 
cinephiles to previous festivals but EurIFF officials treated it as one of the 
festival’s achievements. However, one of the major drawbacks is that the event 
failed to be a real audience-driven event and to focus outwards to appeal to an 
international audience. It catered to the needs of mainly local audiences except 
for invited foreign film professionals and speakers. Moreover, the lack of a 
marketing approach meant they did not prioritise obtaining data on the makeup 
of the audience, which, in turn, impacts on the overall development of the 
event. If the EurIFF is not fully able to connect its films as products with its 
audience, it is fair to conclude that the contribution of the EurIFF to the nation 
building of Kazakhstan is limited. I have argued that, to date, at best, the EurIFF 
has only had a minor image making effect on Kazakhstan.  
The EurIFF will find wider dissemination and might be able to reach a broad 
international coverage if it achieves financial stability and is able to move to a 
more autonomous, well-established management with no dependency on the 
state. Only then will the number of festival-goers be able to grow and for it to 
become an international image-making festival. 
The focus now will shift to the industry element of the EurIFF and to Kazakh film 
policy, where it will explore the impact of co-production, tax rebates in 





7 National or international? The industry and 
Kazakh cinema 
Introduction 
The previous chapter shed light on programming, curation, and the audience of 
the EurIFF as the main elements in building the image of the festival. This final 
findings chapter will attempt to do two things at the same time. Given that the 
industry component of Kazakh cinema can be seen at both the level of the 
state’s film policy and that of the EurIFF, it will, first, respond to the third 
research question - What is the role of Kazakh cinema in nation building? - and, 
secondly, it will also address aspects of the second research question - To what 
extent does the EurIFF contribute to nation building?  
 
To answer these questions, I will explore the role of the stakeholder, the SCSNC, 
the established institute in selecting the projects for state funding, in supporting 
the film industry. Also, great emphasis will be placed on the new tax incentives 
scheme and its possible implications for Kazakh cinema. By focusing on these 
elements as an ideal case of cultural policy analysis, I will argue that 
collaboration with Hollywood and co-production projects with other countries 
may expand the distribution of Kazakh films abroad, but with limited profits for 
Kazakhstan. 
 
7.1      The industry element of EurIFF 
Given that the film industry is so central to all elements of cinema, one simply 
cannot ignore it when studying the way film festivals function within the film 
festival circuit. As Loist (2016, p.60) puts it, “‘[The] film festival circuit’ is 
foremost an industry term, which is versatile, contingent, and rational”. Since 
the establishment of le Marché at Cannes in 1959, festivals have been a 
dynamic, primary element of the film industry (de Valck, 2007). Global markets 
from Berlin and Cannes to Hong-Kong have enabled foreign films to circulate in 
different cities (Koehler, 2009). Therefore, film festivals can be considered a 
significant gathering for the industry’s business representatives, including sales 
agents, distributors and producers as well as being specific environments and 
substantial hubs for universal film industries (Wong, 2011; Bosma, 2015). What is 
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more, film festivals act as a bridge between art and commerce (Mezias et al., 
2008). All in all, festivals provide great marketing options for the film industry 
and the city (Martínez-Ruiz et al., 2011, p.1952), thus contributing to the 
country’s image.  So, exploring the extent to which the industry components of 
the festival contribute to image building is essential. 
 
According to Rosenbaum (2009), some festivals promote film viewing, while 
others mainly contribute to selling films. Global European festivals have both 
features. Unlike festivals with strong business agendas (Cannes, Berlinale, 
Venice), the EurIFF has always endeavoured to build trust as a business-making 
festival and one that can attract international attention. Specific evidence of 
this was reflected in 2017. For the first time in its history the EurIFF launched 
the Eurasia Film Market. Initiated by director Rashid Nugmanov, film traders 
from 60 foreign countries were invited, including the CIS, along with countries 
from the East such as China, India, and South Korea - and Europe and America in 
the West. A further 100 domestic companies participated free of charge (Forbes, 
2017). Unfortunately, these figures declined in 2018 with only 30 foreign 
distributors and 40 Kazakhstani film companies attending (Tengrinews, 2018). It 
was even worse in 2019, given the 15th EurIFF did not hold a Eurasia Film Market 
at all because the new leadership had different priorities. Although round-
tables, discussions and press conferences conducted by local and international 
film figures, as well as practitioners related to the film industry, were beneficial 
for Kazakhstan, no data on films sold as a result of this are available. This 
contradicts the argument, made by Grunwell and Steve (2008, n.p.), that for a 
festival to start working as a business platform it is essential to create a 
presence in the film industry and design a “strategic niche” that singles it out 
from others. Thus, though the EurIFF is the biggest cinema forum in Central Asia, 
it is too early to measure its success in establishing a strong film market 
community within its circuit beyond its success to date in establishing strong 
networks.  
 
Comparisons can be made with a couple of international examples from post-
colonial countries. The Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) in Tanzania, 
launched just one year earlier than EurIFF, in 1997, built its own Soko-Film 
market in 2007. It not only exhibits films, but also provides networking 
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opportunities to improve the industry in West Africa (Slocum, 2009 p.146). Thus, 
an official film market emerged at the ZIFF after 10 years of existence. By way 
of contrast, the Lima Film Festival in Peru has never aimed for a “market 
place”, but rather promotes the participation of guests, which includes 
producers, agents, and distributors outside Latin America (Barrow, 2016, p.144). 
Like Zanzibar, the EurIFF, only launched its first market platform after almost a 
decade in existence, but failed subsequently to sustain it and, like the Lima Film 
Festival, limited its degree of industry promotion to master-classes, round-
tables, conferences, and film pitches.  
 
7.1.1 The pitching of international projects 
In order to more widely disseminate films, festival platforms are often used for 
film pitches.  Eurasia Spotlight,54 a producer-initiated film-business platform to 
support young filmmakers through the pitching of projects, was launched for the 
first time in 2011 and existed for only five years as part of the EurIFF. One of the 
co-founders revealed: 
There has always been a problem. Eurasia Spotlight was tied to the 
Eurasia Film Festival but there has been no stability or continuity 
sustained year on year. This is due to the fact that there has been no 
regular festival directorate. And the management itself is, likewise, 
constantly changing. And when the leadership is changed, the festival 
programme is also changed. So, it is all down to these human factors. 
(Ilyas Akhmet, producer, telephone interview, 2020) 
Another problem that prevents the creation of a genuine market is the fact that 
both the Eurasia Film Market and Eurasia Spotlight, which called themselves a 
film market, are, in fact, separate organisations with different leaderships, 
working in conjunction with the EurIFF. This means that everything is dependent 
on the annually changing leadership of the EurIFF, which may not include them 
in its new programme. Secondly, if the funding of the EurIFF is reduced, as in 
2019 (see the section 5.3.2), it then becomes increasingly likely that Eurasia 
Spotlight does not take place.  
                                         
54 An unofficial, non-profit organisation founded by Ilyas Akhmet and Anna Kachko. 
182 
 
The Eurasia Spotlight was effective when it started, due to the support of JSC 
Kazakhfilm, when it funded winners. For instance, the film Harmony Lessons by 
the young director Emir Baigazin was chosen as the best Kazakh project for the 
first time in 2011 (Smith, 2012). It was produced in collaboration with Germany 
and France and later won a Silver Bear at the Berlinale 2013 for its camera work 
(www.berlinale.de). Reviewed by Hollywood Reporter as “Grimly poetic, 
formally disciplined and psychologically gripping” (Rooney, 2013, n.p.), Harmony 
Lessons tells the story of a 13-year-old boy called Aslan who is bullied at school 
and who lives in the village with his grandmother. This humiliation helps to feed 
Aslan’s submerged personality disorders, and he takes his vengeance out on 
insects. His mental disorder pushes him to kill a bully called Bolat. Aslan and his 
friend Mirsaiyn are placed under investigation. Here, the director Emir Baygazin 
portrays the confrontation between the individual and society. The film picked 
up some twenty awards all over the world, including six Grand-Prix at São Paulo, 
Geneva, Lausanne, Basel, Angers, and Seattle (Kazakhfilm, 2019a). 55 This 
offered strong evidence of what can be achieved with adequate support. Later, 
when funding was limited, Eurasia Spotlight did not offer financial aid, but it did 
help filmmakers with things such as post-production at studios or internship trips 
to the one of the oldest film universities in Europe – the Film and TV School of 
the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague (FAMU) (Brod.kz, 2017). From all this, 
it is clear that regular pitching sessions and stronger financial support would 
enable more Kazakh films to bear fruit.  
In 2019, instead of Eurasia Spotlight, the SCSNC, in collaboration with the EurIFF, 
held an international pitching session to open doors for Kazakh films into the 
distribution market. The SCSNC registered more than thirty projects for pitching 
aimed at co-production with foreign companies. Out of this thirty, only nineteen 
promising projects participated in the pitching: thirteen feature films, five 
animations and one documentary (see Figure 33). However, the SCSNC only 
announced the information about pitching sessions and its deadlines twelve days 
ahead of the festival dates (Kazakh Cinema, 2019). 
                                         
55 The Eurasia Spotlight entry in 2011, Owners, participated in the main competition in Cannes in 
2014. The Eurasia Spotlight entry Adventure, in 2011 (Kazakhstan-France co-production), 
presented in Karlovy Vary Film Festival’s main competition in 2014. Also, the 2015 entry, Walnut 





Figure 33 The participant Maira Karsakbayeva defending a project at the pitching session at 
the 15th EurIFF, Nur-Sultan. www.eiff.kz. 
 
The panel was comprised of the Head of the Kyrgyzfilm National Film Studio 
Aibek Dzhangaziev (Kyrgyzstan), the Head of Uzbekfilm Fatih Jalalov 
(Uzbekistan), the Head of the Sakhafilm Studio Dmitry Shadrin (Russia), the Head 
of the Belarusfilm National Film Studio Vladimir Karachevsky (Belarus), the GFM 
Production Studio President Giorgi Kharebawa (Georgia), and the producer Ivan 
Lopatin (Russia) (see Figure 34). The first question that arises is why the SCSNC 
only drew on leaders of film studios from the post-Soviet countries as jury 
members? This was the response: 
Because we realise that we share a single history in many aspects. Our 
common stories can thus be filmed jointly with the various film studios. 
They [jury members] did not have the right to vote. This was firstly, 
because they are guests and secondly, because we just wanted to attract 
them to see if they would see something interesting in those projects. 
(Andrey Khazbulatov, chairman of the Board of the SCSNC, interview, 
2019) 
This supports Wong’s (2011) statement that the festival and its markets are 
spaces for networking where professionals can express their particular interest 
in a project. Secondly, it is essential for the leadership of the studios as the 
international film community, as de Valck (2007, p.109) puts it, to “to join 
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forces”. Vibrant festivals offer this opportunity and can attract different parties 
to one place (Ibid). Hence, the EurIFF could be the right place to develop 
cooperation within the film industry.  
 
Figure 34 Six international jurors at a pitching session. www.eiff.kz. 
 
On the other hand, as de Valck (2007, p.73) argues, festivals can use marketing 
strategies “to secure a ‘festival image’ for themselves that will effectively 
position the festival both globally and locally”. It was in this way that the EurIFF 
used the pitching session as a marketing strategy and placed itself as local and 
global at the same time. So, evaluation of the Kazakh film projects by CEOs of 
international film studios may start the process of teaming up with pitching 
participants, which would make the EurIFF become the centre of the Central 
Asian film market.  
The pitching of international projects revealed several urgent issues in Kazakh 
film policy. It has become obvious that the EurIFF as a film market cannot 
compete with its local counterpart – the Almaty Film Festival. The EurIFF does 
not have separate funding for projects, but rather the session was SCSNC-run. 
Nor did it provide filmmakers with internships and post-production schemes as 
Eurasia Spotlight had in the past. This feature indicates the limits of Wong’s 
(2011, p.148) argument that “festivals help to provide funds, either from the 
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festivals, or other agencies that use the festival to distribute these funds”. 
Therefore, one may argue that the SCSNC used the EurIFF as a pitching platform 
with ready international jurors, resources (time and space) and the audience to 
choose the best projects (Druzhinina, 2017), continuing the traditions of the 
Eurasia Spotlight platform. To compare, co-production markets at A-list festivals 
such as Cannes have funds to aid standing projects. As Bosma (2015) puts it, the 
festival has to have a demand for a co-production fund. By contrast, 
Kazakhstan’s two-year-old Almaty film festival has funding for new projects, 
including co-production. Although the festival was opened in 2018, the same 
year it funded a criminal drama A Dark-Dark Man56 by the Kazakh director 
Adilkhan Yerzhanov, which was produced by the Astana Film Fund (Kazakhstan), 
Short Brothers (Kazakhstan) and Arizona Productions (France). Lack of funding 
for projects at the EurIFF has implications for film policy. Firstly, the Almaty 
Film Festival as an event with a stronger marketing approach and far more skills 
in funding projects may become more popular than the EurIFF in the near 
future. What is more, the appointment of the general producer of the Almaty 
Film Festival as a deputy chairman of SCSNC (Brod.kz, 2020) in August 2020 may 
increase the status of the Almaty film festival.   
The second issue observed at the festival was its failure to capitalise on 
international funding.57 Already-negotiated distribution deals did not help to win 
state aid. For example, the project Goddess of Fortune did not pass, despite the 
fact that it already had €1.5 million financing (50 per cent out of a total budget 
of €3 million) (£1,357,425 or $1,823,565) from Italy, with a 100 per cent 
distribution deal in the Italian peninsula. As Falicov (2017, p.89) argues, a 
filmmaker’s goal is not only to obtain funds but also, in signing a distribution 
deal, “to enable it to circulate in movie theatres or film festivals worldwide, in 
the best-case scenario”. It was the only film in this session that had an 
agreement with Netflix. According to producer M. Karsakbayeva’s estimation, 
                                         
56 A-category San Sebastian International Film Festival presented the world premiere in September 
2019. The film tells the story of a typical investigation of a murder in a village. The detective wants 
to complete the investigation as quickly as possible because they have already found the ‘guilty’ 
person. But when a journalist comes to this village from the city, the plan falls apart 
(www.adilkhanyerzhanov.com). 
57 The international participants at the EurIFF were few. Only the animation Opportunity by Zhanna 
Bekmambetova (Russia), the feature films Kok Boz At [A Steed] (Tatarstan, Russia) and Goddess 
of Fortune (Italy) applied as international projects seeking Kazakh support. In contrast, other 
projects were from Kazakhstan, with co-production agreements with foreign companies.  
186 
 
this film would have grossed €7 million (£6,334,650 or $8,510,000). None of the 
Kazakh films had been viewed on the Netflix platform before. In this case, even 
a previously signed contract with one of the biggest media providers in the world 
did not help the project get funding from the Kazakh government. In this case, 
the SCSNC contradicted its first and foremost aim stated in article 14 of the 
Cinema Law: “promoting national film abroad”. The answer to why this film 
could not secure state aid can be presumptive. SCSNC provided funding only for 
those projects that participated in the official, national pitching sessions, 
whereas Karsakbayeva’s film took part only in the pitching within EurIFF, which 
was not official.   
Analysing the international jurors’ approach to selecting the best projects shows 
it to be radically different from its counterparts worldwide. The Hubert Bal 
fund, drawing on more standard criteria such as the country of production, 
nationality, gender, and the practicability of the project both financially and 
artistically, seeks to achieve “artistic quality and film authenticity”, not to 
mention looking at the extent to which the project can boost the local film 
environment (Falicov, 2017, p.88). In response to this, one of the current jury 
members said:  
The main criterion is a professional and measured approach to everything. 
They should answer to the question as to why they are shooting the movie 
and for whom? What will it give to Kazakhstan? Budget is not the most 
critical criterion. (Vladimir Karachevskiy, CEO of National Film Studio 
“Belarusfilm”, interview, 2019) 
 
This respondent’s view coincides with Falicov’s (2017) argument that by working 
collaboratively all those film professionals have an input on what aspects are 
valuable for each state’s particular needs. Thus, participation in pitching 
sessions can shape the form of the film festival, where these issues are covered. 
As long as the purpose of the SCSNC was to make world filmmakers reflect on 
the thematic relevance to Kazakhstan, then ‘What will it give to Kazakhstan?’ 
was always the central query in the pitching. This signals that the national 
dimension of the process was of key importance. Karachevskiy went on to 
further endorse this view:  
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I think the significant advantage is that it [pitching] happened very 
democratically, very openly, naturally, without bureaucracy. I honestly 
admit that I want to implement exactly the same experience in my 
country that I got at this festival. (Vladimir Karachevskiy, CEO of the 
National Film Studio “Belarusfilm”, interview, 2019) 
Although he is reminding us of the requirements of the conditions of a good 
pitch, he had no idea that the jurors’ decision would play no significant role in 
the allocation of funds. As long as it was not the primary criterion, the pitching 
would remain nothing more than a kind of a sandpit to perform projects and 
present to jurors how diverse the Kazakh film genre is with hopes for future 
collaboration. Only three projects out of the nineteen performed at the EurIFF 
received a favourable decision: Life by Emir Baigazin, A Poet by Darezhan 
Omirbayev, and Educate Ademoka by Adilkhan Yerzhanov (P. Aldibekova, 
personal communication, 11 October 2019).58 The inter-agency commission (see 
section 4.2.2.) made the final decision about financing based on the results of 
SCSNC’s national pitching session held in June 2019, where the three above-
mentioned projects were presented. The international jurors’ decision at the 
EurIFF was similar to recommendations given by the EC at the national pitching 
sessions of the SCSNC, which have only an advisory role (see the section 4.2.3). 
Both cases show that when it comes to funding issues, the outcome of the 
pitching, whether it is with local EC members or international jurors, has no 
standing. 
One major issue noted at the EurIFF, and at the pitching of projects in 
particular, is language. Kazakh-speaking participants, who are not fluent in 
Russian, had to defend their projects in Russian (in general, the working 
language of the festival was Russian). This is a problem for all pitching sessions 
held by the SCSNC, where most of the Expert Council’s members are Russian-
speaking (see Appendices B and C) and some of them had to rely on colleagues 
to interpret the pitches. This is also a problem for all Kazakh films. Filmmakers 
choose Russian in order to reach more of the population and so recoup costs and 
make profits. Moreover, Western distributors circulate films dubbed into Russian 
in all CIS countries. However, activists on social media criticised the SCSNC for 
infringing the rights of the Kazakh language. The SCSNC, whose leadership is also 
                                         




Russian-speaking, replied that an attempt to discriminate against members of 
the EC who do not speak Kazakh is contrary to the Constitution of the RK, where 
the Russian language has the status of an official language. What is more, the 
SCSNC received 26 applications out of 222 in the Kazakh state language, which is 
slightly more than 10 per cent in total (Kazakh Cinema, 2020c). Here, one can 
see the clash of two identities in bilingual Kazakhstan. This supports Wimmer’s 
(2015) argument given in section 2.1 that if the language environment is diverse 
in the country, the nation-building process is not enhanced. If language is an 
ethnic symbol that shapes national identity, cinematic nation building is being 
created in Kazakhstan through the ex-colonial Russian language, which makes for 
a form of nation building that splits into two.   
Along with the above challenge, film market priorities at Eurasia are only 
realised when the festival officials sign an agreement with international 
producers.  
7.1.2 International producers 
Film festivals shape culture and commerce. Festivals have always cooperated 
with the film industry by giving them a unique space to meet and negotiate 
(Loist, 2016), and, above all, film festivals are popular within the film industry 
for two reasons. Festivals are needed to circumvent the American hegemony 
within the market. Secondly, the event functions as a point of contact for film 
professionals. These markets are not limited to the festival programme, and 
they are attractive to film professionals from Hollywood and other countries (de 
Valck, 2007). The 15th EurIFF was no different in this respect. The festival served 
to strengthen the bonds between the significant and dominant player, 




Figure 35 From left to right: Georgina Surtees (Discovery, England), Rick Smotkin (The 
Third Circle, the USA), Julian Grimmond (Global Film Solutions, New Zealand), and Simona 
Roman Bhrlikova (Polite Rottweiler, the USA). Photo taken by the author. 
 
The EurIFF and SCSNC’s substantial step into the international market was the 
invitation of Western producers for the first time. Filmmakers from LIONSGATE, 
NBS Universal, Warner Horizon, Discovery, and Global Film Solutions (see Figure 
35) within the framework of the EurIFF had a familiarisation tour in three 
locations of Kazakhstan: the Almaty region in the South, the Mangystau region in 
the West, and the capital Nur-Sultan. If producers, alongside sales agents and 
distributors became essential players in the film festival market (Wong, 2011), 
trying to choose the best film locations, the 15th EurIFF could then see itself as 
having market-oriented elements. The SCSNC, acting as the national film 
commission institute of Kazakhstan, was involved in this attempt to attract 
filmmakers for the purpose of promoting prospective film locations (Wong, 
2011). One of the visiting producers revealed:  
I think the fascinating thing about Kazakhstan from a production 
perspective is how complete and how full the ecosystem and landscape 
are; they are extraordinary. People are the palette of that landscape, 
taking into account the talents that I've seen in music, in arts. It gives us 
a whole spectrum of activity. It is a vibrant and really exciting industry 
you have here, which I think the world would be so pleased to 
see. Hollywood looks for places with contrasts. I've just seen that every 
single minute, every single hour that I've been here. (Julian Grimmond, 
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managing director of Global Film Solutions, press conference interview, 
2019)  
 
The ecosystem and landscape in Kazakhstan are unique. However, the 
infrastructure adjacent to these perfect film locations may complicate the 
shooting process. For example, this happened during the filming of Marco Polo, 
an American streaming TV series, in Kazakhstan in 2014.59 According to Akhat 
Ibrayev, Kazakhstani line producer, it was difficult to arrange visits to film 
locations for 400 people (including 135 foreigners); because of the large number 
of participants, they had to stay in different hotels. However, despite the 
challenges, the Kazakh side could organise the filming just in 22 days 
(Prokopenko, 2014). Also, the most beautiful places within the country are 
located far from the cities, which can add additional issues of commuting. Only 
$700,000 (£520,852) were spent on transport, customs, and logistics costs. The 
same amount was spent for food and accommodation for foreign and local film 
crews (Suleimenova, 2014). In addition, Michael Hurd, producer of Marco Polo, 
revealed that the choice of Kazakhstan as a film location was not accidental. He 
came several times to participate in the Eurasia film festival and was amazed, 
like the informant Julian Grimmond, by the variety of natural landscapes – 
forests, steppes, mountains, and deserts (Ibid). This example implies that 
filming the Marco Polo series in Kazakhstan happened thanks to the participation 
of the producer in EurIFF, which shows a successful practical application of the 
festival.  
The interviewee Julian Grimmond’s view here coincides with something that 
Goldsmith (2015) notes, and which I will look at in more detail in the next 
section. He differentiates two main strategies of location marketing: low cost by 
way of tax incentives, and product differentiation. However, the distinctiveness 
of the location is not necessarily an essential selling point, because the film 
location is not typically advertised in terms of its distinguishing qualities, but in 
terms of its acting as a cheaper replacement for a similar location elsewhere. If 
                                         
59 Marco Polo is TV series about the Italian traveller and merchant. He lived for 17 years in the 
Kublaikhan khanate in Mongolia and wrote the diaries about the Turkic-speaking tribes in 
Central Asia. The series was ordered by Netflix and produced by brothers Harvey and Bob 
Weinstein, founders of Miramax and the Weinstein company studios. The first season partly 
was shot in Kazakhstan (Suleimenova, 2014), where the stuntmen from Kazakhstani Nomad 
Stunts International Action company participated and continued to work on the next location in 
Malaysia (www.nomadstunts.com).  
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Hollywood and the festivals are symbiotic (Wong, 2011), then the EurIFF may 
have opportunities to raise its profile via this relationship with the Hollywood 
market. As argued by Elsaesser (2005, pp.38-39), national cinema cannot live 
without Hollywood: 
Yet paradoxically, a national cinema is precisely something which relies 
for its existence on a national exhibition sector at least as much as it does 
on a national production sector. Without Hollywood, no national 
exhibition sector, [that is] without a national exhibition sector, i.e., 
cinemas, whether privately run or state-subsidised prepared to show 
independent releases, you cannot have a national cinema. 
Indeed, even a prominent festival like Cannes requires cooperation with 
Hollywood to win legitimacy (Jungen, 2014). Moreover, the success of the first 
European film festivals has advanced due to their relationship with Hollywood, 
along with importing many of its techniques to strengthen their profile (de 
Valck, 2007). If Kazakhstan enhances cooperation with invited companies, the 
festival circuit of the EurIFF may become an essential interface with Hollywood 
(Elsaesser, 2013). In other words, the EurIFF, by offering an opportunity for 
targeted film professionals, is building up strong networking for future 
collaboration (Martínez-Ruiz et al, 2011). Examining the Transylvania film 
festival in Romania, Sălcudean (2017, p.207) deduces that “opening to the 
outside, partnerships and networking, can channel nationalism in creating 
cultural country branding”. So, if one is successful in establishing connections 
with producers worldwide, then one is creating a unique opportunity for a 
netfilm market to brand Kazakhstan. On the other hand, let us recall 
Schlesinger’s (2000 p.26) argument (see section 2.1) regarding American 
superiority. He states that local markets cannot see American films as “other” 
because of their popularity and growth. Thus, with increased collaboration with 
Western companies, Hollywood, in particular, may be another threat to Kazakh 
national cinema. 
One of the substantial novelties that attracts the foreign film industry to 




7.2 Rebates and tax incentives 
As argued by Vitali and Willemen (2006, p.2), “the developmental engine of the 
cinema is driven by industrial, rather than cultural forces”. One industrial engine 
in filmmaking is tax breaks. Tax incentives began in North America in 1997, 
when the Canadian government decided to attract money for the film industry 
(Stephens, 2018). With similar schemes, Europe and the USA offer three 
different kinds of film production incentives: tax rebates, tax credits, and 
grants. If tax credits are a type of investment that diminishes the amount of the 
investor’s taxable income, a tax grant is calculated as a share of the production 
expenses and is based on the film’s production costs. Although it is similar to the 
grant model, the tax rebate offers a tax refund based on production costs during 
the shooting process (Castendyk, 2018). Following these examples, the Cinema 
Law (2019) in Kazakhstan aimed to open up new possibilities for integrating the 
film industry of the country with the world cinema community:  
Our task is to attract foreign investment. This is just what a [tax] rebate 
allows. Over time, this will enable both small and large-scale events to be 
filmed here in Kazakhstan. We strive for an international level. We strive 
to get international rental. (Andrey Khazbulatov, chairman of the Board 
of the SCSNC, interview, 2019) 
Khazbulatov’s argument is about tax rebates. But the claim to internationalise is 
undermined by the failure to secure agreement for even one film with Netflix 
(see section 7.1.1). How can Kazakhstan see itself as striving for an international 
scale if it does not give a chance to producers who have rich experience in film 
promotion?  
 
Kazakhstan is following the Cinema Law’s well-trodden path by introducing a tax 
rebate that is up to 30 per cent of local costs, with the filmmaker spending at 
least 130,000 monthly accounting indices (MAI),60 which is ₸379,210,000 
(£670,747 or $901,450) at January 2021 rates. Kazakhstan was ahead of Russia 
and the whole of the Central Asian region in introducing tax incentives for the 
first time. To compare, Russia announced tax rebates for foreign film 
productions only at the end of 2019 (Kozlov, 2019), although it adopted the 
                                         
60 The MAI is an index that is used in Kazakhstan to calculate fines, pensions, social benefits. 
From January 2021, one MAI in Kazakhstan reached ₸2,917, which is around £5.  
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Cinema Law in 1996 (Van Gorp, 2011). The Russian programme of tax rebates 
can be considered as disrupted because the only candidate, the Chinese film 
Adventure ZQ, received a negative resolution from the Russian Expert Council. 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia did not have any other films that applied 
for cash rebates in 2020 (Chachelov, 2020). Per contra, Kazakhstan’s Expert 
Council approved two co-productions in 2020 (see section 4.2.3): Oliara [Off-
season], the first Hungarian-Kazakhstani film about the famine in the 1930s (see 
section 2.2); and Kok Boz At [A Steed], a Kazakhstan-Tatarstan project (Kazakh 
Cinema, 2019). In doing so, the country has created the possibility of becoming a 
“film-friendly” (Goldsmith, 2015, p.179) country, which, in turn, would allow 
them to compete against other external film promoters.  
 
This scheme may reshape the film industry, as it did in the UK with the 
introduction of tax incentives in 1992 (Newsinger and Presence, 2018). The fiscal 
incentives were updated by a further tax relief, introduced by New Labour in 
1997. Both systems worked in the UK until 2004, when the new Film Tax Credit 
(FTC) replaced the “dual-clause system”. This last can be classed as cultural 
nationalism versus economic intervention with respect to film policy (Magor and 
Schlesinger, 2009, p.300). Furthermore, the primary beneficiaries of the tax 
benefits in Great Britain are mainly the Hollywood majors (Newsinger and 
Presence, 2018, p.450). It is worth noting that with a population of 18 million in 
Kazakhstan, the film expenses are not justified if it is to spend more than 
$300,000–$500,000 (nearly £226,850–£378,000) for one film. Hence, low-budget 
Kazakh films are doomed to failure in the world market. Nevertheless, tax 
breaks, which may open up new opportunities to produce world-class films with 
foreign investment and worldwide circulation, prepare the ground for greater 
competition with respect to Kazakhstani film products. As such, the impact of 
Kazakh films in building the national image may increase. 
 
Tax incentives have one more advantage in that they may develop film-induced 
tourism. Alexander Shapiro, who previously worked at Warner Brothers Studio 
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for 12 years and is CEO of the QED International Covert Media,61 which launches 
big-name movies, speculated about the profits for Kazakhstan after tax reliefs:  
We did Harry Potter in Great Britain, and now people go there to see 
where Harry Potter was shot. The attraction of film projects will increase 
profitability, above all through the attractiveness of the country; 
everyone will know what Kazakhstan is. Today, few people understand 
what is really here. Secondly, the country’s revenue from attracting 
tourists will increase. (Alexander Shapiro, CEO of the QED International 
Covert Media, press conference interview, 2019) 
These views found other international support:  
The rebate is extraordinarily vital to push Kazakhstan's competitiveness in 
the market- place. If you can imagine projects as a commodity […], you 
then have a landscape where business can happen along with 
creativity. There are amazing tourism opportunities here. (Julian 
Grimmond, managing director of Global Film Solutions, press conference 
interview, 2019) 
 
Indeed, Kazakhstan’s spectacular locations attracted the filmmakers even before 
the Cinema Law (2019) with tax rebates. Kazakhstan earned $4 million 
(£2,976,300) for the organisation of the Marco Polo series described earlier in 
this section (Suleimenova, 2014).  This is a clear example of business 
intersecting with creativity. Also, the above quotes support the argument 
(Beeton, 2016; Busby et al, 2013; Gupta et al, 2018) that cinema can attract 
investment from tourism. However, these tax preferences can cause 
unfavourable conditions for Kazakhstan. The country’s film policy cannot just 
simply be an economic incentive to attract foreign investment; it must also 
develop the country’s own film culture. International companies might just 
come to use Kazakhstani fiscal incentives to access loopholes in the law and 
reduce their filming costs. It is not clear whose benefits will weigh more on the 
scales.  
 
From an international perspective, film-induced tourism to locations enables 
tourists to travel to the location of a particular film. The above quotes suggest 
that because of its films – as the Borat film did - Kazakhstan might more readily 
be seen as a safe place to visit by potential tourists (see the section 2.6.3). As a 
                                         
61 This company launched Fury (2014) with Brad Pitt, Dirty Grandpa (2016) with Robert De Niro, 
Sabotage (2014) with Arnold Schwarzenegger and many other films with famous film stars. 
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consequence, film production could benefit from investment in the local 
economy by way of film-induced tourism. This was seen in the case of The 
Hobbit which triggered an increased interest in tourists visiting New Zealand. 
The country, instead of wasting money on marketing campaigns that are aimed 
at tourists, tends to think that top films “can themselves provide a cost-
effective way to market the brand ‘New Zealand’ internationally more 
successfully” (Ferrer-Roca, 2018, p.396). Also, it may be argued that Sydney 
Harbour Bridge and Opera House in Australia have achieved popularity through 
the impact of films (Beeton, 2016). Accordingly, for Kazakhstan, tax breaks 
could be designed to attract the film world’s attention.  
 
The SCSNC is making steps towards supporting film-induced tourism in 
Kazakhstan. When it participated in the SCSNC at the 70th Berlinale in 2020 it 
gained entry into the AFCI,62 the International Association of Film Commissions 
(Kazakh Cinema, 2020d). This may help Kazakhstan to position itself on the 
world map as well as possibly attracting Hollywood stars to be filmed in the 
country’s spectacular locations (see Figure 36). This supports Dinnie’s (2016, 
p.115) view that one of the main challenges of nation branding is how to 
“position a country so that it is not perceived solely as a tourist destination, but 
also as a credible location for inward investment”. Along with this, SCSNC 
launched its website www.etalents.pro, as a platform that combines the best 
shooting destinations, service companies, filmmakers, and talents, not only from 
Kazakhstan, but all over Central Asia. The website offers annual membership for 
£40 for castings in Kazakhstan and all over the world. By the end of 2020, 3,805 
actors, 257 filmmakers and 37 companies had joined the platform (Kazakh 
Cinema, 2020a). It signals that the expansion of collaboration with neighbouring 
countries has already begun. As such, the involvement of more locations and 
local filmmakers in foreign films may increase the impact on the economic 
element of nation building. 
 
                                         
62 The AFCI is a worldwide network to combine over 360 professional film commissions from 6 





Figure 36 One of the potential film locations in the Mangystau region, Kazakhstan. Extract 
from the booklet at the Berlinale 2020. www.kazakhcinema.kz. 
 
Yet the question of who gets the benefit of this tax relief is still on the agenda. 
On the one hand, Kazakhstan’s tax relief offer of up to 30 per cent is twice that 
of Thailand’s 15 per cent, when there are at least $872,000 (£648,833) local 
filming costs in Thailand (Ravid, 2018) compared to Kazakhstani $901,450 
(£670,746). This, in turn, makes the country more attractive for global 
filmmakers. On the other hand, the Central Asian leader, Kazakhstan, may lose 
on a bad deal. If the average budget of Hollywood films, according to Alexander 
Shapiro, is from $4-80 million (£2,976,300 – £59,526,000) (Alexander Shapiro, 
CEO of the QED International Covert Media, press conference interview, 2019), 
redeeming tax relief of 30 per cent for each costly Hollywood project may 
exceed the benefits for Kazakhstan. That is the reason for ongoing political 
debates in the USA (Castendyk, 2018) over co-production films versus non-
beneficial agreements to the local economy. Therefore, it shows that 
Kazakhstan cannot be sure that the hoped-for outcomes will occur, although this 
is a step in the direction of both nation building and nation-branding strategies 





7.3 Co-production  
Since the 1990s, co-production has become a norm in the auteur-led cinema 
field in the world (de Valck, 2014). From the film industry’s angle, cinema is an 
international business rather than a national notion. It is argued that co-
production has benefits both national and international, ensuring not only the 
economic growth of national cinema but also the promotion of the country’s 
image and culture globally (Cucco, 2018). Therefore, it may be argued that co-
production is potentially beneficial for nation building as well as for branding, 
depending on the deal and whether the extent to which each partner can pursue 
specific goals is clear.  
Co-production is a way to achieve wider circulation of film products. For 
instance, over the last decade, European countries cooperated with 150 
countries, 40 per cent of which were outside the EU. Belgium and Luxembourg 
created the majority of their films through co-production rather than as national 
producers, with 56 and 53 per cent, respectively (Talavera, 2018). This way of 
collaborating generates a larger number of admissions than national films (Ibid; 
Drake, 2018). Since the 1990s, festivals have taken on the additional role of 
promoters, and, increasingly, of co-producers for international films, from 
Sundance to Rotterdam (Wong, 2011). Furthermore, many of the selected films 
for the Cannes and Berlin festivals would not have been produced if it were not 
for transnational films with regional film funding (Appelgren, 2018). Discussions 
on how Kazakhstan can attract foreign investment have been ongoing at the 
Eurasia festival since 2000. Producers noted that poor infrastructure could be a 
stumbling block in the development of bilateral relations. At that time, co-
production initiatives seemed the most likely solution to this (Bell, 2006).  
Notwithstanding previous statements, according to the Central Asian film critic 
Gulnara Abikeyeva, producers from Russia, France, the Netherlands, and Japan 
have all taken an interest in Kazakhstani cinema (Abikeyeva, 2001). The most 
prominent co-production projects of the late 1990s and early 2000s have been: 
the action drama Mongol (2007) by Kazakhstan, Germany and Russia, with a 
budget of €10 million (£9,049,500 or $12,157,100); and Tulpan (2008) a co-
production by Kazakhstan, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland, which won Grand 
Prix at Zurich, Reykjavik, Tokyo, London, Montreal, Karlovy Vary, and Cannes in 
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different competitions in 2008. One of the key Kazakh directors in initiating co-
production at the end of the 1990s has been Darezhan Omirbayev. He filmed 
Killer (1998), which won the Un Certain Regard Grand Prix at Cannes Festival, 
with France and The Road (2001) with France and Japan.  
Some think it would be better to start co-production with closer, neighbouring 
countries, in what the film scholar Mette Hjort calls in her influential typology 
(2010, pp.49-50) ‘affinitive transnationalism’, or cooperating with ‘people like 
us’:  
We are in a sufficiently strong position compared to other Central Asian 
countries, more or less, financially. That is, we could very easily do co-
productions with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. With Uzbekistan, 
we would gain a market of 20 million people. There are still local options; 
we could go for Tatarstan, Yakutia [republics of the Russian Federation], 
and so on. Then there is Turkey, of course, that is close to us. (Gulnara 
Abikeyeva, president of the Association of Film Critics of Kazakhstan, 
interview, 2019) 
This implies that Kazakhstan might feel more comfortable producing films with 
countries that are historically and culturally closer and whose location would 
reduce logistics costs. Yet Kazakhstan has not filmed any pictures with Central 
Asian states. As for Turkey, the Kazakhfilm studio has announced the casting of 
actors in 2019 for a large-scale historical series, which will be commissioned by 
the Ministry of Culture and Sport. A multi-episode project will describe the life 
of one of the most famous Kazakh rulers - Kassym Khan, the fourth Khan of the 
Kazakh Khanate from about 1511 to 1521 (Kazakhfilm, 2019b). Again, however, 
we see Kazakhstan paying more attention to historical films, which are costly for 
the local budget.  
There is some support for restrictive opinions. Consider this view: 
Kazakh cinema cannot conquer the international market. There is 
absolutely no hope for that, and only a fool can have faith in that. 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s markets are enough for us. (Bekbolat 
Tileukhan, Parliament deputy, interview, 2019) 
 
Tileukhan’s opinion was shared by another interviewee:  
I don’t think that Kazakh commercial films would succeed abroad, 
because Hollywood, Bollywood and other film industries have already 
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conquered the market. If Kazakh films are successful within the domestic 
market, that is a big achievement. (Baubek Nogerbek, associate 
professor, doctor in film history and theory of the National Academy of 
Art, interview, 2019) 
 
If a Parliament deputy, who is also a member of the Board of Directors of the 
SCSNC, does not express hope in expanding the market, this shows little respect 
for all the achievements of Kazakh cinema since independence. This idea 
supports Raudino’s (2015, p.119) view that the aim should be for Kazakhstan to 
position itself within both regional and transnational cinema. Moreover, 
neighbouring Kyrgyzstan’s film production is less developed than Kazakhstan’s 
film market. Its population is currently just over 6.5 million people 
(www.stat.kg). As such, co-production with this country will not have much 
impact on Kazakhstan.  
The argument by Nogerbek points out that Kazakhstan first of all needs internal 
nation building through cinema to build internal identity. On the other hand, 
others emphasise that this is not enough: “for cinema to be nationally popular, 
it must also be international in scope” (Higson, 1989, pp.40-41). Moreover, as 
put by Elsaesser (2005, p.38), when Hollywood dominates the world film market, 
“each national cinema is both national and international”. Here, one can see the 
undeniable and strong bond of the national with international, internal branding 
with the external one. If films are recognised as part of the country’s cultural 
products abroad, then it also reflects national recognition (Sălcudean, 2017, 
p.212). That is why branding a country through cinema requires conquering new 
film markets. 
Kazakhstan started to make co-production attempts in the 1990s. By 2000, the 
country had the highest rates of international collaboration in films in the 
Central Asian region. Kazakh cinema was invested in by the Netherlands, Japan, 
Russia, and France (Abikeyeva, 2001). However, those collaboration attempts 
were made by private studios and independent Kazakh producers rather than by 
Kazakhfilm (Abikeyeva, 2006). According to Hammett-Jamart (2018), there are 
two categories of co-production: the official one that appears under 
intergovernmental treaties; and the non-official co-production that occurs 
outside this policy. Kazakhstan’s attempts in the 1990s belong to the latter, 
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without strong co-production agreements between particular states, which 
represent what Hjort (2010) would call ‘сosmopolitan transnationalism’. 
 
To facilitate more adequate co-production projects that meet this combined 
national and international need, it is necessary to expand the audience:  
 
Given we are historically and geographically connected, we really need to 
focus on co-production with Russia. It is easier for us to shoot films for 
this audience. We know their mentality. We know the language. Even 
before the Soviet Union, we had a rich shared history. You can find 
interesting common topics. Another potential market for us is China. A 
large number of the Kazakh diaspora lives in the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region. They are close to us both historically and with 
respect to language. There is Inner Mongolia as well. So, these are all big 
audiences. (Rashid Nugmanov, director, interview, 2019) 
This needs detailed analysis. There was one example of attempted co-production 
with China. The Kazakhfilm Studio and the Chinese companies, Shineworks 
Pictures and China Film Coproduction Corporation, worked on the creation of the 
picture The Composer (2019) (see Figure 37). The film tells the story of the life 
and work of the Chinese composer Xian Xinghai in Almaty, as well as about his 
friendship with the Kazakh composer Bakytzhan Baikadamov. Film rental was 
only available in Kazakhstan after distribution in China. Again, no data on box-
office figures in the two countries is available. Sabit Kurmanbekov, the co-
director with the Chinese director Sherzod Yakub, mentioned that The Composer 
was shown in 3,000 Chinese cinema theatres, but based on the contract between 
the two countries, Kazakhstan only received only a small percentage of the box 
office revenues:  
Making a co-production with China is very profitable for us because each 
Chinese province itself is equivalent to the whole of Russia with regard to 
population. However, we were unable to exhibit the film properly in 
Kazakhstan. We only had seven days. It was shown in one movie theatre in 
Almaty, one in Astana, and one in Aktobe – and that is all! That's the 
worst thing. Everyone knows it. But nobody wants to change the situation. 
(Sabit Kurmanbekov, director, interview, 2019) 
This quote implies the local distribution issue. The same happened with 
Kurmanbekov’s The Returnee (2017) (see section 4.2.2). Others have more to say 
on this: “The problem is that you need to invest money in your project before 
you can know whether they [potential buyers] will buy it from you or not. It is a 
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precarious business, this is why it needs to be done via co-production” 
(Alexander Shapiro, CEO of QED International Covert Media, press-conference 
interview, 2019). However, this does not work well in Kazakhstan due to 
unresolved issues with distribution and theatrical exhibition issues. Co-
production will not work efficiently unless Kazakhstan solves it within the 
country. Otherwise, it will not be worth bothering with it. On the other hand, 
filming unsuccessful projects with Kazakhstan may just be considered to be a 
Chinese soft-power tool; that is, as a means of exerting general influence, given 
the film was initiated by China, even though cooperation with the emerging film 
industry of Kazakhstan is not particularly advantageous to them from a financial 
point of view. Moreover, Xie Fei, a Chinese film critic and member of the 
NETPAC jury at the EurIFF 15, stated that the film was not successful in China 
(press conference interview, 2019). The film turned out to be more Chinese than 
Kazakh, and only the appearance of several Kazakh actors demonstrated some 
aspect of Kazakhstan (Baitukenov, 2019). The movie tries to generate the idea 




Figure 37 The poster of the biopic The Composer (2019) by Kazakhstan and China. 
www.kazakhfilmstudios.kz. 
 
Currently, over half a million ethnic Kazakhs, not to mention Uighurs, are being 
killed in Chinese re-education camps, where they are tortured, raped, deprived 
of sleep, and forced to take suspicious and harmful medicine (Javaid, 2019; 
Maas, 2019). According to other sources, up to 1.5 million ethnic Muslims, which 
is equivalent to one in six adults, have been sent to brainwashing camps (Zenz, 
2019; Raza, 2019). China takes children away from their parents in order to 
destroy their religious faith and culture in orphanages (Hiatt, 2019). This has 
been ongoing since 2017. It can be considered, as Maas (2009, p.18) calls it, 
“cultural genocide”, if not a political one. However, China denies it. The 
Chinese Embassy in the UK told the BBC that the allegations of torture were 
“sheer rumour” (BBC, 2020). Kazakhstani officials believe only Chinese official 
statements. In his interview to Deutsche Welle Russian, the president of 
Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, said that “In general, these materials are 
203 
 
not true. Perhaps, there are some isolated cases of people of Kazakh nationality 
entering these schools for re-education” (Deutsche Welle, 2019, n.p.). Moreover, 
Kazakhstan would not provide asylum for Kazakhs who crossed the border 
illegally to flee China’s repressive policy. Instead, they imprisoned them along 
with those who protested to support them. If China is actively trying to 
eradicate Kazakh/Muslim identity, how can Kazakhstan trade culturally with 
China when the culture itself is being repressed? One may argue that co-
production with China is immoral. 
Secondly, China is a highly regulated market. Only one American company, 
Union Pictures, had a 7.5 per cent of market share in 2016, whereas the market 
is filled by six other Chinese companies (Statista.com, 2016). In 2018 the number 
of major cinema screens in China reached over 60 (Kwok, 2019) and continues to 
grow. In this regard, it is challenging and almost impossible for Kazakhstan to 
release its films in the Chinese market in such a competitive environment. This 
is a brief explanation why the above-mentioned The Composer was not 
successful in the “Celestial Empire”. 
Although European producers tend to think that the advantages of co-production 
outweigh its disadvantages, since this region has become a world centre for 
international collaboration in the film industry (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric & 
Redvall, 2018), for Kazakhstan cooperation with Russia, mentioned as a good 
film-production option by Rashid Nugmanov, would favour the Russian language 
and weaken the role of the already marginalised Kazakh language. As such, it 
would expand the hegemony of the Russian language, whereas Kazakh film 
production is already suffering at the moment from the problem of mixed-
language productions. Moreover, the challenges of “linguistic diversity, different 
national film cultures” exist in the European distribution market as well (Drake, 
2018, p.86; Appelgren, 2018). This downside has been emphasised by Cucco 
(2018) who states that bilateral work risks becoming a hybrid product without 
developing roots within the indigenous culture. Also, one country may benefit at 
the expense of the other in co-production (Elsaesser, 2005, p.37). It is also 
notable that in countries of the European Union, ‘indigenous’ production is a 
policy priority, if the film is produced within the orbit of the European Union’s 
single market (Magor and Schlesinger, 2009, p.301). Kazakhstan’s film 
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production is not similarly protected, and this model of production may further 
weaken the country’s identity.  
Also, analysing an example from French cinema, Hayward (2005, p.50) argues: 
 
It is in this murky area of co-productions, especially when they are the 
predominant production practice, that the identity of a national cinema 
becomes confused – as was the case in the 1920s and in the 1960s. […] It 
is not just the loss of the specificity of a national identity that such 
practices can entail […] the pursuance of these practices also caused a 
loss of small-to-medium-budget films.  
 
This echoes Eleftheriotis’ (2001, p.33) argument stating that “the lack of 
‘purity’ in the co-production is not only the source of classificatory confusion but 
also a serious threat to a national mode of production”. Hence, co-production 
films become transnational rather than national (Eleftheriotis, 2001, p.48), and 
the films do not need to symbolically wave the national flag of the filmmaker 
(Palis, 2015). As such, Kazakh–Russian films are not likely to evoke Kazakh 
culture.  
 
However, some examples of collaboration with East Asia have increased 
turnover. Kazakhfilm finished a project with Japan about Japanese captives in 
the KARLAG camp in Kazakhstan (see section 2.2.1) Akhiko from Aktas. The 
Horse Thieves is a second project between Kazakhfilm and Tokyo New Cinema. 
Directed by Yerlan Nurmukhambetov and Lisa Takeba, it opened at the Busan 
International Film Festival in 2019. According to the plot, based on a true story, 
a gang of horse thieves trick a man, brutally kill him, and steal a herd of horses. 
At the same time, his son is suffering a loss and is trying to cope with a tragedy. 
At the moment of despair and defencelessness, a mysterious stranger named 
Kairat begins to help the family (Brod.kz, 2018). Variety marks the film as “a 
learning and co-operative experience between filmmakers from different 
cultures” (Frater, 2019, n.p.), and the Hollywood Reporter called it “an 
exemplar of … vivid geographical, cultural and perspective alternatives” (Kerr, 
2019, n.p.). Therefore, as Eleftheriotis (2001, p.49) notes: “films can cross-
cultural and national borders and can ‘travel’”. These examples show that some 
cases of co-production can be successful in the international market despite the 




Figure 38 From left to right: signing the memorandum of cooperation by the SCSNC with 
GFM Production Studio (Georgia), "Uzbekfilm" (Uzbekistan), Kyrgyzfilm National Film 
Studio (Kyrgyzstan), and Tatarkino (Tatarstan, Russian Federation). www.eiff.kz. 
 
The SCSNC, aiming to collaborate with the post-Soviet republics, during the 
EurIFF 15 signed a memorandum of cooperation with Tatarkino, Belorusfilm, 
Uzbekfilm, Sakhafilm, Kyrgyzfilm, and Georgian film studios (see Figure 38). 
Commenting on the signing of the agreements on collaboration, the chairman of 
the board, Andrey Khazbulatov, noted that this event would be an essential step 
in strengthening friendship and developing the cinema of the countries of 
Eurasia. “The festival is an association of like-minded people who support 
cinema”, said the chairman. This quote reveals that the body sees the above-
mentioned international film studios as a means of developing national cinema, 
leading to further expansion of the distribution market. In this respect, the 
EurIFF was used as a platform to expand cooperation between the Kazakhstan 
and CIS film studios. Six signed memorandums may expand the geographical 
coverage of Kazakh film. This was the case with Switzerland, which uses co-
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production deals to expand its market and to screen films at major film festivals 
(Cucco, 2018). Also, currently the UK, which is one of the leading countries in 
filming high-quality movies, has bilateral co-production agreements with 12 
countries (Newsinger and Presence, 2018, p.452). However, signed 
memorandums in Kazakhstan do not guarantee instant and high-quality film 




This chapter has addressed the two linked research questions about the degree 
to which, firstly the EurIFF contributes to nation building, and, secondly, on 
what is the role of Kazakh cinema in nation building. 
This chapter has argued that Kazakh cinema is on the threshold of gradual 
industrial development. I traced the influence of EurIFF as an industry 
supporting Kazakhstan’s nation building. The study tried to evaluate the impact 
of co-production and tax incentives on the growth of the Kazakhstani film 
business.  
Previously, the Eurasia Film Market and Eurasia Spotlight pitching sessions were 
different organisations, suffered from instability, lack of funding, and the 
constantly changing leadership of the EurIFF. Statistical data to measure the 
previous market’s success was not available. Thus, the EurIFF from a film 
industry point of view was less successful due to the same reasons I described in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
The pitching of international projects highlighted several issues. Firstly, in terms 
of holding genuine pitching sessions with funding support for winners, it is clear 
that the EurIFF cannot compete with the newly-established Almaty Film Festival, 
which is more market-oriented than the unstable Nur-Sultan-centric festival. 
Secondly, the EurIFF’s pitching sessions, even if held only to attract potential 
partners for those films, failed to capitalise on international funding and to build 
on the opportunities gained from a previously negotiated deal with Netflix.  
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The language issue in the country limits the nation building of Kazakhstan both 
internally and externally. Kazakh filmmakers prefer to shoot in Russian in order 
to reach the general population and Western distributors circulate foreign films 
dubbed into Russian in all CIS countries. It makes the distribution of film as a 
cultural form uncertain. In order to expand its borders and conquer new 
markets, film production needs to go beyond Kazakhstan so that it can achieve 
international recognition. Cooperation with neighbouring Russia weakens the 
role of the already ‘secondary’ Kazakh language in the country. As a result, the 
scope of the influence of cinema on nation building is restricted.  
The findings confirmed that the festival had been attempting to form new 
partnerships between Hollywood studios and the SCSNC. Signing bilateral 
agreements with international producers and studios (LIONSGATE, NBS Universal, 
Warner Horizon, Discovery, Global Film Solutions) may be treated as the first 
steps in collaboration that may bring benefits in future. The EurIFF has shown 
itself to be a platform to tie these networks with the outside world. By keeping 
these factors in mind, it can be argued that the EurIFF has served to bridge gaps 
between the demands of both the Kazakh film industry and those relatively few 
professionals from the West who are eager to collaborate with Central Asia.  
 
Another finding is that Kazakhstan, as a vast country with a small population, is 
not interesting to international filmmakers apart from opportunities it provides 
for tax breaks. From an economic perspective, as was evident from the 
fieldwork, industry-based initiatives under the Cinema Law (2019), such as tax 
rebates, are there to assist Kazakh films in entering the transnational market. I 
argue that although tax incentives are intended to attract investments to the 
local film industry and to develop film-induced tourism, they can also act as a 
loophole that may be manipulated by the global film studios. Refunding up to 30 
per cent of film costs for expensive Hollywood movies can be harmful to the 
local profits. Clearly, there are conflicting interests between film policy and the 
benefits for Kazakhstan.  
 
Although co-production can boost the film industry in Kazakhstan, Kazakh films 
cannot survive in the competitive Chinese market, where even American 
distribution studios are content with a small share. Co-production may also be a 
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threat to Kazakh indigenous production, with the potential loss of a national 
identity that is essential to nation building. 
 
The findings showed that the EurIFF as a platform of filmic experience has 
incipient film market and business components. So, its contribution as an 
industry to nation building is limited. Tax rebates and co-production, with a 
possible increase in the scope and geographical coverage of the Kazakh cinema, 
might contribute to Kazakhstan’s image in future, when the country’s film policy 
has matured. However, currently, this contribution limits the economic benefits 





Kazakhstan as a post-colonial nation finds itself situated at the crossroads of 
complex political and economic issues affecting cultural policy. This thesis has 
explored how the Kazakh nation reconstructs and defines itself through films by 
taking an ethno-symbolism approach inspired by Anthony Smith’s work. Kazakh 
cinema content – exemplified by two case studies of film production and the 
Eurasia International Film Festival - was investigated by employing both semi-
structured interviews and observational work alongside desk research. 
 
The study advanced three research questions: Who takes the decisions in the 
Kazakh cinema market and who controls it? To what extent does EurIFF 
contribute to nation building and the projection of a national identity? What is 
the role of the Kazakh cinema in nation building? Considering the transition 
period in film policy, first of all, the thesis studied how the new Cinema Law is 
reshaping Kazakh film production. Secondly, it examined the case of the EurIFF 
in terms of its organisation and challenges that created serious obstacles for the 
festival’s development. Thirdly, the research critiqued how programming and 
curation, and Kazakh cinema’s connection with audiences (both local and 
international) impacted on recognition of the festival and the country. Finally, 
this study has explored the commercial element of Kazakh cinema and the 
EurIFF and their relationship with the global film industry as a means of 
measuring their impact on the country’s image. 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, several studies investigated Kazakh 
cinema in general and, more specifically, from a nation-building perspective. It 
is worth noting that, to date, there are no academic works on the EurIFF and its 
difference from counterparts in Europe and Asia. This thesis has aimed to fill this 
existing gap in Kazakh film studies.  
 
This chapter will draw out some conclusions on the findings in relation to the 
three research questions in turn. From there, it will move on to discuss the 
implications of these results for film policy in Kazakhstan. The last section will 
both highlight the limitations of the study and suggest possible further areas for 




8.1  Findings 
Who takes the decisions in the Kazakh cinema market and who controls it?  
Chapter 4 considered the production of cinema from both historical and 
contemporary points of view. The evidence indicated that, before 2019, Kazakh 
cinema was in a deplorable state. The new Cinema Law has divided the history 
of Kazakh film policy into two systems: before and after/old and new. The 
debate around the Law, which is maybe too general in some respects, was 
shaped by economic and political factors. 
In Kazakhstan today, support for national cinema is represented by two main 
organisations: the SCSNC as the main financial operator in terms of financing 
film projects, and the old operator, the Kazakhfilm Studio, acting as the main 
base for film production of both national and international film projects.  
 
My main argument is that given the authoritarian nature of the clan regime in 
Kazakhstan, political and cultural nation building (including cinematic nation 
building) has a top-down approach and operates between the Papa of the nation, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, and his administration. What is more, the incoherence of 
the new system and tensions between the old and new systems hinder 
Kazakhstan’s nation-building aspirations. Both the SCSNC and JSC Kazakhfilm 
have national status. Both are controlled by the Ministry of Culture and Sport. 
Since the SCSNC is an innovation of the film policy of Kazakhstan and offers a 
new policy model, there are inevitable pressure between the two systems. This 
creates internal conflicts that impede new developments. Those running the old 
system do not want to lose power or change from the old Soviet-style system. 
The findings reinforce what Abikeyeva (2006, p.290) concluded 15 years ago; 
namely, that the “one studio–one producer” system does not fit the new 
realities of Kazakhstan.  
 
This study showed that these two systems reflect differing interests of a range of 
people all competing for resources. With respect to these competing tensions 
between both systems, the Ministry of Culture and Sport (sometimes dictated by 
the upper echelons), represented by the Interdepartmental Commission at the 
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SCSNC, has the final say in making decisions related to film funding. This now 
puts JSC Kazakhfilm – previously responsible for funding – at a disadvantage. The 
chapter also found that the combined system that is now just beginning to move 
forward has many problems in finance, due partly to bureaucracy, fraud, and 
uncertainty.  
 
The findings suggest that despite the twice-reformed Expert Council, its 
decisions do little more than act as a sieve to separate out promising film 
projects. The interviewees noted that the new system that has been created for 
authorising funding is very complicated, and that it is a mixture of professional 
criteria provided by experts and political criteria provided by people in the 
political system. There is a well-founded perception that decisions about film 
funding are often a fait accompli, and that these pre-decided choices are often 
politically driven. 
 
It was the rationale of this study to see to what extent the restructuring of the 
cinema system changed the relationship between the market and the state. 
Kazakhstan had set an objective of trying to project Kazakhstan to the world. 
However, it would seem fair to conclude that the reforms in cinema production 
are sometimes contradictory. All interviewees pointed to distribution and the 
fact that Kazakh films do not reach the audience as Kazakh cinema’s main 
problem, which clearly defeats the main reason for making them in the first 
place and certainly doesn’t contribute to the country’s original aim of promoting 
the country in the wider world.  
 
With regard to the support of national films in the domestic market, some 
interviewees felt that Kazakhstan needs to stop promoting foreign films, 
especially Russian ones, as they dominate the market and, for this reason, often 
blur the domestic content. This study showed that Kazakh comedies are the 
most dominant genre and the only type of film that grosses high rates at the box 
office. Needless to say, one of the major problems in Kazakhstan is that with 
cinema theatres 100 per cent privately owned, the government cannot force 
them to screen local films, and cinema theatres have to prioritise Western films 
at the expense of local ones for ticket proceeds.  
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The film industry is globalised, and Kazakhstan - with such a small population - 
cannot avoid the rules set by the global film economy. The inconclusive reform 
process in the country does not, and cannot, revive the wide circulation of 
Kazakh cinema that prevailed in Soviet times. However, films about the political 
leader never face obstacles in terms of circulation and promotion. An imbalance 
in the intentions of the government in regard to solving the issue of distribution 
is evident. Furthermore, a lack of statistical data has increasingly worsened the 
situation with regard to market control and sales forecasting. Kazakhstan’s film 
policy, controlled by the Ministry of Culture and Sport, is dependent on the 
biggest world film-market players: Western film interests and Russia.  
Uncertainty about the distribution process, which is still ongoing, obstructs both 
the domestic and international progress of Kazakh cinema, impacting on its 
profile. These are the issues that the Cinema Law with its sub-legal documents 
are expected to address in the near future.  
 
To what extent does the EurIFF contribute to nation building and projection 
of a national identity? 
 
The micro case of this case study, the annual Eurasian International Film Festival, 
has been found to have several important differences from traditional European 
models. 
This study confirmed that the contribution of the EurIFF on the nation building 
of Kazakhstan was limited. The thesis findings suggest that the EurIFF thus far 
has only had a minor branding effect on the country’s image.  
The EurIFF, as the main film event and state-sanctioned forum in Kazakhstan 
accredited by FIAPF, suffered from a misunderstanding of the government’s 
input with respect to decision making on the part of the government itself. The 
constantly changing leadership of the event resulting from the tender system 
does not allow the EurIFF to gain experience and to grow. Late funding 
decisions, as well as the late announcement of the festival dates, significantly 
affected the EurIFF’s image, which, in turn, influences the city’s and country’s 




When it comes to the festival’s venue, the EurIFF did not have a permanent 
office in either Almaty or Nur-Sultan. The relocation of the EurIFF from Almaty 
to Astana in 2017 continues to send mixed messages to those who have already 
got used to Eurasia as a young festival. Moreover, renaming the capital city as 
Nur-Sultan in 2019 hit the festival’s image. Many interviewees noted that, given 
the fact that, most of the filmmakers and film professionals are in Almaty, the 
Nur-Sultan oriented festival inevitably demands additional costs. These findings 
raise questions about whether the festival justifies its expenses. Moreover, since 
the EurIFF does not have commercial interests and does not aim to earn profits 
like A-list festivals such as Cannes, Venice, Berlinale, and Locarno, these 
findings suggest that the EurIFF is just an image-making event and is not 
expected to earn money.  
 
The influence of programming and curation on the flow of the festival is 
enormous and cannot be underestimated. In contrast to the limitations of 
distribution, the EurIFF has more cultural empowerment. As is evident in 
Chapter 6, EurIFF 15 was dominated by the influence of a foreign curator, who 
brought international taste to EurIFF. The festival was not limited by censorship 
and offered complete freedom to curators and selectors to choose the best films 
for Eurasia. This was seen as an advantage. 
 
In Chapter 6 it was shown that occasionally the approach of the International 
Juries in the past was unfair and lacked probity, particularly with respect to 
them distributing the awards either to themselves or foreign guests – going from 
one extreme to another. According to my findings, jurors of the EurIFF 15 tried 
to get to grips with more sophisticated ideas when considering pitches, 
evaluating concepts such as integrity, longevity, and high-level thinking, and 
asking the question ‘What makes the film relevant to new generations?’. One 
influential informant also expressed the view that any decision could be 
subjective or emotional, and that it cannot be a totally objective decision when 
it comes to cinema. An example of a subjective decision is the awarding of the 
Grand Prix to the Kazakh film The Secret of a Leader by Farkhat Sharipov rather 
than the four-time Oscar winner Parasite. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that 





As my findings have shown, the EurIFF could not fully connect with its audience. 
The analysis of the festival’s operations suggests that it could be the best way 
for people to know more about Kazakhstan, but arguably more successfully if it 
had more – especially international – visitors rather than just the 12,000 locals 
who attended. The analysis showed that the audience engagement in 
theatrically screened films was adequate despite the low capacity of 140 to 160 
seats in the two halls. However, viewing in previous years was not sufficient, 
although there were more than enough cinema theatres. Interviewees argued 
that this was because of the audience’s inadequate knowledge of cinema 
culture.  
 
The neglect in recording data on visitor numbers suggests that the festival does 
not have a marketing approach. Added to this, any statistical data that does 
exist is not made readily available. Again, these findings show that the festival 
limits its potential by mainly catering for the needs of the local audience, rather 
than drawing on earlier data and experience to impact on future decisions.  
 
The industrial potential of the EurIFF is revealed in the analysis of Chapter 7. 
The EurIFF had a business element seen its pitching of international projects. 
Findings revealed that although the jurors valued the professional approach of 
the participants, and emphasised that the pitching was held openly, their 
decisions were just nominal ones and did not carry any real weight. For instance, 
it was clear from the research that the aim was just to present the projects to 
the heads of international studios in case there was the opportunity for 
cooperation in the future.  
What is the role of Kazakh cinema in nation building?   
The study offered insights into the preconditions for film policy intervention. 
In general, this research does not paint a very optimistic picture of positive 
nation-building outcomes for Kazakhstan. The findings align with Smith’s (1998) 
concept of ethno-symbolism, suggesting that Kazakhstan is still in the process of 
reconstructing itself through films. Symbolism is circulated through films (mainly 
historical), and in this way, the movies bring both the Sovietised and the post-
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Soviet Kazakh nation together as a community. This statement underpins the 
argument of Isaacs and Polese (2016, p.251) that nation building as a process 
“has no formal end and is based on over changing markers, perceptions and 
measures that are put forward by a potentially unlimited number of actors”. 
This ongoing process keeps happening in Kazakhstan. The growing 
professionalisation of the industry is hampered by old-fashioned structures, 
people, and ideologies which act as obstacles to change. Consequently, 
Kazakhstan is working at two different rates of development – the old and new 
systems – in the industry, with different interests at work. All of these obstacles 
limit the nation-building principles of Kazakh cinema.  
As part of the construction of the nation, a separate related issue here is how 
can Kazakhstan be marketed. As the results show, the lines between the state 
and the film industry in Kazakhstan are quite clearly drawn: the government is 
concerned with addressing its internal needs to construct a national public, 
while the industry is seeking an international market for its films. As is evident 
in Chapter 7, it is only possible to market the nation through cinema when the 
Law is working well with clear strategies; transparent and fair film funding, and 
internal marketing aimed at creating an identity for the Kazakh nation. Yet it is 
also clear that this is rarely adequately achieved. 
 
However, this thesis has recognised some positives with respect to recent 
developments in Kazakhstan. The country is becoming highly appealing to 
international producers due to its newly-introduced tax breaks, so tying the knot 
with co-productions would certainly be one of the options for expanding the 
audience, but this would occur without being able to establish a strong cultural 
and national identity. According to the analysis, given that Kazakhstan launched 
this initiative ahead of Russia and the rest of the Central Asian region, by 
allowing the filming of small- and large-scale productions in its territory, 
Kazakhstan can reach its potential recognition. But it was not clear how 
Kazakhstani ideas can get translated into specific, concrete proposals when the 
country has infrastructural challenges. It is fair to say that the location function 
of Kazakhstan cannot be capitalised upon within the overall development of the 
film policy, which is still not very consistent. In addition, it does appear that this 
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scheme may put Kazakhstan in an unfavourable position by allowing its tax 
preferences and benefits to be manipulated by countries abroad. 
It is much harder to speculate about the necessity of co-production for 
Kazakhstan. Findings showed that the local filmmakers fully support this option. 
Some interviewees suggested that the country should collaborate with 
neighbouring countries. One camp supported cooperation with culturally close 
countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey) and ‘stateless’ nations (Tatarstan, 
Yakutia), whereas the other camp believed that cooperation with geographically 
close Russia and China would be more beneficial. However, the analysis showed 
that working with Russia would, in all likelihood, disadvantage or even destroy 
the Kazakh language and identity, given the continuing weight of Russian culture 
and language in the marketplace. Also, co-production with China is problematic 
due to the repressive Chinese policy on Kazakhs and Uighurs, aimed at 
destroying Muslim communities. , Kazakh films may not be successful in the 
highly regulated and competitive Chinese Market. This raises questions about 
how Kazakhstan is going to consolidate its relationship within cinema when 
cultural diversity and culture itself are being suppressed. As findings show, in 
both cases, Kazakh identity would be eroded, and one particular cultural feature 
of the nation would not be highlighted.  
On the whole, although this analysis did find a slight positive tendency between 
views on co-production perspectives and tax rebates, Kazakh cinema is facing 
the new challenge of responding to Hollywood by cooperating with it.  
 
8.2 Implications for film policy 
2019 clearly shows Kazakhstani cinema at a new phase in its development. The 
reform process is still underway. This is painful for the older category of 
filmmakers, who are used to an outdated development model. Despite the 
reforms, there are major obstacles rooted in Kazakh society and the functioning 
of cultural power. Challenges such as bureaucracy, corruption, authoritarian 
tendencies, and nepotism in narrow circles of Kazakhstani cinematography are 




As this thesis shows, when we look at the whole picture of Kazakh cinema and 
nation building, it is clear that there could be both predictable and surprising 
outcomes for filmmakers and film policy. The enactment of the Cinema Law has 
revealed the gap between the articles of the Law and the government’s activity 
on the ground, particularly if we look at the Ministry of Culture and Sport. The 
long-awaited creation of the SCSNS has brought various advantages such as 
making selections for funding open to the public, centralising film policy as an 
institute, and attempting to promote the Kazakh cinema locally and 
internationally. However, it becomes clear that Kazakhstan has the potential to 
build a strong national identity if it solves its internal distribution of films in the 
first instance. 
Although Kazakhstan does not lead the world on cinema production as India does 
with its Bollywood, increased distribution of Kazakh cinema has the potential to 
reconstruct the nation through films. In this regard, the EurIFF can play a vital 
role in diversifying the Kazakh film landscape. If it gains stability both financially 
and politically, the EurIFF might be expected to find more extensive expansion 
and broader international connections. The gradual growth of the popularity of 
the festival gives hope that Kazakh cinema will experience increased success in 
the forthcoming decades.  
 
An interesting subject throughout in this respect has been the question of 
enticing foreign investment into Kazakhstan with tax incentives. The discussions 
surrounding the tax rebate scheme demonstrate how Kazakhstan may remain in 
a vulnerable position if it allows international producers to manipulate these 
financial incentives. However, on the other hand, it may also be an excellent 
means of putting Kazakh cinema on the map. Kazakhstan’s policy is now working 
to attract international producers to shoot in the country’s spectacular 
locations. Here, one can see the nation-branding efforts of the country as argued 
by Volcic and Andrejevic (2011, p.599): the “creation of a national brand image 
goes hand-in-hand with the development of catchy slogans to portray countries 
from Kosovo to Uganda as desirable tourist destinations”. Following the other 
slogan-making countries such as “Kosovo: The Youngest Europeans”, “Incredible 
India”,and “Malaysia, Truly Yours!”, Kazakhstan has advertised itself in film 
policy as well. In this regard, a catchy slogan from Borat ‘Very nice!’ could 
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become a slogan for all film shooting locations and thus promote film-induced 
tourism in particular.  
 
8.3 Limitations and further research 
The main limitations of this thesis are related to the sample of interviews and 
their representativeness. More than half of the interviewees were indigenous 
Kazakhstani citizens expressing their points of view from their roles in the 
internal situation. These conversations represent the view within Kazakhstan and 
do not reflect on how the policy portrays the country abroad. This leads to some 
bias. However, to combat this bias, interviews with foreign participants at the 
EurIFF were also undertaken. 
 
A second limitation is related to the extent to which the interviewees were 
honest and sincere with the researcher. Some of them revealed valuable 
information that has never been published anywhere before, whereas several 
informants were afraid of losing their jobs and did not disclose full data.  
 
The interviews themselves are embodied in the four empirical chapters of this 
study. Using mainly face-to-face meetings had a significant advantage over 
online interviewing. However, using surveys or focus groups, involving 
international students around Scotland, and a mixed-method approach would 
have expanded the results and findings of the thesis. 
 
The last limitation referred to is the translation process. As the lion’s share of 
the interviews was conducted in Kazakh or Russian and both were transcribed 
into English, there may be some bias in the way I have translated certain words 
into English from the two languages. Finally, the subjective experience of the 
researcher in picking up a specific quotation could affect the research process, 
as my personal opinions and experience might have steered the approach of this 
thesis. However, remaining critically aware of these limitations throughout the 




Although the scope of this thesis has covered the most critical aspects of Kazakh 
cinema concerning nation building, there are still themes that need to be 
researched in future. With regard to the industry side to the research, there 
needs to be future research into the online digital streaming platforms of film 
distribution, given the growing area that this is (now much increased during the 
current COVID-19 quarantine and self-isolation period of 2020/21). 
 
Also, the SCSNC provides ample scope for institutional analysis as a specific 
entity. It would be beneficial to explore it separately as a single operator of film 
policy in Kazakhstan and how it impacts on industry and audience as well as 
nation-building aspirations.  
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis shed light on and made a contribution to knowledge of Kazakh cinema 
as an independent study unit by providing 30 participant informants’ direct 
experience of the industry from the ‘inside’, contextualised by extensive 
additional data-gathering and relevant theoretical reflection. The study, as 
original research, revealed the unusual picture of the Kazakh style of dealing 
with film policy (production and festivals), and how policy is making an 
important step towards the development of a national film production industry. 
Kazakh cinema, like the country itself, is in transition. The state is facing 
political transition of power, whereas Kazakh cinema and film policy is trying to 
move from the Soviet system to one of the modern era. Political nation building 
is based on the tribal clan identity and the authoritarian leader Nursultan 
Nazarbayev and his ruling elite. His system is trying to rewrite the history of the 
Kazakh nation through films as he wants it to be perceived. Also, cinematic 
nation building is limited by the Soviet legacy, evident in the burning issue of 
bilingualism, the unwillingness of the state to solve the distribution system, and 
the struggle for power in film policy. Kazakhstan is economically and politically 
tightly bound to Russia. This shapes national cinema, where distribution flow is 
concentrated in Russia. Therefore, cinematic nation building is closely linked to 
political nation building.  
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If the SCSNC’s commitment to its work were free from corruption and intrigues, 
in the near future, Kazakhstan could rediscover and rebuild its true, particular 
national identity. An identity which could be revived through films by ensuring 
transparent decision-making in film funding competitions, by diversification of 
film genres, and, finally, by solving the domestic distribution issues of Kazakh 
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2. Alma Aidar Doctor and senior 
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History and Theory 
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30 minutes 
7. Asanali Ashimov Actor, director, 
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Chairman of the first 
Expert Council of 
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03.07.2019, 
Nur-Sultan 
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14. Gulnara Abikeyeva President of the 
Association of Film 
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16. Han Jeong-gil Korean director 02.07.2019, 
Nur-Sultan 
15 minutes 
17. Ilyas Akhmet Producer, director 
of Eurasia 
Spotlight’s Business 






18. Kanat Torebay Producer and 
Executive Director 






Iranian director 04.06.2019, 
Nur-Sultan 
6 minutes 
20. Nurlan Sanzhar Actor and 
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1 hour and 5 
minutes 
27. Slambek Tauekel Soviet and Kazakh 
film director, 
screenwriter, 
producer and  
Professor of the 
Department of Film 
and TV of the 
Kazakh National 




1 hour and 7 
minutes 
28. Tamas Toth Hungarian director 
and Chairman of the 
international jury of 






















Appendix B. The composition of the first EC at the SCSNC (Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019).  
1. Adai Abeldinov Director-animator 
2. Asanali Ashimov People's Artist of the Kazakh SSR and the 
USSR, Laureate of state awards of the 
Kazakh SSR and the USSR and Chairman of 
the EC. 
3. Vadim Golenko 
 
General Director of the Meloman Limited 
Liability Partnership, and distributor 
4. Doskhan Zholzhaksynov Actor, director, producer, screenwriter, 
People’s Artist of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Honoured Artist of Kyrgyzstan 
and Laureate of the State Prize of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 
5. Serik Zhubandykov First Vice-President of the JSC Kazakhfilm 
6. Akhat Ibrayev Producer, film director and member of the 
Union of Filmmakers of Kazakhstan 
7. Aleksei Kamenskii Director and screenwriter. 
8. Bakyt Kaiyrbekov Honoured Worker of Kazakhstan, President 
of JSC Kazakhfilm, film director and 
screenwriter 
9. Zhannat Kuanysheva Honoured Artist of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and Head of the JSC 
Kazakhfilm’s Acting department 
10. Askhat Maemirov Theatre director, Honoured Worker of 
Kazakhstan, Rector of the Kazakh National 
Academy of Arts named after T. Zhurgenov, 
Vice-President of the Association of 
Theatres of Kazakhstan, and PhD holder 
11. Satybaldy Narymbetov Film director, Honoured Worker of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and Laureate of the 
State Prize of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
12. Meruert Otekesheva Actress and Honoured Artist of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan 
13. Bekbolat Shekerov Screenwriter and art critic 
14. Bauyrzhan Shukenov General Director of the "Arman" cinema 











Appendix C. The composition of the second EC at SCSNC 
(www.kazakhcinema.kz).  
 
1. Damir Ainikeyev Director of “Studio CUBIC” LLP, producer 
and director 
2. Leila Aranysheva Filmmaker and screenwriter 
3. Oleg Boretskiy Film critic 
4. Saltanat Dungenbayeva Screenwriter and animator 
5. Anar Kashaganova Film producer 
6. Serikbol Utepbergenov 
 
Screenwriter, film director and actor 
7. Farkhat Sharipov Film director, producer and screenwriter 
8. Adai Abeldinov Director-animator 
9. Vadim Golenko 
 
General Director of the Meloman Limited 
Liability Partnership and distributor 
10. Bekbolat Shekerov Screenwriter and art critic 
11. Bauyrzhan Shukenov General Director of the "Arman" cinema 
network and distributor 
12. Meruert Otekesheva Actress and Honoured Artist of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
13. Zhannat Kuanysheva Actress and Honoured Artist of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 
14. Yermek Tursunov (left the EC) Filmmaker, screenwriter, chairman of 
the Union of Filmmakers and President 
of the 15 EurIFF 
15. Satybaldy Narymbetov (left 
the EC) 
Film director, Honoured Worker of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and Laureate of 








Appendix D. Questions for the interviewees. 
 
Questions for organisers of the EurIFF: 
What is the agenda of the festival? In your opinion, how does the EurIFF cope 
with its tasks and aims?  
What is the targeted audience of the EurIFF? 
Who funds the festival? How much money is allocated per year? Do you think it is 
enough?  
Do you think the event justifies the invested money? How much profit does it 
make? 
What is the relationship of the EurIFF to the Kazakh government? To what extent 
does the government have control over the agenda of EurFF? 
Do you consider that Kazakh films can in some way promote Kazakhstan abroad? 
If so, how? 
This festival seems to have been organised rather late. Why do you think that 
happened? Has it made it more challenging to achieve what is needed? 
How has moving the venue from Almaty to Nur-Sultan changed the character of 
the festival? 
 
Questions for the international jury:  
What were the main criteria for selecting films? How broad a remit did you have 
in this respect? 
What is the goal of the festival’s film selection? 
What are the main criteria to select the winners of the festival? 
Does the EurIFF system differ from that of other festivals you attended? In which 
way? 
 
Questions for participants of EurIFF: 
Are you a permanent participant of this festival? 
Did you know about the creation of the festival? Do you consider it as an 
excellent way to brand Kazakhstan internationally? 
How does the EurFF differ from other Kazakhstani festivals? 
Have you come to any conclusions about the EurFF? Has it provided what you 





Questions for the Meloman distribution company representative: 
Would you please tell more about the distribution policy of your company? 
What aims do you pursue in working with the cinema theatres in Kazakhstan? 
How much of the revenue do you take from them and why? 
What relationship does Meloman have with other distribution companies? 
What genres of the film do you tend to buy? 
How does the company comply with the articles of Cinema Law with respect to 
Language? What is your mechanism for translating and subtitling your Kazakh 
language films? 
 
General questions to the interviewees: 
How would you define the Kazakh cinema? What is Kazakh cinema for you? 
To your opinion, what are the main challenges that film production has to face 
with? 
What are advantages/disadvantages of working in public/private sector? 
What film genres are popular in Kazakhstan and why? 
Will new Cinema Law contribute to position Kazakhstan in the world map? 
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Appendix F. Participant Information Letter 
Participant Information Letter 
 
My name is Assel Kamza and I am researching “Kazakh cinema and the 
nation: a critical analysis” for my doctoral thesis at the University of Glasgow in 
Scotland, UK. My research is funded by the JSC Centre for International 
programs, Kazakhstan. My research data will be based on interviews with 
relevant stakeholders in Kazakh screen production as well as information 
gathered by my attendance at film festivals.  
 
I would greatly appreciate it if you could make a contribution to this 
research. I would be grateful if you would consent to giving me an interview 
conducted face to face or by any other method suitable to you, such as Skype or 
any other instant messenger. You will be asked to give signed consent for the 
interview and for its later use in the thesis and later publications. You have my 
assurance that your contribution will be anonymous unless you choose otherwise. 
 
Қатысушыға ақпараттық хат 
  
Менің аты-жөнім – Әсел Қамза, Ұлыбританиядағы Глазго 
университетінің докторантымын. Менің диссертациялық жұмысымның 
тақырыбы – «Қазақ киносы және ұлт: сыни сараптама». Ғылыми зерттеуімді 
халықаралық «Болашақ» стипендиялық бағдарламасы қаржыландырады. 
Зерттеу нысаны – Қазақстан кино өндірісіне қатысты шығармашылық-
технологиялық үдерістер, мүдделі тараптардың ұйымдастырушылық жұмысы 
және Еуразия кинофестивалінің ұлт құрылысына және заманауи 
кинематография ілгерілеуіне әсері. 
 
Сіздің бұл зерттеу жұмысына тигізер септігіңіз бетпе-бет сұхбат 
немесе өзіңізге қолайлы кез келген әлеуметтік желі, Скайп арқылы сұхбат 
беру жолымен жүзеге асады. Сізден сұхбат беруге және ондағы ақпараттарды 
диссертациямда, ғылыми мақалаларда пайдалануға жазбаша келісім беру 





Меня зовут Асель Камза, я – докторант Университета Глазго в 
Великобритании. Тема моей научной работы –  «Казахское кино и нация: 
критический анализ». Исследование финансируется международной 
стипендиальной программой «Болашақ». Объектом исследования явлются 
творческо-технологические процессы, касающиеся кинопроизводства в 
Казахстане, организационные работы заинтересованных сторон и оценка 
влияния  Евразийского кинофестиваля на развитие нациостроительства и 
современного кинематографа.   
 
Ваш вклад в это исследование будет отмечен в форме интервью при 
личной встрече, или при помощи других приемлемых для вас способов, таких, 
как Skype или любых других мессенджеров. Вас попросят дать письменное 
согласие на интервью и последующее использование данных в диссертации и 
230 
 
в дальнейших публикациях. Ваше интервью будет анонимным, если вы не 
пожелаете иные варианты общения. 
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